ClaimsPeople

Jeremy Grantham

Jeremy Grantham is an investor who co-founded the asset managers GMO and Batterymarch, is listed by GMO as its long-term investment strategist, and co-authored 'The Making of a Permabear'.

1,004 claims collected, 267 researched, 73 resolved. Report of 5 November 2026, method 0.1.0+28da144b.

Scores by kind of claim

Each kind of claim is scored on its own, out of 100: the share that held up, with the range it likely falls in. Fewer resolved claims give a wider range.

  • Factual claims

    Statements about the present or the past, checked against the record: did they hold up?

    72 63 80

    Medium confidence, 42 factual claims resolved. From 15 documents, 2007 to 2025; 15 documents sampled from 32 candidates found.

    Not scored: 53 unresolvable, 28 checkable only against their own records.

  • Predictions

    Statements about events outside the person's control, checked once they fell due: did they come true?

    56 46 67

    Medium confidence, 31 predictions resolved. From 10 documents, 2007 to 2023; 15 documents sampled from 32 candidates found.

    Not scored: 93 unresolvable, 1 checkable only against their own records. 17 more fall due later.

    Does not yet allow for how likely each prediction was when made.

  • Promises

    Commitments to the person's or organisation's own future action, with something to deliver: was it delivered?

    Insufficient record: 0 promises resolved, 5 needed for a score.

    Not scored: 2 unresolvable.

All types combined: 65 (likely 59 to 72, high confidence), from 73 claims: 42 factual claims, 31 predictions. It mixes kinds of claim in different proportions for different people, so compare people kind by kind.

Jeremy Grantham's claims

31 claims, sorted by newest said. Choose a claim to read it in full.
VerdictKindSaidClaimTopic
Mostly true Prediction Jan 2023 The Presidential Cycle's positive influence may help support the market for a few more months. Prediction · Jan 2023 Economics and markets
Mixed Prediction Jan 2023 A continued market decline of at least substantial proportions is much more likely than not. Prediction · Jan 2023 Economics and markets
Mostly false Prediction Jan 2023 The January 2023 rally may well not outlive January. Prediction · Jan 2023 Economics and markets
Resolved false Prediction Jan 2023 The final low of this bear market might come well into 2024. Prediction · Jan 2023 Economics and markets
Resolved true Prediction 31 Aug 2022 Grantham says historical parallels suggest the worst of the current market downturn is still to come. Prediction · 31 Aug 2022 Economics and markets
Mostly true Prediction 2020 By the end of 2020, thousands of corporate bankruptcies will arrive into a peak of already existing corporate debt. Prediction · 2020 Economics and markets
Mostly false Prediction 2020 During the depressed earnings phase, market P/E ratios will be pulled down, giving a lower multiple of substantially lower earnings. Prediction · 2020 Economics and markets
Mostly true Prediction 2020 It is nearly certain that a V-shaped economic recovery from the coronavirus crisis looks like a lost hope. Prediction · 2020 Economics and markets
Mostly true Prediction 2020 U.S. unemployment will reach up to 20% for at least a moment. Prediction · 2020 Economics and markets
Mostly false Prediction 2017 Trump is likely to settle for a moderate reduction in corporate tax rates in 2017 rather than a full redo of the tax code. Prediction · 2017 AI policy and governance
Resolved true Prediction 2017 Unless there are substantial unexpected negatives, US corporate margins will be up in 2017. Prediction · 2017 Economics and markets
Mostly true Prediction 2017 Removing regulations here and there will lower corporate costs in the short term. Prediction · 2017 Economics and markets
Mostly false Prediction Jan 2016 In 12 to 24 months U.S. house prices might beat the U.S. equity market in causing the next financial crisis. Prediction · Jan 2016 Economics and markets
Resolved false Prediction Jan 2016 Oil stocks should do well over the next five years, perhaps regaining much of their losses. Prediction · Jan 2016 Economics and markets
Resolved true Prediction 2016 He sees the biggest risk as an extended economic recovery, which he expects to last two more years, that might start to push up wages enough to count. Prediction · 2016 Economics and markets
Mixed Prediction 2016 Brexit will be very damaging for students and faculty at UK universities, which receive much EU money. Prediction · 2016 Economics and markets
Mostly true Prediction Apr 2011 Agricultural commodity prices are generally expected to fall in 2012 if the weather improves. Prediction · Apr 2011 Economics and markets
Mixed Prediction Jul 2010 There is a 45% chance the market (S&P 500) rises to over 1400 by October 2011, accompanied by a speculative spin. Prediction · Jul 2010 Economics and markets
Resolved true Prediction Jul 2010 It would take at least seven years of steady reduction for consumer debt to reach a more normal level. Prediction · Jul 2010 Economics and markets
Mostly true Prediction Jul 2010 Developed countries will be lucky to reach 2% annual growth over the roughly seven years from 2009. Prediction · Jul 2010 Economics and markets
Mostly true Prediction Oct 2009 Grantham said his personal view was that a major China stumble in the next three years or so was maybe only a one in three chance, but was still the most likely important unpleasant surprise of the fundamental economic variety. Prediction · Oct 2009 Economics and markets
Resolved true Prediction Oct 2009 The rising market will be stopped, by Grantham's blind guess in the first few months of 2010, by a combination of factors. Prediction · Oct 2009 Economics and markets
Resolved false Prediction Oct 2009 GMO's seven-year forecast return for the S&P 500 is well below 3%, while the high-quality subset is still handsome. Prediction · Oct 2009 Economics and markets
Resolved false Prediction Oct 2009 The irony may well be that strong economic data in 2010 is likely to be accompanied by a weak stock market. Prediction · Oct 2009 Economics and markets
Mostly true Prediction Apr 2007 Because no similar global event has occurred before, the stresses to the financial system when the bubble bursts are likely to be unexpected. Prediction · Apr 2007 Economics and markets
Resolved true Prediction Apr 2007 Markets are likely to be in for a bumpy ride after April 2007. Prediction · Apr 2007 Economics and markets
Resolved true Prediction Apr 2007 The bursting of the bubble will hit all countries and all assets, with the probable exception of high grade bonds. Prediction · Apr 2007 Economics and markets
Mostly false Prediction Apr 2007 The heart of the current bubble is probably private equity. Prediction · Apr 2007 Economics and markets
Mostly false Prediction Apr 2007 In 10 years the current bubble may well be described as the private equity bubble, as 2000 is thought of as the internet bubble. Prediction · Apr 2007 Economics and markets
Resolved true Prediction Apr 2007 When the bubble bursts, the Fed and overseas equivalents will move to contain the economic damage, as the Fed did after the 2000 break. Prediction · Apr 2007 Economics and markets
Resolved false Prediction Apr 2007 GMO's 7-year forecast implies U.S. equities would return minus 1.4% real per year as P/Es and profit margins revert to long-term averages. Prediction · Apr 2007 Their own work or organisation
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Prediction Economics and markets

