ClaimsPeople

Michael Burry

Michael Burry is a widely known investor who founded Scion Capital/Scion Asset Management and writes a paid Substack newsletter, reported by Yahoo Finance to have passed 300,000 subscribers.

593 claims collected, 191 researched, 73 resolved. Report of 5 November 2026, method 0.1.0+c876030c.

Scores by kind of claim

Each kind of claim is scored on its own, out of 100: the share that held up, with the range it likely falls in. Fewer resolved claims give a wider range.

  • Factual claims

    Statements about the present or the past, checked against the record: did they hold up?

    74 67 80

    High confidence, 66 factual claims resolved. From 9 documents, 2001 to 2026; 14 documents sampled from 30 candidates found.

    Not scored: 46 unresolvable, 40 checkable only against their own records.

  • Predictions

    Statements about events outside the person's control, checked once they fell due: did they come true?

    62 43 81

    Low confidence, 6 predictions resolved. From 2 documents, 2006 to 2011; 14 documents sampled from 30 candidates found.

    Not scored: 20 unresolvable, 3 checkable only against their own records. 1 more fall due later.

    Does not yet allow for how likely each prediction was when made.

  • Promises

    Commitments to the person's or organisation's own future action, with something to deliver: was it delivered?

    Insufficient record: 1 promise resolved, 5 needed for a score.

    Not scored: 4 unresolvable, 2 not yet due, 2 checkable only against their own records.

All types combined: 73 (likely 66 to 79, high confidence), from 72 claims: 66 factual claims, 6 predictions. It mixes kinds of claim in different proportions for different people, so compare people kind by kind.

