ClaimsPeople

Michael Burry

Michael Burry is a widely known investor who founded Scion Capital/Scion Asset Management and writes a paid Substack newsletter, reported by Yahoo Finance to have passed 300,000 subscribers.

593 claims collected, 191 researched, 73 resolved. Report of 5 November 2026, method 0.1.0+c876030c.

Scores by kind of claim

Each kind of claim is scored on its own, out of 100: the share that held up, with the range it likely falls in. Fewer resolved claims give a wider range.

  • Factual claims

    Statements about the present or the past, checked against the record: did they hold up?

    74 67 80

    High confidence, 66 factual claims resolved. From 9 documents, 2001 to 2026; 14 documents sampled from 30 candidates found.

    Not scored: 46 unresolvable, 40 checkable only against their own records.

  • Predictions

    Statements about events outside the person's control, checked once they fell due: did they come true?

    62 43 81

    Low confidence, 6 predictions resolved. From 2 documents, 2006 to 2011; 14 documents sampled from 30 candidates found.

    Not scored: 20 unresolvable, 3 checkable only against their own records. 1 more fall due later.

    Does not yet allow for how likely each prediction was when made.

  • Promises

    Commitments to the person's or organisation's own future action, with something to deliver: was it delivered?

    Insufficient record: 1 promise resolved, 5 needed for a score.

    Not scored: 4 unresolvable, 2 not yet due, 2 checkable only against their own records.

All types combined: 73 (likely 66 to 79, high confidence), from 72 claims: 66 factual claims, 6 predictions. It mixes kinds of claim in different proportions for different people, so compare people kind by kind.

