Michael Burry used six counterparties for his credit default swaps to limit exposure to any one of them.
Mostly true True in substance, wrong in a detail.
Factual: Statements about the present or the past, checked against the record: did they hold up?
The second judge said mixed; the verdict shown is the first judge's.
What would count as true or false
Judged as of 2010-04-06. True: records show that Scion's mortgage CDS positions were spread across six dealer counterparties, chosen to limit exposure to any single one. Mostly true: the positions were deliberately spread across several counterparties, but the count was slightly different (five or seven). Mixed: the positions were spread across counterparties, but the number differs a good deal, or there is no evidence that the spread was meant to limit exposure. Mostly false: nearly all of the exposure was with one or two counterparties, with only token amounts elsewhere. False: Scion used just one or two counterparties.
Set before the research began.
Evidence (3)
-
E1 Scion-Capital-Letters.pdf Scribd (uploaded copy of Scion Capital investor letters) Own record
“The Funds have six counterparties from which credit protection on subordinated tranches of mortgage-backed securities has been purchased.”
-
E2 Scion-Capital-Letters.pdf Scribd (uploaded copy of Scion Capital investor letters) Own record
“The creditworthiness of our counterparties is an integral part of the investment thesis, We have chosen counterparties that are among the largest banks and securities houses in the world”
-
E3 Betting on the Blind Side Vanity Fair · 1 April 2010
“In a few weeks Mike Burry bought several hundred million dollars in credit-default swaps from half a dozen banks, in chunks of $5 million.”
Reasoning
A Scion Capital investor letter states that the Funds bought credit protection on subordinated mortgage-backed tranches from six counterparties (E1). An independent Vanity Fair excerpt also says Burry bought credit-default swaps from half a dozen banks (E3), so the count matches. The same letter says counterparty creditworthiness was an integral part of the thesis (E2), which shows concern about counterparty risk. However, no source says outright that the positions were spread to limit exposure to any one bank, so the stated reason is only partly supported.
Cite this claim
Michael Burry, “Michael Burry used six counterparties for his credit default swaps to limit exposure to any one of them.” (said 6 April 2010). Verdict: mostly true. Reliability API, claim c_ca0272197374, method 0.1.0+c876030c, dataset release v1.1.2. https://epistacklabs.com/claims/c_ca0272197374
This claim is in dataset release v1.1.2, with the same verdict.
Reply to this claim
More factual claims by Michael Burry
-
Mostly true
“I have never said that LLMs would stop improving”
Michael Burry has never said that LLMs would stop improving.
-
Resolved true
“Why I swapped common stock for the junior preferred shares of Fannie Mae”
Michael Burry swapped common stock for junior preferred shares of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
-
Resolved true
“I never said the A100s would stop functioning.”
Michael Burry never said that A100 chips would stop functioning.
-
Mixed
“I have generally stayed away from biomed and medtech.”
Michael Burry has generally stayed away from investing in biomed and medtech.
-
Mostly true
“I am still running my money and active in markets.”
Michael Burry is still managing his own money and is active in markets.
Verdicts are made automatically; how verdicts are made.