Michael Burry's claims

152 claims, sorted by newest said. Choose a claim to read it in full.
VerdictKindSaidClaimTopic
Mostly true Factual 6 Apr 2010 Michael Burry used six counterparties for his credit default swaps to limit exposure to any one of them. Factual · 6 Apr 2010 Their own work or organisation
Unresolvable Factual 6 Apr 2010 In 2005 and 2006 Michael Burry argued in letters to Scion Capital clients that the mortgage market would melt down in the second half of 2007, badly damaging the economy. Factual · 6 Apr 2010 Their own work or organisation
Mostly true Factual 6 Apr 2010 By December 2005, subprime mortgages issued six months earlier were already showing atypically high delinquency rates. Factual · 6 Apr 2010 Economics and markets
Own records only Factual 2008 The Scion Funds' portfolio of credit default swaps on subordinated tranches of subprime mortgage securitizations has been reduced to an insignificant size, with only three contracts remaining. Factual · 2008 Their own work or organisation
Own records only Factual 2008 Burry said he had recently found opportunity in a handful of severely battered South Korean securities, a Chinese media company and a global internet giant, and that such positions amounted to roughly one-third of the portfolio. Factual · 2008 Their own work or organisation
Own records only Factual 2008 If the Funds' remaining credit shorts fell to zero value, Scion Qualified Value Fund would lose about 19% of its value and Scion Value Fund about 15%. Factual · 2008 Their own work or organisation
Own records only Factual 2008 The Scion Funds are roughly one-fifth cash, held largely in foreign currencies. Factual · 2008 Their own work or organisation
Own records only Factual 2008 The Scion Funds established direct commodity exposure through futures contracts during a recent commodity price pullback. Factual · 2008 Their own work or organisation
Own records only Factual Nov 2006 The Scion funds do not participate in the cash residential mortgage-backed securities market. Factual · Nov 2006 Their own work or organisation
Own records only Factual Nov 2006 Variation in side pocket value comes from the Livedoor position being held in Japanese yen while the fund reports in dollars. Factual · Nov 2006 Their own work or organisation
Own records only Factual Nov 2006 On a notional basis, 41.6% of Scion's mortgage shorts are on BBB- tranches and 49.8% on BBB tranches. Factual · Nov 2006 Their own work or organisation
Own records only Factual Nov 2006 The Livedoor, Blue Ocean Re and Symetra side pockets are all carried at cost. Factual · Nov 2006 Their own work or organisation
Resolved true Factual Nov 2006 Servicers may generally advance interest payments to a mortgage pool when a mortgage goes delinquent. Factual · Nov 2006 Economics and markets
Own records only Factual 5 Oct 2006 During March–September 2005, Burry found most mortgage pools and their subordinate tranches totally unworthy as short candidates. Factual · 5 Oct 2006 Economics and markets
Own records only Factual 5 Oct 2006 Through September 2006 the Scion portfolio was down for the year, and its performance was solely due to its credit default swap positions. Factual · 5 Oct 2006 Their own work or organisation
Own records only Factual 5 Oct 2006 Burry attempts, within reason, to keep the Scion Value Fund and Scion Qualified Value Fund pari passu in portfolio composition. Factual · 5 Oct 2006 Their own work or organisation
Own records only Factual Oct 2006 At the end of October 2006, single name corporate CDS were 3.27% of assets under management in the Scion Value Fund and 3.55% in the Scion Qualified Value Fund. Factual · Oct 2006 Their own work or organisation
Own records only Factual 2006 Burry stated that Scion Capital negotiated very favorable ISDA agreements with all eight of its credit derivatives counterparties. Factual · 2006 Their own work or organisation
Own records only Factual 2006 The Scion funds carry credit default swaps on subprime mortgage-backed securities with $1.687 billion in notional value. Factual · 2006 Their own work or organisation
Unresolvable Factual 2006 Most mortgages underlying the tranches Scion is short have not yet reached their interest rate reset, the period of highest risk. Factual · 2006 Economics and markets
Own records only Factual 2006 Burry spends nearly all his time on stocks and other long-oriented analysis rather than shorts. Factual · 2006 Their own work or organisation
Unresolvable Factual 2006 The M9 tranche of the PPSI deal is just under $6 million, less than 1% of the original deal size. Factual · 2006 Economics and markets
Resolved true Factual 2006 Park Place Securities Incorporated (PPSI) is the depositor in the PPSI 2005-WLL1 mortgage deal. Factual · 2006 Economics and markets
Mixed Factual 2006 Because home prices rose steadily for a long time, troubled homeowners were able to refinance, take cash out and often reduce monthly payments at the same time, which reduced foreclosure rates. Factual · 2006 Economics and markets
Own records only Factual 2006 The Funds held quite a bit of cash in 2006, something that last occurred in the 2001-2002 era. Factual · 2006 Their own work or organisation
Own records only Factual 2006 The Scion Funds have roughly a 12% allocation in Asia, lower than in the past. Factual · 2006 Their own work or organisation
Own records only Factual 2006 Burry never expected Scion's mortgage short to pay off within one year. Factual · 2006 Their own work or organisation
Own records only Factual 2006 The Scion Funds hold roughly $2 million in put options focused on the Russell 2000 Index. Factual · 2006 Their own work or organisation
Unresolvable Factual 2006 Loss severities on foreclosed subprime mortgages rose during 2006 from 10-15% at the start of the year to 30-45% recently. Factual · 2006 Economics and markets
Mostly true Factual 2006 Burry said the positions "we" are short are now effectively undercollateralized by performing mortgages, pointing to ratios of delinquent, bankrupt, foreclosed and REO loans to total credit support, several of which were above one. Factual · 2006 Economics and markets
Mostly true Factual 2006 In a securitization, each trust is divided into tranches, each defined and rated by the degree of subordination protecting its principal from loss. Factual · 2006 Economics and markets
Unresolvable Factual Apr 2005 As far back as April 2005, Burry theorized in emails to his staff that a run on AIG would appear as collateral calls following a ratings downgrade. Factual · Apr 2005 Economics and markets
Unresolvable Factual 2004 By fall 2004 Countrywide Financial reported subprime mortgage originations up 158% year over year despite a 24% decline in overall originations, as Burry noted to investors. Factual · 2004 Economics and markets
Own records only Factual 2004 Since earlier in 2004, the Scion Funds have held long equity and distressed debt investments, domestic and foreign, positioned to benefit from higher oil prices. Factual · 2004 Their own work or organisation
Unresolvable Factual 6 Jan 2002 A stock held by the Fund tripled off its lows around the end of the quarter ending September 30, 2001, by late October 2001. Factual · 6 Jan 2002 Their own work or organisation
Own records only Factual 2002 The Scion Value Fund had about $27 million in capital, and its minimum initial investment for new investors was raised to $500,000. Factual · 2002 Their own work or organisation
Own records only Factual 2002 During the vast majority of 2001, the Scion Value Fund held no short positions at all. Factual · 2002 Their own work or organisation
Own records only Factual 2002 The Scion Value Fund's cash position, around 40% for most of Q4 2001, kept it from fully participating in the general price rise across most stock categories. Factual · 2002 Their own work or organisation
Own records only Factual 2002 Michael Burry invested the majority of his 2001 income back into the Scion Value Fund for a January 1 start. Factual · 2002 Their own work or organisation
Resolved true Factual 3 Jul 2001 The Scion Value Fund does not generally offer portfolio transparency to its members. Factual · 3 Jul 2001 Their own work or organisation
Own records only Factual 2001 Burry is a tax-paying US citizen. Factual · 2001 Their own work or organisation
Own records only Factual 2001 Burry personally had over $1 million invested in Scion Value Fund when writing the 2000 annual letter. Factual · 2001 Their own work or organisation
Mixed Factual 2001 The cost of employee stock option compensation is borne by shareholders through significant dilution. Factual · 2001 Economics and markets
Mostly true Factual 2001 Burry earns no income from Scion Capital unless members' annual return exceeds 6% net of expenses. Factual · 2001 Their own work or organisation
Unresolvable Factual 2001 As of the first quarter 2001 letter, Burry's Scion Capital fund was biased toward smaller capitalization stocks. Factual · 2001 Their own work or organisation
Own records only Factual 2001 The vast majority of Burry's net worth, aside from money for modest living expenses, is invested in the Scion Value Fund. Factual · 2001 Their own work or organisation
Own records only Factual 2001 The Scion Value Fund fell in Q3 2001 because several key stocks Burry chose declined in price. Factual · 2001 Their own work or organisation
Own records only Factual 2001 Burry keeps a list of about eighty stocks representing businesses with decent, predictable long-term characteristics. Factual · 2001 Their own work or organisation
Unresolvable Factual 2001 Burry told the room of potential clients that portfolio concentration and illiquidity do not define risk. Factual · 2001 Their own work or organisation
Unresolvable Factual 2001 Burry told a room of about 200 wealthy potential clients that risk is defined by ill-conceived investment, not by volatility. Factual · 2001 Their own work or organisation
Own records only Factual 2001 Burry holds no personal securities account apart from his investment in Scion Value Fund, and his professional focus is solely that fund. Factual · 2001 Their own work or organisation
Own records only Factual 2001 Because the Scion Value Fund added to several decliners, it was more valuable at the time of the letter than one quarter earlier. Factual · 2001 Their own work or organisation
Back to the list

