ClaimsPeople

Michael Burry

Michael Burry is a widely known investor who founded Scion Capital/Scion Asset Management and writes a paid Substack newsletter, reported by Yahoo Finance to have passed 300,000 subscribers.

593 claims collected, 191 researched, 73 resolved. Report of 5 November 2026, method 0.1.0+c876030c.

Scores by kind of claim

Each kind of claim is scored on its own, out of 100: the share that held up, with the range it likely falls in. Fewer resolved claims give a wider range.

  • Factual claims

    Statements about the present or the past, checked against the record: did they hold up?

    74 67 80

    High confidence, 66 factual claims resolved. From 9 documents, 2001 to 2026; 14 documents sampled from 30 candidates found.

    Not scored: 46 unresolvable, 40 checkable only against their own records.

    See the factual claims

  • Predictions

    Statements about events outside the person's control, checked once they fell due: did they come true?

    62 43 81

    Low confidence, 6 predictions resolved. From 2 documents, 2006 to 2011; 14 documents sampled from 30 candidates found.

    Not scored: 20 unresolvable, 3 checkable only against their own records. 1 more fall due later.

    Does not yet allow for how likely each prediction was when made.

    See the predictions

  • Promises

    Commitments to the person's or organisation's own future action, with something to deliver: was it delivered?

    Insufficient record: 1 promise resolved, 5 needed for a score.

    Not scored: 4 unresolvable, 2 not yet due, 2 checkable only against their own records.

    See the promises

All types combined: 73 (likely 66 to 79, high confidence), from 72 claims: 66 factual claims, 6 predictions. It mixes kinds of claim in different proportions for different people, so compare people kind by kind.

