ClaimsPeople

Jeremy Grantham

Jeremy Grantham is an investor who co-founded the asset managers GMO and Batterymarch, is listed by GMO as its long-term investment strategist, and co-authored 'The Making of a Permabear'.

1,004 claims collected, 267 researched, 73 resolved. Report of 5 November 2026, method 0.1.0+28da144b.

Scores by kind of claim

Each kind of claim is scored on its own, out of 100: the share that held up, with the range it likely falls in. Fewer resolved claims give a wider range.

  • Factual claims

    Statements about the present or the past, checked against the record: did they hold up?

    72 63 80

    Medium confidence, 42 factual claims resolved. From 15 documents, 2007 to 2025; 15 documents sampled from 32 candidates found.

    Not scored: 53 unresolvable, 28 checkable only against their own records.

  • Predictions

    Statements about events outside the person's control, checked once they fell due: did they come true?

    56 46 67

    Medium confidence, 31 predictions resolved. From 10 documents, 2007 to 2023; 15 documents sampled from 32 candidates found.

    Not scored: 93 unresolvable, 1 checkable only against their own records. 17 more fall due later.

    Does not yet allow for how likely each prediction was when made.

  • Promises

    Commitments to the person's or organisation's own future action, with something to deliver: was it delivered?

    Insufficient record: 0 promises resolved, 5 needed for a score.

    Not scored: 2 unresolvable.

All types combined: 65 (likely 59 to 72, high confidence), from 73 claims: 42 factual claims, 31 predictions. It mixes kinds of claim in different proportions for different people, so compare people kind by kind.