Michael Burry's claims

206 claims, sorted by newest said. Choose a claim to read it in full.
VerdictKindSaidClaimTopic
Mostly true Factual 5 Apr 2011 Of the people at troubled major institutions and relevant government departments whose insight about the crisis matched or exceeded Burry's, none was in the top job. Factual · 5 Apr 2011 Economics and markets
Mostly false Factual 5 Apr 2011 Wall Street firms all used one single risk model in the mid-2000s. Factual · 5 Apr 2011 Economics and markets
Resolved true Factual 5 Apr 2011 Secretary Paulson now claims that even had he known what was going to happen, he could not have done anything about it. Factual · 5 Apr 2011 Economics and markets
Mixed Factual 6 Apr 2010 After the crisis became clear in early 2007, the Fed chairman, Treasury secretary, president and senior members of Congress repeatedly underestimated its severity. Factual · 6 Apr 2010 Economics and markets
Resolved true Factual 6 Apr 2010 Michael Burry deliberately avoided Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns as swap counterparties. Factual · 6 Apr 2010 Their own work or organisation
Resolved true Factual 6 Apr 2010 Michael Burry shut down Scion Capital in 2008. Factual · 6 Apr 2010 Their own work or organisation
Resolved true Factual 6 Apr 2010 Michael Burry's prediction of a mortgage market meltdown was based on his research into the residential mortgage market and mortgage-backed securities. Factual · 6 Apr 2010 Their own work or organisation
Mostly true Factual 6 Apr 2010 Michael Burry began worrying about the housing market in 2003, when lenders resurrected interest-only mortgages and loosened credit standards. Factual · 6 Apr 2010 Economics and markets
Unresolvable Factual 6 Apr 2010 Scion's credit default swaps covered AIG, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, among other firms that failed or nearly failed. Factual · 6 Apr 2010 Their own work or organisation
Mixed Factual 6 Apr 2010 By mid-2005 Michael Burry bought credit default swaps on billions of dollars of subprime mortgage-backed securities and bonds of financial companies. Factual · 6 Apr 2010 Their own work or organisation
Mostly true Factual 6 Apr 2010 Goldman Sachs and other derivatives dealers did not demand daily collateral settlement from AAA-rated AIG. Factual · 6 Apr 2010 Economics and markets
Unresolvable Factual 6 Apr 2010 Throughout 2004, interest-only mortgages were offered to more and more subprime borrowers with the weakest credit. Factual · 6 Apr 2010 Economics and markets
Unresolvable Factual 6 Apr 2010 After studying regulatory filings on mortgage-backed securities, Michael Burry waited for lenders to offer the riskiest mortgages to the least qualified buyers. Factual · 6 Apr 2010 Their own work or organisation
Unresolvable Factual 6 Apr 2010 Michael Burry said that, during the same period, he also watched ratings agencies vouch for subprime mortgage-backed securities. Factual · 6 Apr 2010 Economics and markets
Mostly true Factual 6 Apr 2010 Michael Burry demanded daily collateral settlement on his swaps, with cash posted to Scion's account the next day if positions moved in its favor. Factual · 6 Apr 2010 Their own work or organisation
Unresolvable Factual 6 Apr 2010 By early 2008 Michael Burry exited all remaining credit default positions by auctioning them to Wall Street banks seeking protection. Factual · 6 Apr 2010 Their own work or organisation
Unresolvable Factual 6 Apr 2010 Burry exited his remaining credit default positions well before the government bailouts of the financial crisis. Factual · 6 Apr 2010 Their own work or organisation
Unresolvable Factual 6 Apr 2010 During 2007, under pressure from investors, Michael Burry liquidated most of Scion's credit default swaps at a substantial profit. Factual · 6 Apr 2010 Their own work or organisation
Mostly true Factual 6 Apr 2010 Michael Burry used six counterparties for his credit default swaps to limit exposure to any one of them. Factual · 6 Apr 2010 Their own work or organisation
Unresolvable Factual 6 Apr 2010 In 2005 and 2006 Michael Burry argued in letters to Scion Capital clients that the mortgage market would melt down in the second half of 2007, badly damaging the economy. Factual · 6 Apr 2010 Their own work or organisation
Mostly true Factual 6 Apr 2010 By December 2005, subprime mortgages issued six months earlier were already showing atypically high delinquency rates. Factual · 6 Apr 2010 Economics and markets
Own records only Factual 2008 The Scion Funds' portfolio of credit default swaps on subordinated tranches of subprime mortgage securitizations has been reduced to an insignificant size, with only three contracts remaining. Factual · 2008 Their own work or organisation
Own records only Factual 2008 Burry said he had recently found opportunity in a handful of severely battered South Korean securities, a Chinese media company and a global internet giant, and that such positions amounted to roughly one-third of the portfolio. Factual · 2008 Their own work or organisation