“The heart of the bubble this time is probably private equity.”

Jeremy Grantham, GMO letter author April 2007 The First Truly Global Bubble (It's Everywhere, In Everything) (GMO)

The heart of the current bubble is probably private equity.

Mostly false False in substance, right in a detail.

The second judge would not resolve this claim; the verdict shown is the first judge's.

Said for an organisation they lead or work for; it counts on both records.

What would count as true or false

The claim is a hedged ('probably') prediction with no horizon. It is judged once the bubble deflated, in the 2007–2009 bust, by asking whether private equity (leveraged buyouts and the credit financing them) turned out to be the central component of the bubble. TRUE if authoritative post-crisis analyses (official inquiries, central bank reports, major academic histories) identify private equity or LBO excess as the core of the bubble. MOSTLY TRUE if private equity is identified as one of the two or three leading components, alongside others of similar weight. MOSTLY FALSE if those analyses treat private equity and leveraged loans as a real but secondary part of a broader credit bubble whose heart was elsewhere, e.g. US housing and mortgage securitisation. FALSE if private equity is treated as peripheral or unaffected, with no meaningful role in the bubble and its collapse.

Evidence

  1. Private equity and financial stability Bank of England (Quarterly Bulletin 2013 Q1, by David Gregory) · 2013
    “The use of debt in buyouts became particularly prominent in the run-up to the 2007–08 financial crisis, and has implications for the fragility of the corporate sector and, consequently, the resilience of the financial system.”
  2. Private equity and financial stability Bank of England (Quarterly Bulletin 2013 Q1, by David Gregory) · 2013
    “In the mid-2000s, there was a dramatic increase in acquisitions of UK companies by private equity funds. The leverage on these buyouts, especially the larger ones, was high.”
  3. Private equity and financial stability Bank of England (Quarterly Bulletin 2013 Q1, by David Gregory) · 2013
    “While insolvencies in the United Kingdom have accounted for around 30% (in unweighted terms) of private equity exits since 2009, these make up less than 1% of overall UK insolvencies.”
  4. Private equity and financial stability Bank of England (Quarterly Bulletin 2013 Q1, by David Gregory) · 2013
    “The use of debt in buyouts became particularly prominent in the run-up to the 2007–08 financial crisis, and has implications for the fragility of the corporate sector and, consequently, the resilience of the financial system.”
  5. Private equity and financial stability Bank of England (Quarterly Bulletin 2013 Q1, by David Gregory) · 2013
    “Chart 3 illustrates the importance of CLOs in this originate to distribute model — arbitrage CLOs, which primarily contain private equity sponsored leveraged loans, grew dramatically between 2004 and 2006.”
  6. Private equity and financial stability Bank of England (Quarterly Bulletin 2013 Q1, by David Gregory) · 2013
    “A significant factor in the dramatic increase in the quantity of buyout debt was the ‘originate to distribute’ model.”
  7. Crisis and Response: An FDIC History, 2008–2013 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) · 6 June 2025
    “The U.S. financial crisis of 2008 followed a boom and bust cycle in the housing market that originated several years earlier and exposed vulnerabilities in the financial system.”
  8. Crisis and Response: An FDIC History, 2008–2013 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) · 6 June 2025
    “By the end of the 2000–2006 period, the rapid rise in U.S. house prices had transformed from a boom to a nationwide housing market bubble.”

Reasoning

The FDIC's history of the crisis says the 2008 crisis followed a boom and bust in the US housing market, which had become a nationwide housing bubble by 2006 (E7, E8). The Bank of England's 2013 analysis says buyout debt was particularly prominent before the 2007–08 crisis, and that CLOs holding private-equity-sponsored leveraged loans grew sharply between 2004 and 2006 (E1, E2, E5, E6). It links the growth in buyout debt to the originate-to-distribute model [E6], without ranking private equity against other parts of the bubble. Taken together, the FDIC places the origin of the crisis in a US housing boom and bust [E7][E8], while the Bank of England documents a real build-up of buyout debt without ranking it against other parts of the bubble [E1][E6]; on balance this points towards mostly false, where private equity played a real part but the heart of the bubble lay elsewhere.

Cite this claim

Jeremy Grantham, “The heart of the current bubble is probably private equity.” (said April 2007). Verdict: mostly false. Reliability API, claim c_a2c70655ffff, method 0.1.0+28da144b. https://epistacklabs.com/claims/c_a2c70655ffff

Claims without a verdict

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