ClaimsPeople

Jeremy Grantham

Jeremy Grantham is an investor who co-founded the asset managers GMO and Batterymarch, is listed by GMO as its long-term investment strategist, and co-authored 'The Making of a Permabear'.

1,004 claims collected, 267 researched, 73 resolved. Report of 5 November 2026, method 0.1.0+28da144b.

Scores by kind of claim

Each kind of claim is scored on its own, out of 100: the share that held up, with the range it likely falls in. Fewer resolved claims give a wider range.

  • Factual claims

    Statements about the present or the past, checked against the record: did they hold up?

    72 63 80

    Medium confidence, 42 factual claims resolved. From 15 documents, 2007 to 2025; 15 documents sampled from 32 candidates found.

    Not scored: 53 unresolvable, 28 checkable only against their own records.

  • Predictions

    Statements about events outside the person's control, checked once they fell due: did they come true?

    56 46 67

    Medium confidence, 31 predictions resolved. From 10 documents, 2007 to 2023; 15 documents sampled from 32 candidates found.

    Not scored: 93 unresolvable, 1 checkable only against their own records. 17 more fall due later.

    Does not yet allow for how likely each prediction was when made.

  • Promises

    Commitments to the person's or organisation's own future action, with something to deliver: was it delivered?

    Insufficient record: 0 promises resolved, 5 needed for a score.

    Not scored: 2 unresolvable.

All types combined: 65 (likely 59 to 72, high confidence), from 73 claims: 42 factual claims, 31 predictions. It mixes kinds of claim in different proportions for different people, so compare people kind by kind.

Jeremy Grantham's claims

313 claims, sorted by newest said. Choose a claim to read it in full.
VerdictKindSaidClaimTopic
Unresolvable Factual Apr 2007 As of April 2007, real estate, stocks and bonds all measure expensive against their own histories and against replacement cost where calculable. Factual · Apr 2007 Economics and markets
Unresolvable Factual Apr 2007 Private equity grew even faster than hedge funds over the three years before April 2007. Factual · Apr 2007 Economics and markets
Not researched Factual Apr 2007 The larger, later-arriving managers have barely averaged a positive return. Factual · Apr 2007 Economics and markets
Own records only Factual Apr 2007 Grantham says GMO has not found any case where excellent fundamentals and generous cheap liquidity coexisted without producing a bubble. Factual · Apr 2007 Their own work or organisation
Not researched Factual Apr 2007 Most bubbles, such as internet stocks and Japanese land, go through an exponential phase before breaking, usually short in time but dramatic in extent. Factual · Apr 2007 Economics and markets
Mostly true Factual Apr 2007 In May 2006 emerging markets declined by 25% in three weeks, during what was fundamentally their best year in history. Factual · Apr 2007 Economics and markets
Own records only Factual Apr 2007 As of April 2007, Grantham personally holds a short position in copper. Factual · Apr 2007 Their own work or organisation
Unresolvable Factual Apr 2007 Infrastructure is the most recent investment area to attract rapid increases in capital, partly because other opportunities became overpriced. Factual · Apr 2007 Economics and markets
Not researched Factual Apr 2007 Every bubble in history has eventually burst. Factual · Apr 2007 Economics and markets
Not researched Factual Apr 2007 Increased supply of investment funds has quickly pushed formerly high risk-adjusted returns on such deals down to thin levels. Factual · Apr 2007 Economics and markets
Not researched Factual Apr 2007 Bubble breaks usually have no observable catalyst; no agreed catalyst exists for 1929, 1987, 2000 or the South Sea bubble. Factual · Apr 2007 Economics and markets
Not researched Factual Apr 2007 The cap-weighted average return of private equity is at best equal to the S&P 500, depending on the analysis. Factual · Apr 2007 Economics and markets
Not researched Factual Apr 2007 Several academics think leveraged buyouts are a modest destroyer of real value. Factual · Apr 2007 Economics and markets
Back to the list

Factual Economics and markets

“All three major asset classes – real estate, stocks, and bonds – measure expensive compared with their histories and compared with replacement cost where it can be calculated.”