Michael Burry's claims

593 claims · page 5 of 6

593 claims, sorted by newest said. Choose a claim to read it in full.
VerdictKindSaidClaimTopic
Not checkable Not checkable 13 Apr 2011 In my view, men are at their best when scrambling from the abyss, and are typically something less at all other times. Not checkable · 13 Apr 2011
Not checkable Not checkable 13 Apr 2011 Whatever success I was bound to achieve, I would repeatedly face severe doubt from the well‐credentialed who looked down on my lack of… Not checkable · 13 Apr 2011
Not checkable Not checkable 13 Apr 2011 The effort showed I cannot sell ANYTHING. Not checkable · 13 Apr 2011
Not checkable Not checkable 13 Apr 2011 But this is an invalid validation of what America is doing. Not checkable · 13 Apr 2011
Not checkable Not checkable 13 Apr 2011 2006 would in fact be the year systemic risk was supersized. Not checkable · 13 Apr 2011
Not checkable Not checkable 13 Apr 2011 And those 22.5 million public workers have no business unionizing against the taxpayer. Not checkable · 13 Apr 2011
Not checkable Not checkable 13 Apr 2011 Such a conclusion is worthless. It guarantees we will make the same mistakes again. Not checkable · 13 Apr 2011
Not checkable Not checkable 13 Apr 2011 It is simply a tragedy of fate that ever‐lower returns encourage ever‐increasing leverage, with only one possible ultimate outcome. Not checkable · 13 Apr 2011
Not checkable Not checkable 13 Apr 2011 I could talk about those for hours. Not checkable · 13 Apr 2011
Not checkable Not checkable 13 Apr 2011 Bespoke one offs were full of contract and counterparty risk and were not my thing. Not checkable · 13 Apr 2011
Not checkable Not checkable 13 Apr 2011 I imagined the top in the housing market would be marked by a mortgage in which home buyers of subprime quality were enticed to buy with… Not checkable · 13 Apr 2011
Not checkable Not checkable 13 Apr 2011 Our country’s math is scary big, but what’s even more scary is that it simply does not work. Not checkable · 13 Apr 2011
Not checkable Not checkable 13 Apr 2011 I have nothing but the highest respect for Vanderbilt and the people here. Not checkable · 13 Apr 2011
Not checkable Not checkable 13 Apr 2011 That our CEOs, our Governors, our Presidents, our Chairmen, did not see this coming, and did not adequately prepare their constituencies… Not checkable · 13 Apr 2011
Not checkable Not checkable 13 Apr 2011 The government’s borrowing of money for the purpose of injecting cash into society, bailing out banks, brokers, and consumers, is a… Not checkable · 13 Apr 2011
Not checkable Not checkable 13 Apr 2011 But I knew my analysis was correct, and not one of the detractors seemed to be able to get any of the details right. Not checkable · 13 Apr 2011
Unresolvable Factual 5 Apr 2011 From Burry's point of view at the time, Goldman Sachs had been moving to his side of the subprime short trade as early as December 2006 and was working to get into the trade even bigger in spring 2007. Factual · 5 Apr 2011 Economics and markets
Mostly true Factual 5 Apr 2011 Credit derivatives on an underlying asset could be worth multiple orders of magnitude more than the asset because all asset-backed derivatives settled in cash. Factual · 5 Apr 2011 Economics and markets
Resolved true Factual 5 Apr 2011 Burry wrote a paper in 1994, as a summer extern at the Rehabilitation Institute of Chicago, on why rehabilitation medicine was doing well. Factual · 5 Apr 2011 Their own work or organisation
Resolved true Prediction 5 Apr 2011 Burry said he expected the US government to attempt to continue easy money policies into the next presidential term. Prediction · 5 Apr 2011 Economics and markets
Resolved true Factual 5 Apr 2011 Burry decided to short the mortgage market, intending to profit from its collapse. Factual · 5 Apr 2011 Their own work or organisation
Mostly true Factual 5 Apr 2011 Burry left medicine with $145,000 in debt and no assets under management when starting Scion Capital. Factual · 5 Apr 2011 Their own work or organisation
Unresolvable Factual 5 Apr 2011 Michael Burry's formal education is not in finance. Factual · 5 Apr 2011 Their own work or organisation
Unresolvable Factual 5 Apr 2011 AIG did not need to post collateral for its derivatives trades as long as it held a AA or better credit rating. Factual · 5 Apr 2011 Economics and markets
Resolved true Factual 5 Apr 2011 Fed Chairman Bernanke says the Federal Reserve is not printing money. Factual · 5 Apr 2011 Economics and markets
Mostly true Factual 5 Apr 2011 Under QE II, the Federal Reserve monetizes roughly $7 to $8 billion of Treasuries each day, according to a daily Fed email. Factual · 5 Apr 2011 Economics and markets
Unresolvable Factual 5 Apr 2011 Around December 2006, Burry's fund liquidated billions of dollars of corporate credit default swap short positions in a fire sale instead of liquidating the fund. Factual · 5 Apr 2011 Their own work or organisation
