Scores by kind of claim
Each kind of claim is scored on its own, out of 100: the share that held up, with the range it likely falls in. Fewer resolved claims give a wider range.
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Factual claims
Statements about the present or the past, checked against the record: did they hold up?
76 70 82 -
Predictions
Statements about events outside the person's control, checked once they fell due: did they come true?
60 42 78
All types combined: 74 (likely 68 to 80, high confidence), from 79 claims: 71 factual claims, 8 predictions. It mixes kinds of claim in different proportions for different people, so compare people kind by kind.
Eliezer Yudkowsky's claims
236 claims · page 3 of 3
“Since Copycat is a model of perceptual analogy-making, rather than a model of category formation, Copycat has a limited store of preprogrammed concepts and does not learn further concepts through experience.”
Eliezer Yudkowsky, MIRI researcher, paper author 2007 Levels of Organization in General Intelligence (MIRI)
The Copycat program has a limited store of preprogrammed concepts and does not learn further concepts through experience.
Resolved true The record shows it happened or was so.
Said for an organisation they lead or work for; it counts on both records.
What would count as true or false
Judged as of 2007 against descriptions of Hofstadter and Mitchell's Copycat program. True: published descriptions show that Copycat's concepts (in the Slipnet) are a fixed, preprogrammed set and that the program does not create new concepts from experience. Mostly true: the core point holds, with a minor nuance, for example node activations and conceptual depths change during a run but no new concepts are learned. Mixed: Copycat has some limited concept learning, so the claim is about half right. Mostly false: Copycat has meaningful mechanisms for acquiring new concepts that the claim ignores. False: Copycat is documented to learn new concepts through experience as a core feature.
Evidence
- Hofstadter 1995: The copycat project: A model of mental fluidity and analogy-making Jim Davies (personal site summary of Hofstadter and Mitchell, Fluid Concepts and Creative Analogies, 1995)
“The net changes during the course of a run, but doesn't change permanently as a result. New concepts are not created.”
- Copycat (software) - Wikipedia Wikipedia
“The codelets rely on an associative network, slipnet, built on pre-programmed concepts and their associations (a long-term memory).”
- Exploring Copycat Architecture: A Cognitive Science Perspective on Analogy-Making - SlideServe SlideServe (presentation by Uma Ramamurthy, Cognitive Science Seminar) · 29 January 2003
“Copycat’s Shortcomings • No Learning • No new Slipnet nodes can be created • No new Codelets can be generated”
- How Could a Copycat Ever be Creative? AAAI Technical Report SS-93-01 (Douglas Hofstadter) · 1993
“manufactures its own mutable representations”
Reasoning
E1 summarises Hofstadter and Mitchell's 1995 description of Copycat. It says the network changes during a run but not permanently, and that new concepts are not created. E2 describes the slipnet as built on pre-programmed concepts. E3 lists as a shortcoming that Copycat has no learning and that no new Slipnet nodes can be created. E4's phrase about mutable representations does not mention learning new concepts, so it does not clearly contradict the claim.
Cite this claim
Eliezer Yudkowsky, “The Copycat program has a limited store of preprogrammed concepts and does not learn further concepts through experience.” (said 2007). Verdict: resolved true. Reliability API, claim c_914c8600742f, method 0.1.0+c876030c. https://epistacklabs.com/claims/c_914c8600742f
Claims without a verdict
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