Of the people at troubled major institutions and relevant government departments whose insight about the crisis matched or exceeded Burry's, none was in the top job.

Judged as of 2011-04-05. The test is whether anyone holding the top job (CEO or chair of a troubled major financial institution, or head of a relevant government department or agency) had a documented pre-crisis understanding of the housing and credit crisis that matched or exceeded Burry's, shown in contemporaneous memos, testimony, public statements or actions such as directing a large hedge against the subprime collapse. True: the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission report, congressional testimony and similar records show no such top-job holder. Mostly true: the general point holds, but there is one marginal or arguable case, for example a top executive at a mid-sized or peripheral firm, or partial foresight that falls short of Burry's. Mixed: one or two clearly documented top-job holders at major troubled institutions or relevant departments did show insight comparable to Burry's. Mostly false: several such top-job holders are documented, so 'none – zero' is a substantial overstatement. False: the evidence shows that top-job holders at many of these institutions or departments broadly shared or exceeded Burry's insight.

Set before the research began.

1. E1 The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (Final Report of the National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States) Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (U.S. government) · January 2011

   “Even among those who worried that the housing bubble might burst, few—if any—foresaw the magnitude of the crisis that would ensue.”

2. E2 The Regulators Who Saw Crisis Coming ProPublica · 25 September 2008

   “We started sounding warnings about risks arising from this lending activity as early as June 1998.”

3. E3 The Regulators Who Saw Crisis Coming ProPublica · 25 September 2008

   “urged Alan Greenspan in 2000 to use the power of the Federal Reserve to crack down on subprime mortgage lenders”

4. E4 Goldman CEO, 'Fabulous Fab' Facing Congress WBUR · 27 April 2010

   “During most of 2007, we maintained a net short subprime (mortgage) position and therefore stood to benefit from declining prices in the mortgage market.”

The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission found that "few—if any" of those who worried about a housing bubble foresaw how large the crisis would be (E1). That supports the general point. There are arguable partial cases. An article titled 'The Regulators Who Saw Crisis Coming' quotes an unnamed speaker saying 'we' began warning about risks from this lending activity as early as June 1998 (E2). The quote does not show whether the speaker held a top job, or that those warnings matched Burry's view of the collapse. Goldman Sachs held a net short subprime position during 2007 (E4), but the evidence does not show what its CEO personally understood. Fed chairman Alan Greenspan was urged in 2000 to use the Federal Reserve's power to crack down on subprime mortgage lenders (E3), but the evidence does not show how he responded or that he foresaw the crisis. The "none – zero" point holds, with only marginal or partial exceptions, which fits mostly true under the criteria.