The 'immune system' that evolved in response to computer viruses has been largely effective.

This is a claim about degree. Judge as of October 2000 whether defences against computer viruses (antivirus software, signature updates, response teams such as CERT) had largely kept viruses from causing lasting or systemic damage. True: contemporary expert assessments and incident data show that outbreaks were generally contained quickly and computing infrastructure kept working despite viruses. Mostly true: defences were broadly effective, but with notable exceptions (for example major outbreaks like Melissa in 1999 or ILOVEYOU in 2000 causing large but temporary losses). Mixed: the evidence is evenly split, with defences effective in many respects but repeatedly failing against major fast-spreading outbreaks with large economic damage. Mostly false: contemporary assessments mainly describe defences as lagging and outbreaks as causing widespread serious damage, with effectiveness only in narrow respects. False: the evidence shows defences were largely ineffective at the time.

Set before the research began.

1. E1 issue036.txt (Net-Sec newsletter, Issue 36) Help Net Security (net-security.org), mirrored at web.textfiles.com · 30 October 2000

   “The number of corporations infected by viruses this year has risen by 20 percent, with the pace of infections accelerating rapidly, according to a report issued Monday by anti-virus consulting firm ICSA.net.”

2. E2 issue036.txt (Net-Sec newsletter, Issue 36) Help Net Security (net-security.org), mirrored at web.textfiles.com · 30 October 2000

   “the danger for corporate "virus disasters" is worse now than it has ever been in the six years that ISCA has been conducting”

3. E3 Net-Sec newsletter Issue 36 Help Net Security (net-security.org), reproduced on textfiles.com · 30 October 2000

   “The number of corporations infected by viruses this year has risen by 20 percent, with the pace of infections accelerating rapidly, according to a report issued Monday by anti-virus consulting firm ICSA.net.”

4. E4 Net-Sec newsletter Issue 36 Help Net Security (net-security.org), reproduced on textfiles.com · 30 October 2000

   “the danger for corporate "virus disasters" is worse now than it has ever been in the six years that ISCA has been conducting its annual virus surveys.”

5. E5 Net-Sec newsletter Issue 36 Help Net Security (net-security.org), reproduced on textfiles.com · 30 October 2000

   “Kaspersky Lab has began to receive numerous reports of virus infections caused by this type of malicious program.”

6. E6 Information Security: "ILOVEYOU" Computer Virus Emphasizes ... U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO/T-AIMD-00-171, testimony by Keith A. Rhodes) · 10 May 2000

   “While the ILOVEYOU worm/virus resulted in relatively limited damage in terms of systems corrupted, the incident continues to underscore the formidable challenge”

7. E7 Information Security: "ILOVEYOU" Computer Virus Emphasizes ... U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO/T-AIMD-00-171, testimony by Keith A. Rhodes) · 10 May 2000

   “responding to the virus/worm has been a tremendous task that took several days to get under control. Some DOD machines required complete software reloads to overcome the extent of the damage.”

8. E8 Information Security: "ILOVEYOU" Computer Virus Emphasizes ... U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO/T-AIMD-00-171, testimony by Keith A. Rhodes) · 10 May 2000

   “Like Melissa more than a year ago, little information was available early enough for agencies to take proactive steps to mitigate the damage.”

9. E9 Information Security: "ILOVEYOU" Computer Virus Emphasizes ... U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO/T-AIMD-00-171, testimony by Keith A. Rhodes) · 10 May 2000

   “most were fortunate that the worst damage done was to shut down e-mail systems and temporarily disrupt operations”

GAO testimony from May 2000 says the ILOVEYOU worm caused relatively limited damage in terms of systems corrupted. It also says most agencies were fortunate that the worst damage was shut-down e-mail and temporary disruption (E6, E9), which suggests outbreaks were eventually contained. The same testimony says ILOVEYOU took several days to bring under control, some DOD machines needed full software reloads, and, as with Melissa, too little information arrived early enough for proactive steps (E7, E8). An ICSA.net survey reported a week after the claim found corporate infections up 20 percent that year and accelerating, with the danger of 'virus disasters' worse than in any of the six years of its surveys (E1, E4). So the evidence is split: the GAO testimony describes ILOVEYOU's damage as relatively limited and mostly temporary [E6][E9], but it also describes ILOVEYOU taking several days to get under control and too little early information for both ILOVEYOU and Melissa [E7][E8], and a contemporary survey report describes a rise in the number of corporations infected [E1][E2].