Burry said the positions "we" are short are now effectively undercollateralized by performing mortgages, pointing to ratios of delinquent, bankrupt, foreclosed and REO loans to total credit support, several of which were above one.
Mostly true True in substance, wrong in a detail.
Factual: Statements about the present or the past, checked against the record: did they hold up?
The second judge would not resolve this claim; the verdict shown is the first judge's.
Said for an organisation they lead or work for; it counts on both records.
What would count as true or false
Judged as of 2006. True: a Scion investor letter or communication from 2006 contains the statement that the positions Scion was short were effectively undercollateralised by performing mortgages, supported by ratios of delinquent, bankrupt, foreclosed and REO loans to total credit support, several of which were above one. Mostly true: the statement and the ratios appear, but with a minor discrepancy, for example the document is dated early 2007, or only one or two ratios exceed one rather than 'several'. Mixed: Burry made the undercollateralisation argument, but the supporting ratios are described materially differently, or the ratios are present but the conclusion is not. Mostly false: the document makes only a much weaker claim, for example rising delinquencies without any undercollateralisation assertion. False: no such statement exists in Burry's 2006 communications, shown by the full text of those letters, or the text says the opposite.
Set before the research began.
Evidence (1)
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E1 서브프라임 공매도 평가손 속의 확신 — Michael Burry valuebeast.co.kr · 1 September 2006
“He tracks the ratio of 60-plus-day delinquencies, bankruptcies, and foreclosures combined, divided by credit enhancement — and that value had already crossed 1. In effect, the collateral was insufficient.”
Reasoning
E3 is a third-party summary of Scion's Q3 2006 letter. It says Burry tracked 60-plus-day delinquencies, bankruptcies and foreclosures combined, divided by credit enhancement, and that this ratio had already crossed 1, so the collateral was insufficient. That matches the core of the claim: an undercollateralisation argument from 2006, backed by loss-to-credit-support ratios above one. It is only a paraphrase, though. It does not mention REO loans, and it describes a single value crossing 1 rather than several ratios above one. That is a minor discrepancy, so the verdict is mostly true rather than true.
Cite this claim
Michael Burry, “Burry said the positions "we" are short are now effectively undercollateralized by performing mortgages, pointing to ratios of delinquent, bankrupt, foreclosed and REO loans to total credit support, several of which were above one.” (said 2006). Verdict: mostly true. Reliability API, claim c_da160aeef6f8, method 0.1.0+c876030c, dataset release v1.1.2. https://epistacklabs.com/claims/c_da160aeef6f8
This claim is in dataset release v1.1.2, with the same verdict.
Reply to this claim
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Verdicts are made automatically; how verdicts are made.