Jeremy Grantham's claims

148 claims · page 2 of 2

148 claims, sorted by newest said. Choose a claim to read it in full.
VerdictKindSaidClaimTopic
Unresolvable Prediction Jul 2010 When relative prices of quality stocks versus the rest of the market next cross fair value, the excess return for quality could be over 40 percentage points. Prediction · Jul 2010 Economics and markets
Unresolvable Prediction Jul 2010 On average, European countries will be better than the U.S. at rationing health costs. Prediction · Jul 2010 Economics and markets
Unresolvable Prediction Jul 2010 Japan, with its social cohesion, should dig its way through the aging-related choices and agree to pay the inevitable high prices more easily than others. Prediction · Jul 2010 Economics and markets
Unresolvable Prediction Jul 2010 Consumers' changed attitudes toward debt and saving will surely last for years. Prediction · Jul 2010 Economics and markets
Unresolvable Prediction Jul 2010 Grantham said his faith in an eventual decent P/E premium for emerging equities over developed equities, exceeding 15% and perhaps by a lot, remained intact. Prediction · Jul 2010 Economics and markets
Unresolvable Prediction Jul 2010 The biggest cost of global warming is likely to be the accumulated loss of biodiversity. Prediction · Jul 2010 Other global risks
Unresolvable Factual Jul 2010 A 25% market decline in any six-month period has historically had about a 3% probability. Factual · Jul 2010 Economics and markets
Unresolvable Factual Jul 2010 Over the last 20 years the market has been mostly overpriced, occasionally spiking down to fair value. Factual · Jul 2010 Economics and markets
Unresolvable Prediction Jul 2010 GMO's seven-year forecast suggests a global equity portfolio can be built returning just over 6% a year plus inflation. Prediction · Jul 2010 Economics and markets
Unresolvable Prediction Jul 2010 Global warming will be the most important investment issue for the foreseeable future. Prediction · Jul 2010 Economics and markets
Unresolvable Prediction Jul 2010 Grantham said it was fairly clear that a weak economy and declining or flat prices were the prospect for the immediate future. Prediction · Jul 2010 Economics and markets
Unresolvable Prediction Jul 2010 With progress in human genome research, breathtakingly expensive ways to reduce very rare diseases, hard to ration or resist, will soon appear. Prediction · Jul 2010 Technology
Unresolvable Factual Jul 2010 As of mid-2010, stock prices in the developed world, despite a strong recovery, are well below their highs of 10 years earlier and, notably in the U.S., are still overpriced. Factual · Jul 2010 Economics and markets
Unresolvable Prediction Jul 2010 He says that a 25% probability for a route he described last quarter for the market and economy would now seem generous. Prediction · Jul 2010 Economics and markets
Unresolvable Prediction Jul 2010 Some further decline in house prices is probably more than a 50/50 bet in the U.S., and nearly certain in the U.K. and Australia. Prediction · Jul 2010 Economics and markets
Unresolvable Factual Oct 2009 Most if not all banks that engage in proprietary trading now gather information from their institutional clients and exploit it. Factual · Oct 2009 Economics and markets
Unresolvable Prediction Oct 2009 GMO's seven-year forecast has quality stocks returning 7 percentage points more than the S&P 500, or 9 points more than the non-quality remainder. Prediction · Oct 2009 Economics and markets
Unresolvable Prediction Oct 2009 All overpriced markets will eventually mean revert, leaving most institutions with withdrawal symptoms. Prediction · Oct 2009 Economics and markets
Unresolvable Prediction Oct 2009 Grantham guessed that the US market would drop below fair value, which he put at a 22% decline from the S&P 500 level of 1098 on October 19, 2009. Prediction · Oct 2009 Economics and markets
Unresolvable Factual Oct 2009 By 2006 the US CEO-to-average-worker pay ratio had risen to between 400/1 and 600/1. Factual · Oct 2009 Economics and markets
Unresolvable Factual Oct 2009 The October 2009 letter refers to underweighting emerging equity "last summer" just in time to avoid its two-month 40% freefall; the extracted text is jumbled, and it does not make clear whether this describes a move GMO made or one Grantham said it would have been good to make. Factual · Oct 2009 Their own work or organisation
Unresolvable Prediction Oct 2009 In October 2009, Grantham wrote that it still seemed a safe bet that seven lean years lay ahead. Prediction · Oct 2009 Economics and markets
Unresolvable Factual Oct 2009 As of October 2009 the size of the financial system continues to grow and shows every sign of being out of control. Factual · Oct 2009 Economics and markets
Unresolvable Prediction Oct 2009 By failing to learn from the crisis, the US is probably condemning itself to another serious financial crisis in the not-too-distant future. Prediction · Oct 2009 Economics and markets
Unresolvable Factual Oct 2009 The body under discussion (referred to only as "it") did not rise to the occasion to limit the recklessness of Fannie and Freddie. Factual · Oct 2009 AI policy and governance
Unresolvable Prediction Oct 2009 GMO forecasts seven-year real returns below 1.25% a year for bonds other than emerging. Prediction · Oct 2009 Economics and markets
Unresolvable Factual Oct 2009 By 2007 the share had risen to 7.5% of GDP; the surrounding text also mentions a figure of 3%, but does not say what year it refers to or what sector the share describes. Factual · Oct 2009 Economics and markets
Unresolvable Prediction Oct 2009 Grantham said he expected developed markets to grow moderately less fast, at about 2.25%, for the next chunk of time, and to look pretty anemic compared with emerging countries growing at twice that rate. Prediction · Oct 2009 Economics and markets
Unresolvable Factual Oct 2009 As the financial system grows it becomes a bigger drain on the rest of the economy and slows it down. Factual · Oct 2009 Economics and markets
Unresolvable Prediction Oct 2009 Grantham said he believed emerging market equities were well on the way to the 'emerging emerging bubble' he described about 18 months earlier, in his 1Q 2008 Quarterly Letter. Prediction · Oct 2009 Economics and markets
Unresolvable Prediction Oct 2009 Grantham guessed that before the end of 2010 the US market would fall painfully (which he defined as at least 15%) from its October 2009 levels. Prediction · Oct 2009 Economics and markets
Unresolvable Prediction Oct 2009 Without the measure Grantham was discussing, which the surrounding text does not name, "we shall surely fail again." Prediction · Oct 2009 Economics and markets
Unresolvable Factual Oct 2009 Quality stocks have slightly outperformed the market over the 40 years to 2009, per GMO's Exhibit 2. Factual · Oct 2009 Economics and markets
Unresolvable Promise Oct 2009 GMO plans to post its entire set of forecasts to its website with some preliminary analysis of the results. Promise · Oct 2009 Their own work or organisation
Unresolvable Factual Oct 2009 In 1930 there was no extra liquidity flowing around and absolutely no moral hazard. Factual · Oct 2009 Economics and markets
Unresolvable Prediction Oct 2009 The US market will not need to fall below the February 2009 low of 666 in the coming decline. Prediction · Oct 2009 Economics and markets
Unresolvable Factual Oct 2009 Goldman Sachs presents a potential hedge fund trade to clients as attractive because Goldman has already chosen to make that trade itself. Factual · Oct 2009 Economics and markets
Unresolvable Factual Apr 2007 Forestry holdings are an example where the diversifying effect alone has dramatically changed pricing. Factual · Apr 2007 Economics and markets
Unresolvable Prediction Apr 2007 Institutional shift into expensive hedge fund vehicles may lower returns available to existing long-only managers with positive alpha. Prediction · Apr 2007 Economics and markets
Unresolvable Factual Apr 2007 Hedge fund money is leveraged several times and turns over far more frequently than traditional money. Factual · Apr 2007 Economics and markets
Unresolvable Prediction Apr 2007 The most extreme relative overpricing in coming years should be at the intersection of high-risk and exotic diversification drivers. Prediction · Apr 2007 Economics and markets
Unresolvable Factual Apr 2007 As of April 2007, real estate, stocks and bonds all measure expensive against their own histories and against replacement cost where calculable. Factual · Apr 2007 Economics and markets
Unresolvable Prediction Apr 2007 Global profit margins, currently far above average, will come down. Prediction · Apr 2007 Economics and markets
Unresolvable Factual Apr 2007 Private equity grew even faster than hedge funds over the three years before April 2007. Factual · Apr 2007 Economics and markets
Unresolvable Prediction Apr 2007 For slow-moving managers who do not exit quickly by unloading their company, default will probably be common. Prediction · Apr 2007 Their own work or organisation
Unresolvable Factual Apr 2007 Infrastructure is the most recent investment area to attract rapid increases in capital, partly because other opportunities became overpriced. Factual · Apr 2007 Economics and markets
Unresolvable Prediction Apr 2007 Markets are probably in for an extended period of mispricing, usually favoring trendy assets, with sometimes dramatic reactions. Prediction · Apr 2007 Economics and markets
Unresolvable Prediction Apr 2007 U.S. blue chips and U.S. bonds will mostly be priced lower relative to fair value than the trendier newer asset classes. Prediction · Apr 2007 Economics and markets
Back to the list

