ClaimsPeople

Nouriel Roubini

Nouriel Roubini is an author and Project Syndicate columnist who is Chairman and CEO of Roubini Macro Associates and Professor Emeritus at NYU Stern, widely known as 'Dr. Doom'.

294 claims collected, 146 researched, 66 resolved. Report of 4 November 2026, method 0.1.0+c876030c.

Scores by kind of claim

Each kind of claim is scored on its own, out of 100: the share that held up, with the range it likely falls in. Fewer resolved claims give a wider range.

  • Factual claims

    Statements about the present or the past, checked against the record: did they hold up?

    72 64 80

    Medium confidence, 48 factual claims resolved. From 14 documents, 2006 to 2026; 19 documents sampled from 35 candidates found.

    Not scored: 29 unresolvable.

  • Predictions

    Statements about events outside the person's control, checked once they fell due: did they come true?

    40 27 53

    Medium confidence, 18 predictions resolved. From 9 documents, 2006 to 2024; 19 documents sampled from 35 candidates found.

    Not scored: 46 unresolvable. 5 more fall due later.

    Does not yet allow for how likely each prediction was when made.

All types combined: 63 (likely 56 to 70, high confidence), from 66 claims: 48 factual claims, 18 predictions. It mixes kinds of claim in different proportions for different people, so compare people kind by kind.