Own records only Factual 2008 If the Funds' remaining credit shorts fell to zero value, Scion Qualified Value Fund would lose about 19% of its value and Scion Value Fund about 15%. Factual · 2008 Their own work or organisation
Own records only Factual 2008 The Scion Funds are roughly one-fifth cash, held largely in foreign currencies. Factual · 2008 Their own work or organisation
Own records only Factual 2008 The Scion Funds established direct commodity exposure through futures contracts during a recent commodity price pullback. Factual · 2008 Their own work or organisation
Own records only Factual Nov 2006 The Scion funds do not participate in the cash residential mortgage-backed securities market. Factual · Nov 2006 Their own work or organisation
Not researched Factual Nov 2006 To the extent such replacement of fraudulent loans happened, it was disclosed in servicer reports, and it was not significant. Factual · Nov 2006 Economics and markets
Own records only Factual Nov 2006 Variation in side pocket value comes from the Livedoor position being held in Japanese yen while the fund reports in dollars. Factual · Nov 2006 Their own work or organisation
Own records only Factual Nov 2006 On a notional basis, 41.6% of Scion's mortgage shorts are on BBB- tranches and 49.8% on BBB tranches. Factual · Nov 2006 Their own work or organisation
Own records only Factual Nov 2006 The Livedoor, Blue Ocean Re and Symetra side pockets are all carried at cost. Factual · Nov 2006 Their own work or organisation
Not researched Factual Nov 2006 In a side pocket, exiting investors retain their portion of the side pocket, so remaining investors see no increase in concentration. Factual · Nov 2006 Their own work or organisation
Not researched Factual Nov 2006 In the early years of a mortgage pool, income is relatively fixed while payouts to investors float based on LIBOR. Factual · Nov 2006 Economics and markets
Not researched Factual Nov 2006 The stated life of each of Scion's swap contracts is technically 30 years. Factual · Nov 2006 Their own work or organisation
Not researched Factual Nov 2006 Scion's credit default swaps are cash-settle, pay-as-you-go contracts backed by the full credit of the counterparty. Factual · Nov 2006 Their own work or organisation
Not researched Factual Nov 2006 The trustee, not the servicer, administers cash flows to investors within a mortgage trust. Factual · Nov 2006 Economics and markets
Resolved true Factual Nov 2006 Servicers may generally advance interest payments to a mortgage pool when a mortgage goes delinquent. Factual · Nov 2006 Economics and markets
Not researched Factual Nov 2006 Prepayment speeds have determined the lifespan of mortgage pools for nearly the entire history of the mortgage-backed securitization market. Factual · Nov 2006 Economics and markets
Not researched Factual 5 Oct 2006 The Scion Value Fund lost 17.36% net of all expenses in 2006 through September 30. Factual · 5 Oct 2006 Their own work or organisation
Own records only Factual 5 Oct 2006 During March–September 2005, Burry found most mortgage pools and their subordinate tranches totally unworthy as short candidates. Factual · 5 Oct 2006 Economics and markets
Own records only Factual 5 Oct 2006 Through September 2006 the Scion portfolio was down for the year, and its performance was solely due to its credit default swap positions. Factual · 5 Oct 2006 Their own work or organisation
Own records only Factual 5 Oct 2006 Burry attempts, within reason, to keep the Scion Value Fund and Scion Qualified Value Fund pari passu in portfolio composition. Factual · 5 Oct 2006 Their own work or organisation
Own records only Factual Oct 2006 At the end of October 2006, single name corporate CDS were 3.27% of assets under management in the Scion Value Fund and 3.55% in the Scion Qualified Value Fund. Factual · Oct 2006 Their own work or organisation
Own records only Factual 2006 Burry stated that Scion Capital negotiated very favorable ISDA agreements with all eight of its credit derivatives counterparties. Factual · 2006 Their own work or organisation
Not researched Factual 2006 Recent year-over-year US national home price declines have not been seen since the Great Depression. Factual · 2006 Economics and markets
Own records only Factual 2006 The Scion funds carry credit default swaps on subprime mortgage-backed securities with $1.687 billion in notional value. Factual · 2006 Their own work or organisation
Unresolvable Factual 2006 Most mortgages underlying the tranches Scion is short have not yet reached their interest rate reset, the period of highest risk. Factual · 2006 Economics and markets
Not researched Factual 2006 In the example subprime pool, senior tranches A-1A and A-1B make up 79% of the pool and have credit support of 21% of the pool. Factual · 2006 Economics and markets
Own records only Factual 2006 Burry spends nearly all his time on stocks and other long-oriented analysis rather than shorts. Factual · 2006 Their own work or organisation
