Administrations aim to achieve this objective, and to do so they stimulate the economy 12 to 18 months earlier because the economy is large, complicated and has plenty of inertia.

This is a general claim about political behaviour: US administrations aim for a strong economy and labour market before elections, and stimulate 12-18 months ahead because of economic lags. True: empirical research (political business cycle or presidential cycle studies) shows systematic pre-election fiscal or monetary stimulus with roughly a 12-18 month lead, and evidence of that intent. Mostly true: there is clear evidence of pre-election stimulus, but the timing differs somewhat from 12-18 months. Mixed: the evidence is split, with some administrations or periods showing it and others not. Mostly false: the evidence is weak or inconclusive, and the claim states an unproven pattern as established fact. False: research shows no such pre-election stimulus pattern.

Set before the research began.

1. E1 The Fed-Induced Political Business Cycle Munich Personal RePEc Archive (author: Yoshito Funashima, Tohoku Gakuin University) · April 2015

   “Our results indicate an inclination of the Federal Reserve to cut the Funds rate prior to presidential elections except for the 1990s.”

2. E2 The Political Business Cycle: How Significant? Public Finance Quarterly (Sage), by Stuart D. Allen, Joseph M. Sulock and William A. Sabo · January 1986

   “This article provides evidence that the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate conforms to a four-year political business cycle such as the one hypothesized by Nordhaus (1976) but only when the incumbent party wins the presidential election.”

3. E3 The Political Business Cycle: How Significant? Public Finance Quarterly (Sage), by Stuart D. Allen, Joseph M. Sulock and William A. Sabo · January 1986

   “Nordhaus's analysis suggests a political exploitation of a short-run Phillips curve in which an incumbent president fights inflation with higher unemployment during the first two years and then fights unemployment with expansionary policies during the last two years.”

4. E4 The Political Business Cycle: How Significant? Public Finance Quarterly (Sage), by Stuart D. Allen, Joseph M. Sulock and William A. Sabo · January 1986

   “McCallum (1978: 513) noted that although the tests were not exhaustive, the evidence "can only be regarded as unfavorable to the political business cycle theory."”

E1 finds the Federal Reserve tended to cut the Funds rate before presidential elections, but not in the 1990s. E2 finds unemployment follows a four-year political business cycle of the kind Nordhaus described (E3), but only when the incumbent party wins. E4 reports McCallum's 1978 tests as unfavourable to the theory. So the pattern shows up in some periods and not others. None of the evidence confirms the 12-18 month lead or shows that administrations intend it.