Scores by kind of claim
Each kind of claim is scored on its own, out of 100: the share that held up, with the range it likely falls in. Fewer resolved claims give a wider range.
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Factual claims
Statements about the present or the past, checked against the record: did they hold up?
80 75 85 -
Predictions
Statements about events outside the person's control, checked once they fell due: did they come true?
Insufficient record: 4 predictions resolved, 5 needed for a score.
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Promises
Commitments to the person's or organisation's own future action, with something to deliver: was it delivered?
Insufficient record: 0 promises resolved, 5 needed for a score.
All types combined: 80 (likely 75 to 85, high confidence), from 93 claims: 93 factual claims. It mixes kinds of claim in different proportions for different people, so compare people kind by kind.
Tyler Cowen's claims
45 claims
“I'm an optimist who thinks productivity growth has slowed down.”
Tyler Cowen, guest 18 July 2019 Tyler Cowen on Big Business (EconTalk)
Productivity growth has slowed down.
Resolved true The record shows it happened or was so.
What would count as true or false
Judge as of 2019-07-18, using US data (Cowen's usual frame) and comparing productivity growth in recent periods with earlier ones. True: official statistics (for example US BLS labour productivity or San Francisco Fed TFP) show average productivity growth in the period since about 2005 (or since 1973) clearly below the earlier benchmark period, such as 1995–2004 or 1947–1973. Mostly true: a slowdown is evident on most standard measures, with minor dispute over the period or the measure. Mixed: the measures disagree, with a slowdown on roughly half. Mostly false: a slowdown appears only in a narrow window or on one measure, while broader data do not show it. False: the data show productivity growth has not slowed or has accelerated relative to earlier periods.
Evidence
- Does the United States have a Productivity Slowdown or a Measurement Problem Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (FEDS Working Paper 2016-017), by David M. Byrne, John G. Fernald, and Marshall B. Reinsdorf · 1 March 2016
“After 2004, measured growth in labor productivity and total-factor productivity (TFP) slowed.”
- A Practitioner's Perspective on the Productivity Slowdown Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond (speech by President Thomas I. Barkin) · 4 April 2019
“But since 2006, average annual labor productivity growth has been just 1.3 percent. In contrast, it averaged 2.3 percent between 1985 and 2005.”
- Does the United States have a Productivity Slowdown or a Measurement Problem Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (FEDS Working Paper 2016-017), by David M. Byrne, John G. Fernald, and Marshall B. Reinsdorf · 1 March 2016
“About two-thirds of industries show a slowdown in measured TFP growth after 2004.”
Reasoning
A Federal Reserve Board staff paper reports that measured US labour productivity and total-factor productivity growth both slowed after 2004 (E1). It also finds the slowdown in about two-thirds of industries, so it is not confined to one sector (E4). In April 2019, a few months before the claim date, the Richmond Fed president said average annual labour productivity growth was 1.3 percent since 2006, against 2.3 percent over 1985–2005 (E3). The evidence shows that measured labour productivity and TFP growth slowed after 2004 [E1], with labour productivity growth averaging 1.3 percent since 2006 against 2.3 percent over 1985–2005 [E3], which meets the criteria for true.
Cite this claim
Tyler Cowen, “Productivity growth has slowed down.” (said 18 July 2019). Verdict: resolved true. Reliability API, claim c_6e379300a9ca, method 0.1.0+c876030c. https://epistacklabs.com/claims/c_6e379300a9ca
Claims without a verdict
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