Unresolvable Factual 2006 The M9 tranche of the PPSI deal is just under $6 million, less than 1% of the original deal size. Factual · 2006 Economics and markets
Not researched Factual 2006 Burry said that as 2005 came to a close, organizers of new mortgage pools included or extended use of extra protections to bolster credit support for the pools' tranches, and that this is why he found many more recent deals much less attractive from a short's perspective than mid-2005 deals. Factual · 2006 Economics and markets
Not researched Factual 2006 In the PPSI 2005-WLL1 deal, Argent Mortgage and Olympus Mortgage separately originated subprime mortgages and each sold them to Ameriquest Mortgage Company. Factual · 2006 Economics and markets
Resolved true Factual 2006 Park Place Securities Incorporated (PPSI) is the depositor in the PPSI 2005-WLL1 mortgage deal. Factual · 2006 Economics and markets
Mixed Factual 2006 Because home prices rose steadily for a long time, troubled homeowners were able to refinance, take cash out and often reduce monthly payments at the same time, which reduced foreclosure rates. Factual · 2006 Economics and markets
Not researched Factual 2006 Home prices did not appreciate during the year before this 2006 letter. Factual · 2006 Economics and markets
Own records only Factual 2006 The Funds held quite a bit of cash in 2006, something that last occurred in the 2001-2002 era. Factual · 2006 Their own work or organisation
Not researched Factual 2006 Credit default swap protection contracts on these tranches are pay-as-you-go. Factual · 2006 Economics and markets
Own records only Factual 2006 The Scion Funds have roughly a 12% allocation in Asia, lower than in the past. Factual · 2006 Their own work or organisation
Own records only Factual 2006 Burry never expected Scion's mortgage short to pay off within one year. Factual · 2006 Their own work or organisation
Own records only Factual 2006 The Scion Funds hold roughly $2 million in put options focused on the Russell 2000 Index. Factual · 2006 Their own work or organisation
Unresolvable Factual 2006 Loss severities on foreclosed subprime mortgages rose during 2006 from 10-15% at the start of the year to 30-45% recently. Factual · 2006 Economics and markets
Mostly true Factual 2006 Burry said the positions "we" are short are now effectively undercollateralized by performing mortgages, pointing to ratios of delinquent, bankrupt, foreclosed and REO loans to total credit support, several of which were above one. Factual · 2006 Economics and markets
Not researched Factual 2006 The secondary market for mortgages is vast and deep thanks to the invention of mortgage-backed securitizations in the 1970s. Factual · 2006 Economics and markets
Mostly true Factual 2006 In a securitization, each trust is divided into tranches, each defined and rated by the degree of subordination protecting its principal from loss. Factual · 2006 Economics and markets
Unresolvable Factual Apr 2005 As far back as April 2005, Burry theorized in emails to his staff that a run on AIG would appear as collateral calls following a ratings downgrade. Factual · Apr 2005 Economics and markets
Unresolvable Factual 2004 By fall 2004 Countrywide Financial reported subprime mortgage originations up 158% year over year despite a 24% decline in overall originations, as Burry noted to investors. Factual · 2004 Economics and markets
Not researched Factual 2004 Inflation-adjusted oil prices have declined for decades and are not even half what they were in the 1970s. Factual · 2004 Economics and markets
Own records only Factual 2004 Since earlier in 2004, the Scion Funds have held long equity and distressed debt investments, domestic and foreign, positioned to benefit from higher oil prices. Factual · 2004 Their own work or organisation
Not researched Factual 6 Jan 2002 Burry committed the Fund to a substantial investment in the common stock of a company later targeted for acquisition by another investor. Factual · 6 Jan 2002 Their own work or organisation
Not researched Factual 6 Jan 2002 During 2001 the Fund, before the manager's performance allocation, outperformed the dividend-adjusted S&P 500 by 6,732 basis points. Factual · 6 Jan 2002 Their own work or organisation
Not researched Factual 6 Jan 2002 In early December 2001 a competitor agreed to buy all stock of a company held by the Fund at nearly seven times its September 30, 2001 price. Factual · 6 Jan 2002 Their own work or organisation
Not researched Factual 6 Jan 2002 During 2001 the Scion Value Fund appreciated 44.60% net of expenses and performance allocations. Factual · 6 Jan 2002 Their own work or organisation
Not researched Factual 6 Jan 2002 Since inception on November 1, 2000 to end-2001, the Scion Value Fund appreciated 54.16% net of allocations and expenses. Factual · 6 Jan 2002 Their own work or organisation
