Almost all serious economic declines have been associated with oil price surges, and the trend price of oil, based on the cost of finding new oil, is now about three and a half times the old price.

The claim has two parts: (a) almost all serious economic declines have been associated with oil price surges; (b) the trend price of oil, based on the cost of finding new oil, is about 3.5 times the old price. True: research (e.g. Hamilton's work linking oil shocks to recessions) shows that most serious post-war US or global recessions followed oil price surges, and cost or trend data from around 2017 support a trend price roughly 3–4 times the earlier level (e.g. about $20 rising to about $70). Mostly true: both parts broadly hold, with a minor slip in the multiple (e.g. 3 or 4 times rather than 3.5). Mixed: one part holds and the other does not. Mostly false: both parts are overstated, for example the oil link holds for only some declines and the multiple is clearly off. False: both parts are contradicted.

Set before the research began.

1. E1 Oil and the Macroeconomy Since the 1970s Journal of Economic Perspectives (Robert B. Barsky and Lutz Kilian), digitized by FRASER, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis · 2004

   “Thus, we conclude that disturbances in the oil market are likely to m atter less for U.S. macroeconomic performance than has commonly been thought.”

2. E2 Oil and the Macroeconomy Since the 1970s Journal of Economic Perspectives (Robert B. Barsky and Lutz Kilian), digitized by FRASER, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis · 2004

   “Thus, the data are consistent with the accelerationist model, making it unnecessary to appeal to special factors such as oil shocks.”

3. E3 Oil and the Macroeconomy Since the 1970s Journal of Economic Perspectives (Robert B. Barsky and Lutz Kilian), digitized by FRASER, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis · 2004

   “There is no evidence of sharp drops in consumer spending after oil dates.”

4. E4 Oil and the Macroeconomy Since the 1970s Journal of Economic Perspectives (Robert B. Barsky and Lutz Kilian), digitized by FRASER, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis · 2004

   “Since then, a large body of work has accumulated that purports to establish this link on theoretical grounds and to provide empirical evidence in its support.”

5. E5 Oil and the Macroeconomy Since the 1970s Journal of Economic Perspectives (Robert B. Barsky and Lutz Kilian) · 2004

   “We also showed that oil price shocks are neither necessary nor sufficient to explain stagflation in real GDP and in the implicit GDP deflator.”

6. E6 Oil and the Macroeconomy Since the 1970s Journal of Economic Perspectives (Robert B. Barsky and Lutz Kilian) · 2004

   “There is a widespread belief that exogenous political events in the Middle East cause recessions in industrialized countries through their effect on the price of oil.”

7. E7 Oil Price Shocks NBER (The Reporter), by James D. Hamilton · January 2011

   “In the paper, I note that in fact all but one of the 11 U.S. recessions since World War II were preceded by a sharp increase in the price of crude petroleum”

8. E8 Oil shocks and economic recessions Econbrowser · 15 January 2011

   “All but one of the 11 postwar recessions were associated with an increase in the price of oil, the single exception being the recession of 1960.”

9. E9 Oil shocks and economic recessions Econbrowser · 15 January 2011

   “This is not to claim that the oil price increases themselves were the sole cause of most postwar recessions. Instead the indicated conclusion is that oil shocks were a contributing factor in at least some postwar recessions.”

10. E10 Oil companies' proved reserves decline for second consecutive year as finding costs remain near historical average - Mansfield Energy Mansfield Energy · 5 June 2017

    “companies spent almost the same amount per boe to add reserves to their future production base, as the finding cost was $27.07/boe in 2016, only 4% below the 2011–15 average”

On part (a), Hamilton reports that all but one of the 11 post-war US recessions were preceded by a sharp rise in crude oil prices (E7, E8). That supports an association, though Hamilton cautions that oil price rises were not the sole cause of most postwar recessions and says they were a contributing factor in at least some (E9), and Barsky and Kilian question whether oil shocks matter much for the macroeconomy (E1, E5). On part (b), the only evidence is a 2016 finding cost of $27.07/boe (E10), which gives no earlier price to compare against. Nothing shows a trend price about 3.5 times an old level, so the evidence can neither confirm nor refute part (b), and the claim as a whole cannot be settled.