Scores by kind of claim
Each kind of claim is scored on its own, out of 100: the share that held up, with the range it likely falls in. Fewer resolved claims give a wider range.
-
Factual claims
Statements about the present or the past, checked against the record: did they hold up?
76 70 82 -
Predictions
Statements about events outside the person's control, checked once they fell due: did they come true?
60 42 78
All types combined: 74 (likely 68 to 80, high confidence), from 79 claims: 71 factual claims, 8 predictions. It mixes kinds of claim in different proportions for different people, so compare people kind by kind.
Eliezer Yudkowsky's claims
236 claims · page 3 of 3
“but the process is not really open to human introspection.”
Eliezer Yudkowsky, author, MIRI paper 2007 Levels of Organization in General Intelligence (MIRI)
The process of visualizing a triangular light bulb is not really open to human introspection.
Mostly true True in substance, wrong in a detail.
The second judge said resolved true; the verdict shown is the first judge's.
Said for an organisation they lead or work for; it counts on both records.
What would count as true or false
Judge against cognitive science as of 2007. True: research shows that the processes underlying visual imagery, such as forming a mental image of a new object, are largely unconscious and cannot be reached by introspection, beyond awareness of the resulting image. Mostly true: the processes are mostly inaccessible to introspection, with some debated partial access. Mixed: the research is genuinely split. Mostly false: the evidence is inconclusive, or shows meaningful introspective access that the claim overstates the absence of. False: research shows that the mechanisms of visual imagery are substantially open to introspection.
Evidence
- ERIC - EJ163657 - Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes, Psychological Review, 1977 ERIC (Education Resources Information Center), abstracting Nisbett & Wilson, Psychological Review 84(3) · 1977
“Evidence is reviewed which suggests that there may be little or no direct introspective access to higher order cognitive processes.”
- What the Mind's Eye Tells the Mind's Brain: A Critique of Mental Imagery Springer (chapter by Z.W. Pylyshyn, in Nicholas (ed.), Images, Perception, and Knowledge) · 1973
“requires that we posit abstract mental structures to which we do not have conscious access and which are essentially conceptual and propositional, rather than sensory or pictorial, in nature.”
- Imagery and Imagination Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy · 28 March 2023
“Nonetheless, the subjects never realized that they were seeing an image of a banana.”
- Imagery debate - Wikipedia Wikipedia · 30 April 2023
“Although the imagery debate was a central focus of cognitive research in the 1980s, it was never conclusively resolved.”
Reasoning
Nisbett & Wilson's 1977 review [E1] found that there may be little or no direct introspective access to higher-order cognitive processes. Pylyshyn's critique of mental imagery [E2] argues that imagery depends on abstract structures to which we have no conscious access. The finding reported in [E3], that subjects never realized they were seeing an image of a banana, bears on the limits of introspective discrimination. The imagery debate [E4] was never conclusively resolved, and the evidence's tentative wording ("may be") points to mostly rather than fully inaccessible processes.
Cite this claim
Eliezer Yudkowsky, “The process of visualizing a triangular light bulb is not really open to human introspection.” (said 2007). Verdict: mostly true. Reliability API, claim c_72fa8b709e63, method 0.1.0+c876030c. https://epistacklabs.com/claims/c_72fa8b709e63
Claims without a verdict
Is a verdict here wrong, or do you speak for Eliezer Yudkowsky? Reply on the claim's own page, with the form at its foot (how replies work). Verdicts are made automatically; how verdicts and scores are made.