Unresolvable Factual 6 Jan 2002 A stock held by the Fund tripled off its lows around the end of the quarter ending September 30, 2001, by late October 2001. Factual · 6 Jan 2002 Their own work or organisation
Own records only Factual 2002 The Scion Value Fund had about $27 million in capital, and its minimum initial investment for new investors was raised to $500,000. Factual · 2002 Their own work or organisation
Own records only Factual 2002 During the vast majority of 2001, the Scion Value Fund held no short positions at all. Factual · 2002 Their own work or organisation
Own records only Factual 2002 The Scion Value Fund's cash position, around 40% for most of Q4 2001, kept it from fully participating in the general price rise across most stock categories. Factual · 2002 Their own work or organisation
Own records only Factual 2002 Michael Burry invested the majority of his 2001 income back into the Scion Value Fund for a January 1 start. Factual · 2002 Their own work or organisation
Not researched Factual 2002 Since shortly after the Scion Value Fund's inception, Burry has outsourced administration and bookkeeping to Hedgeworks, LLC. Factual · 2002 Their own work or organisation
Not researched Factual 3 Jul 2001 The Black-Scholes methodology relies on volatility for pricing options. Factual · 3 Jul 2001 Economics and markets
Not researched Factual 3 Jul 2001 Burry does not hedge the Scion Value Fund's portfolio, except to the extent that buying securities very cheaply may be considered a hedge. Factual · 3 Jul 2001 Their own work or organisation
Not researched Factual 3 Jul 2001 During the first half of 2001 the Scion Value Fund appreciated 22.00% net of expenses and performance allocations. Factual · 3 Jul 2001 Their own work or organisation
Resolved true Factual 3 Jul 2001 The Scion Value Fund does not generally offer portfolio transparency to its members. Factual · 3 Jul 2001 Their own work or organisation
Not researched Factual 2001 Unlike nearly every other industry, technology companies pay employees in a way that hides much of the compensation expense from the income statement (stock options). Factual · 2001 Economics and markets
Own records only Factual 2001 Burry is a tax-paying US citizen. Factual · 2001 Their own work or organisation
Own records only Factual 2001 Burry personally had over $1 million invested in Scion Value Fund when writing the 2000 annual letter. Factual · 2001 Their own work or organisation
Mixed Factual 2001 The cost of employee stock option compensation is borne by shareholders through significant dilution. Factual · 2001 Economics and markets
Not researched Factual 2001 The Scion Value Fund's largest holding on September 11, 2001 was an airline stock. Factual · 2001 Their own work or organisation
Not researched Factual 2001 In the first nine months of 2001 the Scion Value Fund appreciated 10.98% net of expenses and performance allocations. Factual · 2001 Their own work or organisation
Mostly true Factual 2001 Burry earns no income from Scion Capital unless members' annual return exceeds 6% net of expenses. Factual · 2001 Their own work or organisation
Unresolvable Factual 2001 As of the first quarter 2001 letter, Burry's Scion Capital fund was biased toward smaller capitalization stocks. Factual · 2001 Their own work or organisation
Own records only Factual 2001 The vast majority of Burry's net worth, aside from money for modest living expenses, is invested in the Scion Value Fund. Factual · 2001 Their own work or organisation
Own records only Factual 2001 The Scion Value Fund fell in Q3 2001 because several key stocks Burry chose declined in price. Factual · 2001 Their own work or organisation
Not researched Factual 2001 In the two months ended December 31, 2000, Scion Value Fund's net performance beat the S&P 500 by 14.08%. Factual · 2001 Their own work or organisation
Own records only Factual 2001 Burry keeps a list of about eighty stocks representing businesses with decent, predictable long-term characteristics. Factual · 2001 Their own work or organisation
Not researched Factual 2001 Burry earns a paycheck from the Fund only if he achieves a return on investors' capital in excess of the hurdle rate. Factual · 2001 Their own work or organisation
Not researched Factual 2001 Counting option compensation recognized by the IRS as an expense would cut Adobe's operating income, less investment gains and interest, from $408 million to $51 million. Factual · 2001 Economics and markets
Unresolvable Factual 2001 Burry told the room of potential clients that portfolio concentration and illiquidity do not define risk. Factual · 2001 Their own work or organisation
Not researched Factual 2001 In its first period to December 31, 2000, Scion Value Fund acquired no short positions or options contracts. Factual · 2001 Their own work or organisation
Not researched Factual 2001 Scion Capital charges no quarterly asset-based fee and relies entirely on performance-based compensation. Factual · 2001 Their own work or organisation
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Factual Economics and markets

