Pershing Square largely abandoned its strategy of shorting the credit of highly rated, highly leveraged companies as a hedge in 2009.
Mostly true True in substance, wrong in a detail.
Factual: Statements about the present or the past, checked against the record: did they hold up?
The evidence is the person's or their organisation's own records.
Said for an organisation they lead or work for; it counts on both records.
What would count as true or false
True: Pershing Square letters, reports or reliable press coverage show that the firm used shorts on corporate credit (e.g., credit default swaps) as a hedge before and during the financial crisis, and largely unwound or stopped using this strategy in 2009. Mostly true: it was largely abandoned, but in late 2008 or 2010 rather than in 2009, or a small residual position stayed in place. Mixed: the strategy was cut back substantially in 2009 but stayed significant for some time after. Mostly false: the hedge was used, but the evidence shows it continued at scale for well after 2009. False: Pershing Square did not use a credit-short hedging strategy, or it did not wind it down around that time.
Set before the research began.
Evidence (7)
-
E1 Pershing Square Q3 2008 Investor Letter Scribd (copy of Pershing Square investor letter) · 3 November 2008 Own record
“We recently repurchased CDS on the investment grade credit index as certain technical factors have made this investment/hedge attractive once again.”
-
E2 Pershing Square Holdings, Ltd. Public Class USD Accum.Shs (PSHZF) Q3 FY2022 Earnings Call Transcript - November 17, 2022 roic.ai · 17 November 2022 Own record
“So we had a period of practically a decade where there was -- we had no meaningful hedges in place other than forward contracts where we were concerned about some risk of moves in currencies”
-
E3 1 Pershing Square Holdings, Ltd. · 26 January 2016 Own record
“Because CDS have been an unattractive hedge, we have looked for other instruments and hedges”
-
E4 Pershing Square Q3 2008 Investor Letter Scribd (copy of Pershing Square investor letter) · 3 November 2008 Own record
“default swaps in cases where spreads have increased significantly, and have covered certain short”
-
E5 Pershing Square Holdings, Ltd. Public Class USD Accum.Shs (PSHZF) Q3 FY2022 Earnings Call Transcript - November 17, 2022 roic.ai · 17 November 2022 Own record
“So we had a period of practically a decade where there was -- we had no meaningful hedges in place other than forward contracts where we were concerned about some risk of moves in currencies, whereas”
-
E6 Pershing Square Q2 Letter Scribd (repost of Pershing Square Capital Management letter) · 18 September 2009 Own record
“Many of the poorly capitalized businesses with bad business models, and aggressive or fraudulent financials on which we owned CDS imploded during the credit crisis. We exited these positions at large profits.”
-
E7 Pershing Square Q2 Letter Scribd (repost of Pershing Square Capital Management letter) · 18 September 2009 Own record
“We currently own a small portfolio of principally single-name CDS which represents disaster protection more so than investments on which we expect to profit.”
Reasoning
Pershing Square's Q3 2008 investor letter shows the firm held CDS on the investment-grade credit index as an "investment/hedge" during the crisis (E2, E5). Its Q2 2009 letter says it exited CDS positions at large profits and by then held only "a small portfolio of principally single-name CDS" as disaster protection (E8, E9). A 2022 earnings call describes about a decade with no meaningful hedges apart from currency forwards (E3), and the 2016 letter says CDS had been an unattractive hedge (E4). This supports the claim that the strategy was largely dropped in 2009, but a small residual position remained, which the criteria rate as mostly true. All of these are the firm's own letters and transcripts.
Cite this claim
Bill Ackman, “Pershing Square largely abandoned its strategy of shorting the credit of highly rated, highly leveraged companies as a hedge in 2009.” (said January 2016). Verdict: mostly true. Reliability API, claim c_a586f70e1df3, method 0.1.0+c876030c, dataset release v1.1.2. https://epistacklabs.com/claims/c_a586f70e1df3
This claim is in dataset release v1.1.2, with the same verdict.
Reply to this claim
More factual claims by Bill Ackman
-
Resolved false
“the average life of an S&P 500 CEO is probably, I don’t know, 4 years or 3 years, 3 and a half years or something like this.”
-
Mostly true
“SpaceX is near monopoly in terms of low-cost space launch.”
-
Resolved true
“We created it out of the bankruptcy of General Growth.”
Howard Hughes was created out of the bankruptcy of General Growth as a spinoff of its other assets.
-
Resolved true
“2 years later, we emerged from Chapter 11.”
General Growth emerged from Chapter 11 two years after Pershing Square's investment.
-
Resolved true
“The company’s got a 4 billion dollar market cap, and the goal is to build it into a trillion-dollar thing over time, compounding.”
Howard Hughes Holdings has a market capitalisation of about $4 billion.
Verdicts are made automatically; how verdicts are made.