Scores by kind of claim
Each kind of claim is scored on its own, out of 100: the share that held up, with the range it likely falls in. Fewer resolved claims give a wider range.
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Factual claims
Statements about the present or the past, checked against the record: did they hold up?
74 67 80 -
Predictions
Statements about events outside the person's control, checked once they fell due: did they come true?
62 43 81 -
Promises
Commitments to the person's or organisation's own future action, with something to deliver: was it delivered?
Insufficient record: 1 promise resolved, 5 needed for a score.
All types combined: 73 (likely 66 to 79, high confidence), from 72 claims: 66 factual claims, 6 predictions. It mixes kinds of claim in different proportions for different people, so compare people kind by kind.
Michael Burry's claims
30 claims
“This was something I knew that Goldman Sachs and other derivatives dealers did not demand of AAA-rated A.I.G.”
Michael Burry, op-ed author 6 April 2010 Michael Burry Saw the Financial Crisis Coming. Why didn't the Fed? (NYT op-ed) (Lawrence University blog)
Goldman Sachs and other derivatives dealers did not demand daily collateral settlement from AAA-rated AIG.
Mostly true True in substance, wrong in a detail.
The second judge would not resolve this claim; the verdict shown is the first judge's.
What would count as true or false
Judged as of 2010-04-06, about the CDS arrangements before 2007–2008. True: records show that Goldman Sachs and other dealers' CDS contracts with AIG Financial Products did not require AIG to post collateral (or settle collateral daily) while AIG kept its AAA rating, with collateral triggered only by downgrades or market-value thresholds, while dealers did require collateral from counterparties such as Scion. Mostly true: the core point holds, but there is a small difference in the details, for example some contracts had limited collateral provisions but no daily settlement. Mixed: Goldman's arrangements matched the claim but other dealers' did not, or the reverse. Mostly false: AIG did have to post collateral under market-value triggers, which is how Goldman got its collateral calls in 2007, but the claim distorts how often or on what basis. False: dealers routinely demanded daily collateral settlement from AIG while it was AAA rated.
Evidence
- Michael Burry's Testimony Before The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission ValueWalk · 29 March 2011 Own record
“I shorted their credit but it was just on the fact about collateral and just what I knew about AAA counterparties and collateral and what I thought was coming down the road; but not with AIG, just in general.”
- Michael Burry's Testimony Before The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission ValueWalk · 29 March 2011
“FCIC: You talked about the particular terms of the master agreement which you negotiated for your own confirmations and master agreements. Did you specifically negotiate any terms related to the collateral trigger points? Not that it would change hands daily but what …?”
- Michael Burry's Testimony Before The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission ValueWalk · 29 March 2011
“FCIC: I take it the dispute was with the counterparties was, “Hey your marks aren’t low enough, you should be posting collateral for us?””
- Michael Burry's Testimony Before The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission ValueWalk · 29 March 2011 Own record
“With AIG I was just looking with the fact that they are a AAA, they’re busy, they’re impossible to analyze, but I shorted their credit but it was just on the fact about collateral”
- Michael Burry's Testimony Before The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission ValueWalk · 29 March 2011 Own record
“Did you specifically negotiate any terms related to the collateral trigger points? Not that it would change hands daily”
- AIG in Hindsight Robert L. McDonald and Anna Paulson NBER Working Paper Series (Working Paper 21108) · April 2015
“Most of the credit default swap contracts written by AIG did not call for full exchange of variation margin.”
- AIG in Hindsight Robert L. McDonald and Anna Paulson NBER Working Paper Series (Working Paper 21108) · April 2015
“Some contracts made no provision for any exchange of collateral. Most often, AIG would make collateral payments only if the decline in value of the insured assets exceeded some predefined threshold.”
- Remarks of Commissioner Brian D. Quintenz Commodity Futures Trading Commission at the ICDA 39th Annual European Summit (Bürgenstock) U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission · 18 September 2018
“Instead, under the terms of these bilateral contracts, AIG was only required to post margin in the event the market value of the underlying mortgage-backed securities dropped, or if AIG itself suffered a credit downgrade.”
- Remarks of Commissioner Brian D. Quintenz Commodity Futures Trading Commission at the ICDA 39th Annual European Summit (Bürgenstock) U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission · 18 September 2018
“In July 2007, after the credit ratings agencies downgraded their ratings of mortgage-backed securities, AIG received its first collateral call from Goldman Sachs.”
Reasoning
Independent sources say most of AIG's CDS contracts did not call for full exchange of variation margin, which is the daily-settlement arrangement (E7). Some contracts had no collateral provision at all, and most required AIG to post only when the insured assets fell in value past a set threshold or when AIG was downgraded (E8, E9). That supports the core claim that dealers did not demand daily collateral settlement from AIG. However, AIG did have collateral obligations: it was required to post margin if the market value of the underlying mortgage-backed securities dropped or if AIG was downgraded (E9, E8), and Goldman Sachs made its first collateral call on AIG in July 2007, after the rating agencies downgraded mortgage-backed securities (E10); the evidence does not clearly establish what dealers required of Scion. So the claim is mostly true rather than fully true.
Cite this claim
Michael Burry, “Goldman Sachs and other derivatives dealers did not demand daily collateral settlement from AAA-rated AIG.” (said 6 April 2010). Verdict: mostly true. Reliability API, claim c_5b8a1a84d593, method 0.1.0+c876030c. https://epistacklabs.com/claims/c_5b8a1a84d593
Claims without a verdict
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