Nouriel Roubini's claims

146 claims, sorted by newest said. Choose a claim to read it in full.
VerdictKindSaidClaimTopic
Unresolvable Factual 24 Dec 2019 The Chinese prefer Donald Trump to be re-elected US president because he is protectionist and unilateralist. Factual · 24 Dec 2019 AI policy and governance
Unresolvable Prediction 24 Dec 2019 Over time Trump will damage US alliances and weaken US soft and hard power, making China stronger. Prediction · 24 Dec 2019 AI policy and governance
Unresolvable Factual 8 Dec 2019 As of 8 December 2019, 99.9% of cryptocurrencies have lost 99% of their value since their peak. Factual · 8 Dec 2019 Economics and markets
Mixed Factual 27 Nov 2019 As of 27 November 2019, Ethereum is down 90% from its peak and close to its 2018 low. Factual · 27 Nov 2019 Economics and markets
Unresolvable Factual 26 Nov 2019 As of late November 2019, Bitcoin is down 65% from its peak and the other top 10 cryptocurrencies are down 80% from their peaks. Factual · 26 Nov 2019 Economics and markets
Mostly true Factual 20 Nov 2019 In November 2019 there is a growing disconnect between mediocre global economic growth with rising risks and frothy, exuberant financial markets. Factual · 20 Nov 2019 Economics and markets
Mixed Factual 6 Nov 2019 As of November 2019, no application of blockchain, defined as a public, decentralized, permission-less, trustless ledger, works or is widely used despite billions spent on it over a decade. Factual · 6 Nov 2019 Technology
Unresolvable Factual 14 Jun 2019 As of June 2019, nine of the ten recession risks Roubini and Rosa identified in summer 2018 are still in play. Factual · 14 Jun 2019 Economics and markets
Resolved true Factual 15 Oct 2018 Bitcoin's value had fallen by around 70% from its peak in late 2017 as of October 2018. Factual · 15 Oct 2018 Economics and markets
Unresolvable Factual 15 Oct 2018 The value of leading coins such as Ether, EOS, Litecoin and XRP had all fallen by over 80% as of October 2018. Factual · 15 Oct 2018 Economics and markets
Unresolvable Factual 15 Oct 2018 the rest have been exposed as outright frauds. Factual · 15 Oct 2018 Economics and markets
Unresolvable Factual 15 Oct 2018 Thousands of other digital currencies had fallen by 90-99% from their peaks as of October 2018. Factual · 15 Oct 2018 Economics and markets
Mixed Prediction 15 Oct 2018 Now that cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin have plummeted from 2017's valuations, the techno-utopian mystique of distributed-ledger technologies should be next. Prediction · 15 Oct 2018 Technology
Resolved true Factual 15 Oct 2018 Four out of five initial coin offerings (ICOs) were scams. Factual · 15 Oct 2018 Economics and markets
Mostly false Prediction 13 Sep 2018 Unlike in 2008, governments will lack the policy tools to manage the next downturn around 2020. Prediction · 13 Sep 2018 AI policy and governance
Unresolvable Prediction 13 Sep 2018 The global economy's synchronized growth will lose momentum as unsustainable US fiscal policies start to phase out. Prediction · 13 Sep 2018 Economics and markets
Unresolvable Prediction 13 Sep 2018 By 2020, conditions will be in place for another economic downturn. Prediction · 13 Sep 2018 Economics and markets
Mostly true Factual 26 Jan 2018 Unlike the Internet, which quickly produced email, the World Wide Web and millions of commercial ventures, blockchain's only application, cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin, does not even fulfill its stated purpose. Factual · 26 Jan 2018 Technology
Mostly true Factual 2009 Greenspan and the Fed spoke of irrational exuberance in tech stocks in 1996 without acting, and after the tech bubble burst cut rates to 1%, then to zero after the housing bust. Factual · 2009 Economics and markets
Resolved true Factual 2009 US real home prices doubled between 1996 and 2006, whereas historically home prices never rose more than inflation. Factual · 2009 Economics and markets
Mostly true Factual 2009 Roubini began worrying about the US economy and financial system in 2006 after seeing an unsustainable housing bubble in home prices and mortgages. Factual · 2009 Their own work or organisation
Unresolvable Factual 2009 US housing quantities fell by 80% and home prices fell more than 25%, and prices were still falling at more than a 20% annualised rate in 2009. Factual · 2009 Economics and markets
Mostly true Factual 2009 Roubini wrote about his concerns in summer 2006 and gave a speech to a few hundred International Monetary Fund staff in early September 2006. Factual · 2009 Their own work or organisation
Mostly true Factual 2009 The Fed's philosophy was to not act against asset bubbles on the way up, as hard to identify and dangerous to prick, but to ease aggressively after they burst. Factual · 2009 Economics and markets
Mostly true Factual 2009 After the 1987 stock market crash the Fed eased aggressively, giving the impression it would rescue markets, leading to talk of a 'Greenspan put'. Factual · 2009 Economics and markets
Mostly true Factual 2009 In 2006 people were sceptical of Roubini's predictions, talking instead of high growth, a Goldilocks economy and a gently deflating minor housing bubble. Factual · 2009 Their own work or organisation
Mostly true Factual 2009 By mid-2006 US new home production had risen more than speculative demand, housing starts were peaking, new home sales were flattening and price increases were slowing. Factual · 2009 Economics and markets
Resolved true Factual 25 Sep 2006 Existing home sales figures released on 2006-09-25 showed falling home prices. Factual · 25 Sep 2006 Economics and markets
Mostly true Prediction 25 Sep 2006 The housing bust will trigger an economy-wide US recession in 2007. Prediction · 25 Sep 2006 Economics and markets
Mostly false Prediction 25 Sep 2006 There is going to be a huge glut. Prediction · 25 Sep 2006 Economics and markets
Unresolvable Factual 25 Sep 2006 There is a glut of new condos in Manhattan and it is getting worse. Factual · 25 Sep 2006 Economics and markets
Unresolvable Prediction 25 Sep 2006 US real home prices will fall 20 to 30 percent over the next three years or so, from September 2006. Prediction · 25 Sep 2006 Economics and markets
Unresolvable Prediction 25 Sep 2006 The US housing market will have its biggest bust in decades. Prediction · 25 Sep 2006 Economics and markets
Mostly false Prediction 25 Sep 2006 The US will have a national recession in early 2007 and Wall Street profits and bonuses will sharply drop. Prediction · 25 Sep 2006 Economics and markets
Mostly true Factual 25 Sep 2006 As of September 2006 there was not yet hard data on exactly what was happening in the market, but home prices were sluggish. Factual · 25 Sep 2006 Economics and markets
Resolved true Factual 25 Sep 2006 In 2006 returns for many hedge funds are below those of safe Treasury bills. Factual · 25 Sep 2006 Economics and markets
Mixed Prediction 25 Sep 2006 New home sales data released later in the week of 2006-09-25 will be even worse than the existing home sales data. Prediction · 25 Sep 2006 Economics and markets
Resolved false Prediction 25 Sep 2006 New York City home prices will be 5 to 10 percent lower on average a year from September 2006. Prediction · 25 Sep 2006 Economics and markets
Unresolvable Prediction 25 Sep 2006 Foreign buyers purchasing US property in dollars will suffer currency capital losses as the dollar weakens against the euro and other currencies. Prediction · 25 Sep 2006 Economics and markets
Unresolvable Prediction 25 Sep 2006 Speculative housing demand will now disappear because prices are flattening and falling. Prediction · 25 Sep 2006 Economics and markets
Mostly true Factual 25 Sep 2006 Real US home prices have increased by about 90 percent since 1997. Factual · 25 Sep 2006 Economics and markets
Unresolvable Prediction 25 Sep 2006 US national real home prices may fall 20 to 30 percent. Prediction · 25 Sep 2006 Economics and markets
Mostly false Factual 25 Sep 2006 Over the 110 years since 1890, rising housing supply has been accompanied by falling prices. Factual · 25 Sep 2006 Economics and markets
Unresolvable Prediction Sep 2006 US home prices would fall at least 20% and housing starts and demand at least 50% in the worst housing recession since the Great Depression. Prediction · Sep 2006 Economics and markets
Resolved true Prediction 2006 The housing bust would lead to a banking and financial crisis as homeowners defaulted on mortgages and banks failed. Prediction · 2006 Economics and markets
Mixed Prediction 2006 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac would go bankrupt and the credit crunch would lead to a US recession by some time in 2007. Prediction · 2006 Economics and markets
Back to the list

