Scores by kind of claim
Each kind of claim is scored on its own, out of 100: the share that held up, with the range it likely falls in. Fewer resolved claims give a wider range.
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Factual claims
Statements about the present or the past, checked against the record: did they hold up?
76 70 81 -
Predictions
Statements about events outside the person's control, checked once they fell due: did they come true?
68 54 82 -
Promises
Commitments to the person's or organisation's own future action, with something to deliver: was it delivered?
Insufficient record: 3 promises resolved, 5 needed for a score.
All types combined: 74 (likely 69 to 80, high confidence), from 96 claims: 82 factual claims, 14 predictions. It mixes kinds of claim in different proportions for different people, so compare people kind by kind.
Bill Ackman's claims
42 claims
“We largely abandoned this strategy in 2009 as corporations recapitalized and balance sheets improved”
Bill Ackman, Pershing Square letter January 2016 Bill Ackman's Pershing Square Annual Investor Letter (2015 letter) (GuruFocus)
Pershing Square largely abandoned its strategy of shorting the credit of highly rated, highly leveraged companies as a hedge in 2009.
Mostly true True in substance, wrong in a detail.
The evidence is the person's or their organisation's own records.
Said for an organisation they lead or work for; it counts on both records.
What would count as true or false
True: Pershing Square letters, reports or reliable press coverage show that the firm used shorts on corporate credit (e.g., credit default swaps) as a hedge before and during the financial crisis, and largely unwound or stopped using this strategy in 2009. Mostly true: it was largely abandoned, but in late 2008 or 2010 rather than in 2009, or a small residual position stayed in place. Mixed: the strategy was cut back substantially in 2009 but stayed significant for some time after. Mostly false: the hedge was used, but the evidence shows it continued at scale for well after 2009. False: Pershing Square did not use a credit-short hedging strategy, or it did not wind it down around that time.
Evidence
- Pershing Square Q3 2008 Investor Letter Scribd (copy of Pershing Square investor letter) · 3 November 2008 Own record
“We recently repurchased CDS on the investment grade credit index as certain technical factors have made this investment/hedge attractive once again.”
- Pershing Square Holdings, Ltd. Public Class USD Accum.Shs (PSHZF) Q3 FY2022 Earnings Call Transcript - November 17, 2022 roic.ai · 17 November 2022 Own record
“So we had a period of practically a decade where there was -- we had no meaningful hedges in place other than forward contracts where we were concerned about some risk of moves in currencies”
- 1 Pershing Square Holdings, Ltd. · 26 January 2016 Own record
“Because CDS have been an unattractive hedge, we have looked for other instruments and hedges”
- Pershing Square Q3 2008 Investor Letter Scribd (copy of Pershing Square investor letter) · 3 November 2008 Own record
“default swaps in cases where spreads have increased significantly, and have covered certain short”
- Pershing Square Holdings, Ltd. Public Class USD Accum.Shs (PSHZF) Q3 FY2022 Earnings Call Transcript - November 17, 2022 roic.ai · 17 November 2022 Own record
“So we had a period of practically a decade where there was -- we had no meaningful hedges in place other than forward contracts where we were concerned about some risk of moves in currencies, whereas”
- Pershing Square Q2 Letter Scribd (repost of Pershing Square Capital Management letter) · 18 September 2009 Own record
“Many of the poorly capitalized businesses with bad business models, and aggressive or fraudulent financials on which we owned CDS imploded during the credit crisis. We exited these positions at large profits.”
- Pershing Square Q2 Letter Scribd (repost of Pershing Square Capital Management letter) · 18 September 2009 Own record
“We currently own a small portfolio of principally single-name CDS which represents disaster protection more so than investments on which we expect to profit.”
Reasoning
Pershing Square's Q3 2008 investor letter shows the firm held CDS on the investment-grade credit index as an "investment/hedge" during the crisis (E2, E5). Its Q2 2009 letter says it exited CDS positions at large profits and by then held only "a small portfolio of principally single-name CDS" as disaster protection (E8, E9). A 2022 earnings call describes about a decade with no meaningful hedges apart from currency forwards (E3), and the 2016 letter says CDS had been an unattractive hedge (E4). This supports the claim that the strategy was largely dropped in 2009, but a small residual position remained, which the criteria rate as mostly true. All of these are the firm's own letters and transcripts.
Cite this claim
Bill Ackman, “Pershing Square largely abandoned its strategy of shorting the credit of highly rated, highly leveraged companies as a hedge in 2009.” (said January 2016). Verdict: mostly true. Reliability API, claim c_a586f70e1df3, method 0.1.0+c876030c. https://epistacklabs.com/claims/c_a586f70e1df3
Claims without a verdict
- Unresolvable 135
- Not yet due 9
- Own records only 29
- Not researched 162
- Not checkable 431
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