Jeremy Grantham, GMO letter author April 2007 The First Truly Global Bubble (It's Everywhere, In Everything) (GMO)

As of April 2007, real estate, stocks and bonds all measure expensive against their own histories and against replacement cost where calculable.

Unresolvable The public record could not settle it.

Said for an organisation they lead or work for; it counts on both records.

What would count as true or false

Judge as of April 2007, mainly for US markets (global data where relevant). Count an asset class as 'expensive' if standard valuation measures in early 2007 were clearly above their long-run historical averages, and above replacement cost where that can be calculated. Stocks: Shiller CAPE or Tobin's q above the long-run mean. Real estate: price-to-rent or price-to-income ratios, or real house prices, above the long-run norm, or prices above construction or replacement cost. Bonds: yields and/or credit spreads below historical norms, meaning high prices. True: all three asset classes were clearly expensive on these measures. Mostly true: two were clearly expensive and the third was expensive only modestly or on some measures. Mixed: two of the three were expensive and the third was near or below its historical norm. Mostly false: only one was expensive. False: none was.

Evidence

  1. Asset-Pricing Puzzles, Credit Risk, and Credit Derivatives Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (speech by Vice Chairman Donald L. Kohn) · 22 March 2007
    “Credit-risk spreads vary substantially over the cycle, and right now they are on the low side of historical experience.”
  2. Asset-Pricing Puzzles, Credit Risk, and Credit Derivatives Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (speech by Vice Chairman Donald L. Kohn) · 22 March 2007
    “We estimate from the Treasury market that the term premium has declined substantially in recent years to unusually low levels, which has contributed to the inversion of the yield curve.”
  3. Asset-Pricing Puzzles, Credit Risk, and Credit Derivatives Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (speech by Vice Chairman Donald L. Kohn) · 22 March 2007
    “Credit-risk spreads vary substantially over the cycle, and right now they are on the low side of historical experience.”
  4. Asset-Pricing Puzzles, Credit Risk, and Credit Derivatives Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (speech by Vice Chairman Donald L. Kohn) · 22 March 2007
    “We estimate from the Treasury market that the term premium has declined substantially in recent years to unusually low levels, which has contributed to the inversion of the yield curve.”
  5. Run-up in the House Price-Rent Ratio: How Much Can Be Explained by Fundamentals? U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (Working Paper 441, co-authored with Georgetown University and FRB Minneapolis authors) · June 2011
    “These models predict a doubling of the house price-rent ratio in response to the 50 percent reduction in interest rates observed during the recent housing boom.”
  6. Run-up in the House Price-Rent Ratio: How Much Can Be Explained by Fundamentals? U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (Working Paper 441, co-authored with Georgetown University and FRB Minneapolis authors) · June 2011
    “The total household debt to disposable income ratio has increased from 80 percent in 1985 to 93 percent in 1995 and to a whopping 141 percent in 2007.”
  7. Run-up in the House Price-Rent Ratio: How Much Can Be Explained by Fundamentals? U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (Working Paper 441, co-authored with Georgetown University and FRB Minneapolis authors) · June 2011
    “easing of down payment requirements observed in the data can explain about one-half of the increase in U.S. house prices between 1995 and 2005.”

Reasoning

The Federal Reserve speech of March 2007 says credit-risk spreads were "on the low side of historical experience" and the Treasury term premium had fallen to "unusually low levels" (E1, E2). On the criteria, that makes bonds expensive. The BLS working paper describes a run-up in the US house price-rent ratio during the housing boom (E5, E7), which points to real estate being expensive. However, no evidence covers stock valuations such as Shiller CAPE or Tobin's q, or replacement cost. Without the third asset class, the evidence cannot tell apart the true, mostly true and mixed outcomes the criteria define.

Cite this claim

Jeremy Grantham, “As of April 2007, real estate, stocks and bonds all measure expensive against their own histories and against replacement cost where calculable.” (said April 2007). Verdict: unresolvable. Reliability API, claim c_8ef23095066b, method 0.1.0+28da144b. https://epistacklabs.com/claims/c_8ef23095066b

Claims without a verdict

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