Mostly true Factual 5 Apr 2011 Burry ran a website during the latter half of the 1990s on which he posted his thoughts about stocks and markets. Factual · 5 Apr 2011 Their own work or organisation
Unresolvable Factual 5 Apr 2011 In late 2005 technical factors, including synthetic CDOs and ABX indices, kept credit derivative markets from signalling a warning about subprime risk. Factual · 5 Apr 2011 Economics and markets
Mostly false Factual 5 Apr 2011 AIG was nationalized a few years after 2005 and the nationalization cost taxpayers some $180 billion. Factual · 5 Apr 2011 Economics and markets
Resolved true Factual 5 Apr 2011 Two trillion seconds equals about 64,000 years. Factual · 5 Apr 2011 Other
Mostly true Factual 5 Apr 2011 After Burry criticized index funds and hyperlinked to Vanguard on his website, Vanguard's attorneys told him to cease and desist. Factual · 5 Apr 2011 Their own work or organisation
Mixed Factual 5 Apr 2011 Burry's proposed "Milton's Opus" never got off the ground, after his investors met it with scepticism and outside institutions he approached went off to do the idea themselves. Factual · 5 Apr 2011 Their own work or organisation
Mostly true Factual 5 Apr 2011 Of the people at troubled major institutions and relevant government departments whose insight about the crisis matched or exceeded Burry's, none was in the top job. Factual · 5 Apr 2011 Economics and markets
Mostly false Factual 5 Apr 2011 Wall Street firms all used one single risk model in the mid-2000s. Factual · 5 Apr 2011 Economics and markets
Resolved true Factual 5 Apr 2011 Secretary Paulson now claims that even had he known what was going to happen, he could not have done anything about it. Factual · 5 Apr 2011 Economics and markets
Mostly false Prediction 5 Apr 2011 US interest expense on the national debt alone could exceed $1 trillion by 2020. Prediction · 5 Apr 2011 Economics and markets
Unresolvable Prediction 6 Apr 2010 Future generations of Americans will suffer terrible financial consequences from the bailouts and the extended bubble. Prediction · 6 Apr 2010 Economics and markets
Mixed Factual 6 Apr 2010 After the crisis became clear in early 2007, the Fed chairman, Treasury secretary, president and senior members of Congress repeatedly underestimated its severity. Factual · 6 Apr 2010 Economics and markets
Not checkable Not checkable 6 Apr 2010 Unfortunately, he did not give good advice. Not checkable · 6 Apr 2010
Resolved true Factual 6 Apr 2010 Michael Burry deliberately avoided Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns as swap counterparties. Factual · 6 Apr 2010 Their own work or organisation
Not checkable Not checkable 6 Apr 2010 To me, these agencies seemed not to be paying much attention. Not checkable · 6 Apr 2010
Resolved true Factual 6 Apr 2010 Michael Burry shut down Scion Capital in 2008. Factual · 6 Apr 2010 Their own work or organisation
Resolved true Factual 6 Apr 2010 Michael Burry's prediction of a mortgage market meltdown was based on his research into the residential mortgage market and mortgage-backed securities. Factual · 6 Apr 2010 Their own work or organisation
Not checkable Not checkable 6 Apr 2010 I knew that would mark the beginning of the end of the housing bubble; it would mean that prices had risen — with the expansion of easy… Not checkable · 6 Apr 2010
Mostly true Factual 6 Apr 2010 Michael Burry began worrying about the housing market in 2003, when lenders resurrected interest-only mortgages and loosened credit standards. Factual · 6 Apr 2010 Economics and markets
Unresolvable Factual 6 Apr 2010 Scion's credit default swaps covered AIG, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, among other firms that failed or nearly failed. Factual · 6 Apr 2010 Their own work or organisation
Not checkable Not checkable 6 Apr 2010 Yet the tide was about to turn. Not checkable · 6 Apr 2010
Not checkable Not checkable 6 Apr 2010 The truth is, he should have seen what was coming and offered a sober, apolitical warning. Not checkable · 6 Apr 2010
Not checkable Not checkable 6 Apr 2010 Since then, I have often wondered why nobody in Washington showed any interest in hearing exactly how I arrived at my conclusions that the… Not checkable · 6 Apr 2010
Not checkable Not checkable 6 Apr 2010 If the mistakes were properly outlined, that might both inform Congress’s efforts to improve financial regulation and help keep future Fed… Not checkable · 6 Apr 2010
Mixed Factual 6 Apr 2010 By mid-2005 Michael Burry bought credit default swaps on billions of dollars of subprime mortgage-backed securities and bonds of financial companies. Factual · 6 Apr 2010 Their own work or organisation
Not checkable Not checkable 6 Apr 2010 Because I had been operating in the face of strong opposition from both my investors and the Wall Street community, it took everything I… Not checkable · 6 Apr 2010
