Scores by kind of claim
Each kind of claim is scored on its own, out of 100: the share that held up, with the range it likely falls in. Fewer resolved claims give a wider range.
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Factual claims
Statements about the present or the past, checked against the record: did they hold up?
72 63 80 -
Predictions
Statements about events outside the person's control, checked once they fell due: did they come true?
56 46 67 -
Promises
Commitments to the person's or organisation's own future action, with something to deliver: was it delivered?
Insufficient record: 0 promises resolved, 5 needed for a score.
All types combined: 65 (likely 59 to 72, high confidence), from 73 claims: 42 factual claims, 31 predictions. It mixes kinds of claim in different proportions for different people, so compare people kind by kind.
Jeremy Grantham's claims
313 claims · page 4 of 4
“All three major asset classes – real estate, stocks, and bonds – measure expensive compared with their histories and compared with replacement cost where it can be calculated.”
Jeremy Grantham, GMO letter author April 2007 The First Truly Global Bubble (It's Everywhere, In Everything) (GMO)
As of April 2007, real estate, stocks and bonds all measure expensive against their own histories and against replacement cost where calculable.
Unresolvable The public record could not settle it.
Said for an organisation they lead or work for; it counts on both records.
What would count as true or false
Judge as of April 2007, mainly for US markets (global data where relevant). Count an asset class as 'expensive' if standard valuation measures in early 2007 were clearly above their long-run historical averages, and above replacement cost where that can be calculated. Stocks: Shiller CAPE or Tobin's q above the long-run mean. Real estate: price-to-rent or price-to-income ratios, or real house prices, above the long-run norm, or prices above construction or replacement cost. Bonds: yields and/or credit spreads below historical norms, meaning high prices. True: all three asset classes were clearly expensive on these measures. Mostly true: two were clearly expensive and the third was expensive only modestly or on some measures. Mixed: two of the three were expensive and the third was near or below its historical norm. Mostly false: only one was expensive. False: none was.
Evidence
- Asset-Pricing Puzzles, Credit Risk, and Credit Derivatives Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (speech by Vice Chairman Donald L. Kohn) · 22 March 2007
“Credit-risk spreads vary substantially over the cycle, and right now they are on the low side of historical experience.”
- Asset-Pricing Puzzles, Credit Risk, and Credit Derivatives Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (speech by Vice Chairman Donald L. Kohn) · 22 March 2007
“We estimate from the Treasury market that the term premium has declined substantially in recent years to unusually low levels, which has contributed to the inversion of the yield curve.”
- Asset-Pricing Puzzles, Credit Risk, and Credit Derivatives Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (speech by Vice Chairman Donald L. Kohn) · 22 March 2007
“Credit-risk spreads vary substantially over the cycle, and right now they are on the low side of historical experience.”
- Asset-Pricing Puzzles, Credit Risk, and Credit Derivatives Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (speech by Vice Chairman Donald L. Kohn) · 22 March 2007
“We estimate from the Treasury market that the term premium has declined substantially in recent years to unusually low levels, which has contributed to the inversion of the yield curve.”
- Run-up in the House Price-Rent Ratio: How Much Can Be Explained by Fundamentals? U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (Working Paper 441, co-authored with Georgetown University and FRB Minneapolis authors) · June 2011
“These models predict a doubling of the house price-rent ratio in response to the 50 percent reduction in interest rates observed during the recent housing boom.”
- Run-up in the House Price-Rent Ratio: How Much Can Be Explained by Fundamentals? U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (Working Paper 441, co-authored with Georgetown University and FRB Minneapolis authors) · June 2011
“The total household debt to disposable income ratio has increased from 80 percent in 1985 to 93 percent in 1995 and to a whopping 141 percent in 2007.”
- Run-up in the House Price-Rent Ratio: How Much Can Be Explained by Fundamentals? U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (Working Paper 441, co-authored with Georgetown University and FRB Minneapolis authors) · June 2011
“easing of down payment requirements observed in the data can explain about one-half of the increase in U.S. house prices between 1995 and 2005.”
Reasoning
The Federal Reserve speech of March 2007 says credit-risk spreads were "on the low side of historical experience" and the Treasury term premium had fallen to "unusually low levels" (E1, E2). On the criteria, that makes bonds expensive. The BLS working paper describes a run-up in the US house price-rent ratio during the housing boom (E5, E7), which points to real estate being expensive. However, no evidence covers stock valuations such as Shiller CAPE or Tobin's q, or replacement cost. Without the third asset class, the evidence cannot tell apart the true, mostly true and mixed outcomes the criteria define.
Cite this claim
Jeremy Grantham, “As of April 2007, real estate, stocks and bonds all measure expensive against their own histories and against replacement cost where calculable.” (said April 2007). Verdict: unresolvable. Reliability API, claim c_8ef23095066b, method 0.1.0+28da144b. https://epistacklabs.com/claims/c_8ef23095066b
Claims without a verdict
- Unresolvable 148
- Not yet due 17
- Own records only 29
- Not researched 194
- Not checkable 543
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