“However, NONE – ZERO ‐ were in the top job.”

Michael Burry, speaking at Vanderbilt lecture 5 April 2011 Transcript of Michael Burry's talk, Missteps to Mayhem (Vanderbilt News)

Of the people at troubled major institutions and relevant government departments whose insight about the crisis matched or exceeded Burry's, none was in the top job.

Mostly true True in substance, wrong in a detail.

What would count as true or false

Judged as of 2011-04-05. The test is whether anyone holding the top job (CEO or chair of a troubled major financial institution, or head of a relevant government department or agency) had a documented pre-crisis understanding of the housing and credit crisis that matched or exceeded Burry's, shown in contemporaneous memos, testimony, public statements or actions such as directing a large hedge against the subprime collapse. True: the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission report, congressional testimony and similar records show no such top-job holder. Mostly true: the general point holds, but there is one marginal or arguable case, for example a top executive at a mid-sized or peripheral firm, or partial foresight that falls short of Burry's. Mixed: one or two clearly documented top-job holders at major troubled institutions or relevant departments did show insight comparable to Burry's. Mostly false: several such top-job holders are documented, so 'none – zero' is a substantial overstatement. False: the evidence shows that top-job holders at many of these institutions or departments broadly shared or exceeded Burry's insight.

Evidence

  1. The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (Final Report of the National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States) Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (U.S. government) · January 2011
    “Even among those who worried that the housing bubble might burst, few—if any—foresaw the magnitude of the crisis that would ensue.”
  2. The Regulators Who Saw Crisis Coming ProPublica · 25 September 2008
    “We started sounding warnings about risks arising from this lending activity as early as June 1998.”
  3. The Regulators Who Saw Crisis Coming ProPublica · 25 September 2008
    “urged Alan Greenspan in 2000 to use the power of the Federal Reserve to crack down on subprime mortgage lenders”
  4. Goldman CEO, 'Fabulous Fab' Facing Congress WBUR · 27 April 2010
    “During most of 2007, we maintained a net short subprime (mortgage) position and therefore stood to benefit from declining prices in the mortgage market.”

Reasoning

The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission found that "few—if any" of those who worried about a housing bubble foresaw how large the crisis would be (E1). That supports the general point. There are arguable partial cases. An article titled 'The Regulators Who Saw Crisis Coming' quotes an unnamed speaker saying 'we' began warning about risks from this lending activity as early as June 1998 (E2). The quote does not show whether the speaker held a top job, or that those warnings matched Burry's view of the collapse. Goldman Sachs held a net short subprime position during 2007 (E4), but the evidence does not show what its CEO personally understood. Fed chairman Alan Greenspan was urged in 2000 to use the Federal Reserve's power to crack down on subprime mortgage lenders (E3), but the evidence does not show how he responded or that he foresaw the crisis. The "none – zero" point holds, with only marginal or partial exceptions, which fits mostly true under the criteria.

Cite this claim

Michael Burry, “Of the people at troubled major institutions and relevant government departments whose insight about the crisis matched or exceeded Burry's, none was in the top job.” (said 5 April 2011). Verdict: mostly true. Reliability API, claim c_deae0c10466c, method 0.1.0+c876030c. https://epistacklabs.com/claims/c_deae0c10466c

Claims without a verdict

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