Not checkable Not checkable 6 Apr 2010 But the signs were all there in 2005, when a bursting of the bubble would have had far less dire consequences, and when the government… Not checkable · 6 Apr 2010
Mostly true Factual 6 Apr 2010 Goldman Sachs and other derivatives dealers did not demand daily collateral settlement from AAA-rated AIG. Factual · 6 Apr 2010 Economics and markets
Unresolvable Factual 6 Apr 2010 Throughout 2004, interest-only mortgages were offered to more and more subprime borrowers with the weakest credit. Factual · 6 Apr 2010 Economics and markets
Unresolvable Factual 6 Apr 2010 After studying regulatory filings on mortgage-backed securities, Michael Burry waited for lenders to offer the riskiest mortgages to the least qualified buyers. Factual · 6 Apr 2010 Their own work or organisation
Unresolvable Factual 6 Apr 2010 Michael Burry said that, during the same period, he also watched ratings agencies vouch for subprime mortgage-backed securities. Factual · 6 Apr 2010 Economics and markets
Not checkable Not checkable 6 Apr 2010 And at this point there is no reason to reflexively dismiss the analysis of those who foresaw the crisis. Not checkable · 6 Apr 2010
Mostly true Factual 6 Apr 2010 Michael Burry demanded daily collateral settlement on his swaps, with cash posted to Scion's account the next day if positions moved in its favor. Factual · 6 Apr 2010 Their own work or organisation
Not checkable Not checkable 6 Apr 2010 Instead, our leaders in Washington either willfully or ignorantly aided and abetted the bubble. Not checkable · 6 Apr 2010
Unresolvable Factual 6 Apr 2010 By early 2008 Michael Burry exited all remaining credit default positions by auctioning them to Wall Street banks seeking protection. Factual · 6 Apr 2010 Their own work or organisation
Unresolvable Factual 6 Apr 2010 Burry exited his remaining credit default positions well before the government bailouts of the financial crisis. Factual · 6 Apr 2010 Their own work or organisation
Unresolvable Factual 6 Apr 2010 During 2007, under pressure from investors, Michael Burry liquidated most of Scion's credit default swaps at a substantial profit. Factual · 6 Apr 2010 Their own work or organisation
Not checkable Not checkable 6 Apr 2010 ultimately leaving themselves with only one policy tool — the epic and unfair taxpayer-financed bailouts. Not checkable · 6 Apr 2010
Not checkable Not checkable 6 Apr 2010 As a nation, we cannot afford to live with Mr. Greenspan’s way of thinking. Not checkable · 6 Apr 2010
Mostly true Factual 6 Apr 2010 Michael Burry used six counterparties for his credit default swaps to limit exposure to any one of them. Factual · 6 Apr 2010 Their own work or organisation
Not checkable Not checkable 6 Apr 2010 It did not have to be this way. Not checkable · 6 Apr 2010
Unresolvable Factual 6 Apr 2010 In 2005 and 2006 Michael Burry argued in letters to Scion Capital clients that the mortgage market would melt down in the second half of 2007, badly damaging the economy. Factual · 6 Apr 2010 Their own work or organisation
Mostly true Factual 6 Apr 2010 By December 2005, subprime mortgages issued six months earlier were already showing atypically high delinquency rates. Factual · 6 Apr 2010 Economics and markets
Not checkable Not checkable 6 Apr 2010 Mr. Greenspan should use his substantial intellect and unsurpassed knowledge of government to ascertain and explain exactly how he and… Not checkable · 6 Apr 2010
Not checkable Not checkable 6 Apr 2010 Increasingly, lenders concerned themselves more with the quantity of mortgages they sold than with their quality. Not checkable · 6 Apr 2010
Not checkable Not checkable 6 Apr 2010 By mid-2005, I had so much confidence in my analysis that I staked my reputation on it. Not checkable · 6 Apr 2010
Not checkable Not checkable 6 Apr 2010 But at the time almost no one else thought these trades would work out in my favor. Not checkable · 6 Apr 2010
Not checkable Not checkable 6 Apr 2010 I believed that the collapse of the subprime mortgage market would ultimately lead to huge failures among the largest financial… Not checkable · 6 Apr 2010
Not checkable Not checkable 4 Mar 2010 And yes, I am talking about March 2001, not March 2000. Not checkable · 4 Mar 2010
Not checkable Not checkable 4 Mar 2010 Many stocks remain overvalued, and speculative excess – both on the upside and on the downside – is embedded in the frenzy around stocks of… Not checkable · 4 Mar 2010
Not checkable Not checkable 4 Mar 2010 The preference, always, would be to buy a long-term franchise at a substantial discount from growing intrinsic value. Not checkable · 4 Mar 2010
Not checkable Not checkable 4 Mar 2010 these stocks, having largely missed out on the speculative ride up, have nevertheless frequently been pushed down to absurd levels owing to… Not checkable · 4 Mar 2010
Not checkable Not checkable 4 Mar 2010 In essence, the stock market represents three separate categories of business. Not checkable · 4 Mar 2010
