Scores by kind of claim
Each kind of claim is scored on its own, out of 100: the share that held up, with the range it likely falls in. Fewer resolved claims give a wider range.
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Factual claims
Statements about the present or the past, checked against the record: did they hold up?
85 79 91 -
Predictions
Statements about events outside the person's control, checked once they fell due: did they come true?
78 65 89 -
Promises
Commitments to the person's or organisation's own future action, with something to deliver: was it delivered?
72 57 85 -
Guidance
A company's own figures for its results over a period, checked against what it then reported.
Insufficient record: 1 guidance claim resolved, 5 needed for a score.
All types combined: 82 (likely 76 to 87, high confidence), from 77 claims: 51 factual claims, 14 predictions, 12 promises. It mixes kinds of claim in different proportions for different people, so compare people kind by kind.
Warren Buffett's claims
141 claims · page 2 of 2
“Absent a mega-catastrophe, we expect our float cost to fall in 2001 ¾ perhaps substantially ¾ in large part because of corrections in pricing at General Re that should increasingly be felt as the year progresses.”
Warren Buffett, Berkshire chairman, in annual letter 28 February 2001 Chairman's Letter (2000) (Berkshire Hathaway)
Absent a mega-catastrophe, Berkshire expected its float cost to fall in 2001, perhaps substantially, in large part because of pricing corrections at General Re.
Unresolvable The public record could not settle it.
The evidence is the person's or their organisation's own records.
Said for an organisation they lead or work for; it counts on both records.
What would count as true or false
Measure float cost as underwriting loss divided by average float, as Berkshire reports it. Compare 2001 with 2000. The claim is conditional on no mega-catastrophe. If a mega-catastrophe occurred in 2001, judge on Berkshire's reported 2001 float cost excluding that event's losses. If Berkshire did not report, and the evidence does not allow, an ex-catastrophe figure, the claim is unresolvable. True: the relevant 2001 float cost was lower than in 2000, and improved General Re pricing was a major contributor. "Perhaps substantially" is a hedge, so the size of the fall is not required. Mostly true: float cost fell, but mainly for reasons other than General Re pricing. Mostly false: float cost was roughly flat (within about 0.2 percentage points), or fell by a negligible amount. False: the relevant float cost rose.
Evidence
- Management's Discussion Berkshire Hathaway Inc. · 31 December 2000 Own record
“Due to the magnitude of underwriting losses in 2001, the cost of float was about 12.8%. In 2000, the cost of float was approximately 6.0%.”
- Chairman's Letter Berkshire Hathaway Inc. · 28 February 2002 Own record
“Last year I told you that, barring a mega-catastrophe, our cost of float would probably drop from its 2000 level of 6%.”
- Management's Discussion Berkshire Hathaway Inc. · 31 December 2000 Own record
“Underwriting results for 2001 include approximately $1.54 billion of net losses from the September 11th terrorist attack.”
- Management's Discussion Berkshire Hathaway Inc. · 31 December 2000 Own record
“Results in 2001 also included $800 million of net underwriting losses arising from increases to loss reserve estimates for loss events occurring in 2000 and prior years.”
- Chairman's Letter Berkshire Hathaway Inc. · 28 February 2002 Own record
“Last year I told you that, barring a mega-catastrophe, our cost of float would probably drop from its 2000 level of 6%. I had in mind natural catastrophes when I said that, but instead we were hit by a man-made catastrophe on September 11th ¾ an event that delivered the insurance industry its largest loss in history.”
- Management's Discussion Berkshire Hathaway Inc. Own record
“Due to the magnitude of underwriting losses in 2001, the cost of float was about 12.8%. In 2000, the cost of float was approximately 6.0%.”
- Management's Discussion Berkshire Hathaway Inc. Own record
“Over this period, increases in loss costs accelerated and outpaced pricing corrections.”
- 2001 Annual Report Berkshire Hathaway Inc. Own record
“Includes pre-tax underwriting loss of $2.4 billion in connection with the”
- a80220e10-k.txt (Berkshire Hathaway Inc. Form 10-K, fiscal year ended December 31, 2001) U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (filed by Berkshire Hathaway Inc.) Own record
“underwriting loss as a percentage of average float, increased from 6% in 2000 to 12.8% in 2001.”
- Note: The following table appears in the ... - Berkshire Hathaway (2001 Chairman's letter) Berkshire Hathaway Inc. Own record
“I had in mind natural catastrophes when I said that, but instead we were hit by a man-made catastrophe on September 11th – an event that delivered the insurance industry its largest loss in history.”
- a80220e10-k.txt (Berkshire Hathaway Inc. Form 10-K, fiscal year ended December 31, 2001) U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (filed by Berkshire Hathaway Inc.) Own record
“Underwriting results for 2001 include approximately $1.54 billion of net losses from the September 11th terrorist attack.”
- a80220e10-k.txt (Berkshire Hathaway Inc. Form 10-K, fiscal year ended December 31, 2001) U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (filed by Berkshire Hathaway Inc.) Own record
“results have been very poor. Over this period, increases in loss costs accelerated and outpaced pricing corrections.”
Reasoning
Berkshire's filings put the cost of float at about 12.8% in 2001, up from about 6.0% in 2000 (E1, E9). The 2001 letter describes the September 11th attack as a man-made catastrophe that delivered the insurance industry its largest loss in history (E5, E10), and Berkshire reports about $1.54 billion of net 2001 underwriting losses from it (E3). The criteria say to judge the 2001 figure without that event's losses. The evidence contains no ex-catastrophe figure, and it lacks the total 2001 underwriting loss and the average float needed to work it out. The evidence also mentions $800 million in prior-year reserve increases and loss costs that outpaced pricing corrections (E4, E12), but it still cannot show whether the ex-catastrophe float cost fell, so the claim is unresolvable.
Cite this claim
Warren Buffett, “Absent a mega-catastrophe, Berkshire expected its float cost to fall in 2001, perhaps substantially, in large part because of pricing corrections at General Re.” (said 28 February 2001). Verdict: unresolvable. Reliability API, claim c_6aca6b84481c, method 0.1.0+28da144b. https://epistacklabs.com/claims/c_6aca6b84481c
Claims without a verdict
- Unresolvable 141
- Not yet due 14
- Own records only 48
- Not researched 240
- Not checkable 1,035
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