In 1930 there was no extra liquidity flowing around and absolutely no moral hazard.

Judged as of October 2009 against the historical record of 1930. True: the record shows no meaningful injection of extra liquidity by the Federal Reserve or government in 1930 and no implicit or explicit bailout expectations (moral hazard) shaping behaviour. Mostly true: liquidity provision and moral-hazard factors in 1930 were negligible, with only trivial exceptions. Mixed: one half holds (for example no moral hazard) while the other is clearly contradicted. Mostly false: the gist (far less liquidity and moral hazard than in 2009) holds, but the absolute statement is contradicted by documented 1930 actions such as Fed discount-rate cuts or open-market purchases or rescue expectations. False: the record shows substantial liquidity provision and significant moral hazard in 1930.

Set before the research began.

1. E1 The United States Financial Crisis of 1931 Harvard Business School · 24 March 1999

   “In the early months of the depression, the Fed supplied bank reserves through sizable purchases of government securities on the open market—$341 million between November 12, 1929 and January 28, 1930. Discount rates at the New York Fed dropped from 6% to 41/2% and bill-buying”

2. E2 The United States Financial Crisis of 1931 Harvard Business School · 24 March 1999

   “There were few more open market securities purchased, and although discount and bill buying rates were lowered (with the New York Fed’s rate reaching 2% in December 1930), member bank borrowing from the Fed shrank by 83% between July 1929 and September 1930.”

3. E3 Achieving Economic Stability: Lessons from the Crash of 1929 Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis · 1988

   “Between October 1929 and February 1930, the discount rate was reduced from 6 to 4 percent.”

4. E4 Achieving Economic Stability: Lessons from the Crash of 1929 Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis · 1988

   “Open market purchases of government securities became very modest until large purchases were made in 1932. Further, although the discount rate was reduced between March 1930 and September 1931, it then was raised on two occasions late that year”

The evidence shows Fed discount-rate cuts during 1930 and open market purchases running into January 1930 [E1][E2][E4], which contradicts 'no extra liquidity'. It does not compare 1930 liquidity with 2009 and says nothing about moral hazard, so it cannot settle which verdict under the criteria applies.