Factual Economics and markets

“the philosophy of the Fed was if there is an asset bubble on the way up, you don’t do anything about it because they claim it’s hard to see one and it’s like trying to prick a bubble, it’s going to be too dangerous”

Nouriel Roubini, professor, Stern School of Business 2009 The housing crash and the man who saw it coming (OpenLearn)

The Fed's philosophy was to not act against asset bubbles on the way up, as hard to identify and dangerous to prick, but to ease aggressively after they burst.

Mostly true True in substance, wrong in a detail.

The second judge said mixed; the verdict shown is the first judge's.

What would count as true or false

Judge as of 2009, against the Fed's pre-crisis policy approach (the 'Greenspan doctrine' or 'mop up after'), as shown in Fed officials' speeches (for example Greenspan 2002, Bernanke 2002) and the Fed's post-bubble actions (2001–2003). True: these sources show the Fed held that bubbles are hard to identify before they burst and that using policy to deflate them is risky or damaging, and that it should instead ease aggressively after a bust. Mostly true: the doctrine is accurately described, but one nuance is lost, for example that the Fed's main reason was ineffectiveness or collateral damage rather than 'danger'. Mixed: one half (not leaning against bubbles) is supported but the other (aggressive easing after a bust) is not. Mostly false: the description substantially misstates Fed thinking. False: the Fed's stated approach was to actively target asset bubbles.

Evidence

  1. Interim budget to decide market direction The Economic Times (Times of India group) · 15 February 2009
    “The intellectual justification for the Greenspan idea ��� was that identifying equilibrium levels of asset prices is difficult; and policy tools to prick or limit bubbles are limited.”
  2. FRB: Speech, Greenspan -- Economic volatility -- August 30, 2002 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System · 30 August 2002
    “Some have asserted that the Federal Reserve can deflate a stock-price bubble--rather painlessly--by boosting margin requirements. The evidence suggests otherwise.”
  3. FRB Speech, Bernanke -- Asset-price "bubbles" and monetary policy -- October 15, 2002 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System · 15 October 2002
    “Alan Blinder has likened bubble-popping strategies to sticking a needle in a balloon; one cannot count on letting out the air slowly or in a finely calibrated amount.”
  4. FRB Speech, Bernanke -- Asset-price "bubbles" and monetary policy -- October 15, 2002 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System · 15 October 2002
    “The 1987 stock market crash is a real-world example of how monetary policy aimed at macro stability coupled with other types of policy emphasizing financial stability can minimize the economic fallout of a sharp decline in asset prices.”

Reasoning

Bernanke's 2002 speech compares popping a bubble to sticking a needle in a balloon (E3), and Greenspan's 2002 speech says the evidence does not show a stock-price bubble can be deflated painlessly by raising margin requirements (E2). A 2009 independent account says the case for the Greenspan approach was that bubbles are hard to identify and policy tools to prick them are limited (E1). Together these support the claim that the Fed did not lean against bubbles because they were hard to spot and risky to prick. Bernanke's speech also backs responding after a crash with policy aimed at macroeconomic stability (E4), but the evidence does not explicitly show "aggressive" easing after 2001, and part of the Fed's reasoning was that the tools would not work, not only that they were dangerous.

Cite this claim

Nouriel Roubini, “The Fed's philosophy was to not act against asset bubbles on the way up, as hard to identify and dangerous to prick, but to ease aggressively after they burst.” (said 2009). Verdict: mostly true. Reliability API, claim c_b79a447550a2, method 0.1.0+c876030c. https://epistacklabs.com/claims/c_b79a447550a2

Claims without a verdict

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