Factual Economics and markets

“The trillion is leveraged several times and turns over far more frequently than ‘old-fashioned’ money”

Jeremy Grantham, GMO letter author April 2007 The First Truly Global Bubble (It's Everywhere, In Everything) (GMO)

Hedge fund money is leveraged several times and turns over far more frequently than traditional money.

Unresolvable The public record could not settle it.

Said for an organisation they lead or work for; it counts on both records.

What would count as true or false

Judge as of April 2007. Hedge fund assets were roughly $1 trillion or more. The claim has two parts: (a) that money was leveraged several times, and (b) it turned over far more often than traditional long-only money. True: industry or regulatory data from around 2007 show typical hedge fund gross leverage of about 2x or more on aggregate, and portfolio turnover well above that of mutual funds or pension money. Mostly true: both parts hold broadly, but aggregate leverage was nearer 1.5-2x than 'several times'. Mixed: only one part holds. Mostly false: leverage was modest (near 1x) and turnover only somewhat higher. False: neither leverage nor turnover was notably higher than for traditional money.

Evidence

  1. IMF Global Financial Stability Report: Market Developments and Issues; April 2007. International Monetary Fund · April 2007
    “They typically use leverage to amplify the returns from their trading strategies.”
  2. IMF Global Financial Stability Report: Market Developments and Issues; April 2007. International Monetary Fund · April 2007
    “Global institutional investors’ capital allocated to hedge funds was estimated at $360 billion as of end-2005, representing 30 percent of total hedge fund assets under management”
  3. IMF Global Financial Stability Report: Market Developments and Issues; April 2007. International Monetary Fund · April 2007
    “Hedge funds now account for a third of trading volume and, therefore, the liquidity provided”
  4. Global Financial Stability Report: Market Developments and Issues (April 2007) International Monetary Fund · April 2007
    “grew from $30 billion in 1990 to more than $1.4 trillion as of end-2005.”
  5. Global Financial Stability Report: Market Developments and Issues (April 2007) International Monetary Fund · April 2007
    “U.S. institutional investment in hedge funds more than doubled to $136 billion from 2003 to 2005, much of which came from pension fund allocations”
  6. [PDF] FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW - Publications - Banque de France Banque de France (Financial Stability Review, special issue on hedge funds, No. 10) · April 2007
    “in 2006, there were approximately 9,500 hedge funds with about USD 1,400 billion worth of assets under management.”
  7. [PDF] FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW - Publications - Banque de France Banque de France (Financial Stability Review, special issue on hedge funds, No. 10) · April 2007
    “By early 2007, several data providers indicated that, on the basis of joint internal and commercially distributed hedge fund data samples, the total capital under management by single-manager hedge funds globally was rapidly approaching the USD 1.5 trillion mark.”
  8. [PDF] FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW - Publications - Banque de France Banque de France (Financial Stability Review, special issue on hedge funds, No. 10) · April 2007
    “a relatively aggressive average leverage ratio of 5 to the entire hedge fund industry, its total size remains small compared to the more than USD 60,000 billion”

Reasoning

The evidence supports the size premise: hedge fund assets were about $1.4 trillion or more by end-2005 and 2006 (E4, E6, E7). The IMF says hedge funds typically use leverage but gives no aggregate multiple (E1). The only figure, a "relatively aggressive average leverage ratio of 5" (E8), is cut off, and it may be a hypothetical used to illustrate scale rather than an observed figure. On turnover, the IMF says hedge funds account for a third of trading volume (E3), but none of the evidence compares their portfolio turnover with that of mutual funds or pension money. Neither part of the claim can be settled under the criteria.

Cite this claim

Jeremy Grantham, “Hedge fund money is leveraged several times and turns over far more frequently than traditional money.” (said April 2007). Verdict: unresolvable. Reliability API, claim c_33aeadff4522, method 0.1.0+28da144b. https://epistacklabs.com/claims/c_33aeadff4522

Claims without a verdict

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