Factual Their own work or organisation

“Suspecting that my Wall Street counterparties might not be able or willing to pay up when the time came, I used six counterparties to minimize my exposure to any one of them.”

Michael Burry, op-ed author 6 April 2010 Michael Burry Saw the Financial Crisis Coming. Why didn't the Fed? (NYT op-ed) (Lawrence University blog)

Michael Burry used six counterparties for his credit default swaps to limit exposure to any one of them.

Mostly true True in substance, wrong in a detail.

The second judge said mixed; the verdict shown is the first judge's.

What would count as true or false

Judged as of 2010-04-06. True: records show that Scion's mortgage CDS positions were spread across six dealer counterparties, chosen to limit exposure to any single one. Mostly true: the positions were deliberately spread across several counterparties, but the count was slightly different (five or seven). Mixed: the positions were spread across counterparties, but the number differs a good deal, or there is no evidence that the spread was meant to limit exposure. Mostly false: nearly all of the exposure was with one or two counterparties, with only token amounts elsewhere. False: Scion used just one or two counterparties.

Evidence

  1. Scion-Capital-Letters.pdf Scribd (uploaded copy of Scion Capital investor letters) Own record
    “The Funds have six counterparties from which credit protection on subordinated tranches of mortgage-backed securities has been purchased.”
  2. Scion-Capital-Letters.pdf Scribd (uploaded copy of Scion Capital investor letters) Own record
    “The creditworthiness of our counterparties is an integral part of the investment thesis, We have chosen counterparties that are among the largest banks and securities houses in the world”
  3. Betting on the Blind Side Vanity Fair · 1 April 2010
    “In a few weeks Mike Burry bought several hundred million dollars in credit-default swaps from half a dozen banks, in chunks of $5 million.”

Reasoning

A Scion Capital investor letter states that the Funds bought credit protection on subordinated mortgage-backed tranches from six counterparties (E1). An independent Vanity Fair excerpt also says Burry bought credit-default swaps from half a dozen banks (E3), so the count matches. The same letter says counterparty creditworthiness was an integral part of the thesis (E2), which shows concern about counterparty risk. However, no source says outright that the positions were spread to limit exposure to any one bank, so the stated reason is only partly supported.

Cite this claim

Michael Burry, “Michael Burry used six counterparties for his credit default swaps to limit exposure to any one of them.” (said 6 April 2010). Verdict: mostly true. Reliability API, claim c_ca0272197374, method 0.1.0+c876030c. https://epistacklabs.com/claims/c_ca0272197374

Claims without a verdict

Is a verdict here wrong, or do you speak for Michael Burry? Reply on the claim's own page, with the form at its foot (how replies work). Verdicts are made automatically; how verdicts and scores are made.