Scores by kind of claim
Each kind of claim is scored on its own, out of 100: the share that held up, with the range it likely falls in. Fewer resolved claims give a wider range.
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Factual claims
Statements about the present or the past, checked against the record: did they hold up?
73 67 79 -
Predictions
Statements about events outside the person's control, checked once they fell due: did they come true?
Insufficient record: 0 predictions resolved, 5 needed for a score.
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Promises
Commitments to the person's or organisation's own future action, with something to deliver: was it delivered?
Insufficient record: 0 promises resolved, 5 needed for a score.
All types combined: 73 (likely 67 to 79, high confidence), from 94 claims: 94 factual claims. It mixes kinds of claim in different proportions for different people, so compare people kind by kind.
Nassim Taleb's claims
48 claims
“The financial crisis took place because people took a lot of hidden risks, which meant that a small blip could have massive consequences.”
Nassim Taleb, author, interview answer 12 January 2009 Taking Improbable Events Seriously: An Interview with the Author of 'The Black Swan' (CBS News)
Taleb said the financial crisis occurred because people took many hidden risks, which meant a small blip could have massive consequences.
Mostly true True in substance, wrong in a detail.
What would count as true or false
This is a causal claim about the 2007–2009 financial crisis, judged by what was known when it was made (2009-01-12) together with later authoritative analyses of the same events. True: major authoritative accounts (for example the US Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission report, central bank or IMF post-mortems, or the main academic surveys) find that hidden, opaque or under-recognised risk-taking was a central cause. Such risk-taking includes off-balance-sheet exposures, concealed tail risk, excessive leverage and poorly understood derivatives or securitisations, which left the system fragile enough that a relatively small shock (such as losses on subprime mortgages) had outsized consequences. Mostly true: these accounts treat hidden risk and fragility as one of the main causes, alongside others that are given comparable weight (for example monetary policy, regulatory failures or housing policy), so the claim is broadly right but simplified. Mixed: the accounts are split, with hidden risk-taking seen as an important contributor by some and as secondary by others. Mostly false: the accounts treat hidden risk as a minor contributor and attribute the crisis mainly to other factors, or show that the triggering shock was not small. False: the accounts show that the risks were neither hidden nor central, and that the crisis had a substantially different cause.
Evidence
- Speech by Chairman Bernanke on some reflections on the crisis and the policy response Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System · 13 April 2012
“In the private sector, some key vulnerabilities included high levels of leverage; excessive dependence on unstable short-term funding; deficiencies in risk management in major financial firms; and the use of exotic and nontransparent financial instruments that obscured concentrations of risk.”
- Speech by Chairman Bernanke on some reflections on the crisis and the policy response Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System · 13 April 2012
“Thus, losses on subprime mortgages can plausibly account for the massive reaction seen during the crisis only insofar as they interacted with other factors--more fundamental vulnerabilities--that served to amplify their effects.”
- Finance and Development International Monetary Fund · December 2008
“Finally, financial institutions did not always sufficiently disclose the type and magnitude of their on- and off-balance-sheet risk exposures, particularly those related to structured products.”
- The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission American Enterprise Institute (testimony to the US House Financial Services Committee) · 16 February 2011
“If as I believe government housing policy was responsible for the financial crisis, it was not caused by failures of regulation or risk management, or by predatory lending, unregulated derivatives, or compensation structures on Wall Street.”
Reasoning
Bernanke's 2012 speech names high leverage and "exotic and nontransparent financial instruments that obscured concentrations of risk" as key private-sector vulnerabilities (E1). The same speech says subprime losses could explain the size of the crisis only because deeper vulnerabilities amplified them, which supports the idea that a small blip had massive consequences (E2). An IMF article from before the claim date says financial institutions did not always sufficiently disclose their on- and off-balance-sheet risk exposures, particularly those related to structured products (E3). Testimony from the American Enterprise Institute to the House Financial Services Committee argues that government housing policy, rather than failures of risk management or derivatives, was responsible for the crisis (E4). Together, the sources treat hidden risk and fragility as one of the main causes, with other causes given comparable weight, so the claim is broadly right but simplified.
Cite this claim
Nassim Taleb, “Taleb said the financial crisis occurred because people took many hidden risks, which meant a small blip could have massive consequences.” (said 12 January 2009). Verdict: mostly true. Reliability API, claim c_de5c7857d7ed, method 0.1.0+28da144b. https://epistacklabs.com/claims/c_de5c7857d7ed
Claims without a verdict
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