Scores by kind of claim
Each kind of claim is scored on its own, out of 100: the share that held up, with the range it likely falls in. Fewer resolved claims give a wider range.
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Factual claims
Statements about the present or the past, checked against the record: did they hold up?
76 70 81 -
Predictions
Statements about events outside the person's control, checked once they fell due: did they come true?
68 54 82 -
Promises
Commitments to the person's or organisation's own future action, with something to deliver: was it delivered?
Insufficient record: 3 promises resolved, 5 needed for a score.
All types combined: 74 (likely 69 to 80, high confidence), from 96 claims: 82 factual claims, 14 predictions. It mixes kinds of claim in different proportions for different people, so compare people kind by kind.
Bill Ackman's claims
35 claims
“highly-levered, hedge-fund-like business”
Bill Ackman, speaking at Ira Sohn conference 5 May 2014 Bill Ackman Presentation At Ira Sohn 2014 Investment Conference (Hedge Fund Alpha)
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac's fixed-income arbitrage activity is a highly-levered, hedge-fund-like business.
Resolved true The record shows it happened or was so.
The second judge would not resolve this claim; the verdict shown is the first judge's.
What would count as true or false
This is a characterisation, judged as of May 2014 (and on the period it describes, before conservatorship). True: the evidence shows that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac's retained-portfolio ("fixed-income arbitrage") business consisted of buying mortgages and MBS funded largely with debt at their low implied-guarantee borrowing cost, earning the spread, with high leverage (thin capital relative to assets, for example capital of a few percent or less of portfolio assets). Sources would be their filings, FHFA, Treasury, the Fed or GAO, or independent analysts who describe it in comparable terms (as a carry, arbitrage or hedge-fund-like activity). Mostly true: the activity was substantially as described but the evidence shows its leverage was moderate rather than high, or by 2014 the portfolios had largely been wound down under conservatorship caps, so the description fits mainly the earlier period. Mixed: credible sources dispute the description on substantive grounds roughly as much as they support it. Mostly false: the business was a spread business but not highly levered or not comparable to a hedge fund in any meaningful sense. False: the GSEs did not run a materially leveraged, debt-funded investment portfolio.
Evidence
- Guaranteed to Fail: Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and the Debacle of Mortgage Finance Acharya, Richardson, Van Nieuwerburgh and White (NYU Stern); hosted by St. Louis Fed · January 2011
“With respect to (ii), the GSEs were to hold 2.50% capital against their balance sheet assets (of which mortgages are by far the largest category).”
- Guaranteed to Fail: Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and the Debacle of Mortgage Finance Acharya, Richardson, Van Nieuwerburgh and White (NYU Stern); hosted by St. Louis Fed · January 2011
“Over this period, the GSE leverage ratios generally ranged between values of 20 to 40 whereas the commercial banking sector had ratios of 10 to 15.”
- Guaranteed to Fail: Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and the Debacle of Mortgage Finance Acharya, Richardson, Van Nieuwerburgh and White (NYU Stern); hosted by St. Louis Fed · January 2011
“Rather than making markets more liquid, it had as its true objective to make money for the shareholders, traders, and CEOs of the GSEs, just as is true of any other hedge fund.”
- Fannie, Freddie, and the Crisis National Affairs
“The investment portfolios actually generated a cumulative net profit of $13 billion over the same period.”
Reasoning
The NYU Stern analysis hosted by the St. Louis Fed reports that the GSEs had to hold 2.50% capital against their balance-sheet assets (E1). It also puts their leverage ratios at 20 to 40, against 10 to 15 for commercial banks (E2). The same source says the portfolio business existed to make money for shareholders, traders and CEOs, "just as is true of any other hedge fund" (E3). That is independent support for both the high-leverage part and the hedge-fund comparison. E4 shows the portfolios made a cumulative profit, which fits a spread business and does not contradict the description.
Cite this claim
Bill Ackman, “Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac's fixed-income arbitrage activity is a highly-levered, hedge-fund-like business.” (said 5 May 2014). Verdict: resolved true. Reliability API, claim c_ae9d1a147296, method 0.1.0+c876030c. https://epistacklabs.com/claims/c_ae9d1a147296
Claims without a verdict
- Unresolvable 135
- Not yet due 9
- Own records only 29
- Not researched 162
- Not checkable 431
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