Not checkable Not checkable 4 Mar 2010 They are, adjusted for inflation, those with shrinking intrinsic value, those with approximately stable intrinsic value, and those with… Not checkable · 4 Mar 2010
Not checkable Not checkable 4 Mar 2010 The bulk of the opportunities remain in undervalued, smaller, more illiquid situations that often represent average or slightly… Not checkable · 4 Mar 2010
Not checkable Not checkable 4 Mar 2010 I will not label this Fund a “small cap” fund, for this may not be where the best opportunities are next month or next year. Not checkable · 4 Mar 2010
Not checkable Not checkable 4 Mar 2010 Hence, the world’s best companies largely remain overpriced in the marketplace. Not checkable · 4 Mar 2010
Not checkable Not checkable 4 Mar 2010 it is my feeling that the revisions have not been severe enough, the expectations not yet realistic enough. Not checkable · 4 Mar 2010
Not checkable Not checkable 4 Mar 2010 As for the future, I can only say the Fund will always be biased to where the value is. Not checkable · 4 Mar 2010
Not checkable Not checkable 4 Mar 2010 When I stand on my special-issue “Intelligent Investor” ladder and peer out over the frenzied crowd, I see very few others doing the same. Not checkable · 4 Mar 2010
Not checkable Not checkable 4 Mar 2010 If recent trends continue, it would not be surprising to find the stocks of several larger capitalization stocks with significant long-term… Not checkable · 4 Mar 2010
Not checkable Not checkable 4 Mar 2010 the valuations placed on these securities have implied overly rosy scenarios prone to popular revision in times of more realistic… Not checkable · 4 Mar 2010
Own records only Factual 2008 The Scion Funds' portfolio of credit default swaps on subordinated tranches of subprime mortgage securitizations has been reduced to an insignificant size, with only three contracts remaining. Factual · 2008 Their own work or organisation
Own records only Factual 2008 Burry said he had recently found opportunity in a handful of severely battered South Korean securities, a Chinese media company and a global internet giant, and that such positions amounted to roughly one-third of the portfolio. Factual · 2008 Their own work or organisation
Own records only Factual 2008 If the Funds' remaining credit shorts fell to zero value, Scion Qualified Value Fund would lose about 19% of its value and Scion Value Fund about 15%. Factual · 2008 Their own work or organisation
Mostly true Prediction 2008 Less leverage and lower returns on assets are now likely for financial institutions. Prediction · 2008 Economics and markets
Own records only Factual 2008 The Scion Funds are roughly one-fifth cash, held largely in foreign currencies. Factual · 2008 Their own work or organisation
Own records only Prediction 2008 Burry said that, with only three such contracts remaining in force, he did not expect further meaningful impact on the Funds' portfolios from this sort of trade. Prediction · 2008 Their own work or organisation
Own records only Promise 2008 Scion Capital is closing its dedicated Asian investment funds and returning capital to investors in those funds. Promise · 2008 Their own work or organisation
Mixed Prediction 2008 Burry said he imagined that shares of most of these financial companies would become very boring before they became attractive again. Prediction · 2008 Economics and markets
Own records only Factual 2008 The Scion Funds established direct commodity exposure through futures contracts during a recent commodity price pullback. Factual · 2008 Their own work or organisation
Resolved true Prediction 2007 The S&P 500 could easily finish 2008 with a negative return, dragging down crowded value-oriented investment funds. Prediction · 2007 Economics and markets
Own records only Factual Nov 2006 The Scion funds do not participate in the cash residential mortgage-backed securities market. Factual · Nov 2006 Their own work or organisation
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Michael Burry

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Not checkable

“In my view, men are at their best when scrambling from the abyss, and are typically something less at all other times.”

Michael Burry 13 April 2011 Transcript of Michael Burry's talk, Missteps to Mayhem (Vanderbilt News)

In my view, men are at their best when scrambling from the abyss, and are typically something less at all other times.

Not checkable An opinion, value judgement or statement with nothing to check.

Cite this claim

Michael Burry, “In my view, men are at their best when scrambling from the abyss, and are typically something less at all other times.” (said 13 April 2011). Verdict: not checkable. Reliability API, claim c_ab5451580e43, method 0.1.0+c876030c. https://epistacklabs.com/claims/c_ab5451580e43

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