By December 2005, subprime mortgages issued six months earlier were already showing atypically high delinquency rates.

True: mortgage performance data from that time (for example data on 2005 subprime loans or vintages, or ABX/remittance reports) show that subprime loans originated around mid-2005 had delinquency rates by December 2005 that were high compared with earlier vintages at the same age. Mostly true: early delinquencies were elevated, but the timing differs slightly (for example clear by early 2006 rather than December 2005) or the gap from historical norms was modest. Mixed: some data show elevated early delinquencies while others show them in line with norms in late 2005. Mostly false: elevated early delinquencies only became clear well into 2006 or later, though some faint early signs existed by late 2005. False: data show delinquencies on mid-2005 subprime loans were normal or below historical norms as of December 2005.

Set before the research began.

1. E1 [PDF] The Subprime Mortgage Market and the Valuation of Subprime Bonds Zell/Lurie Real Estate Center, Wharton (William R. Greenberg and Brooks Payner)

   “By late 2005, the first evidence of increasing delinquencies appeared, and, in particular, an increase in early payment defaults, which typically occur in the first month or two after the loan is closed.”

2. E2 [PDF] The Subprime Mortgage Market and the Valuation of Subprime Bonds Zell/Lurie Real Estate Center, Wharton (William R. Greenberg and Brooks Payner)

   “As of November 2006, there was still uncertainty about whether these high delinquencies represented a short-term blip or a long-term trend.”

E2 is an independent Wharton real estate center paper. It says that by late 2005 the first evidence of rising subprime delinquencies had appeared, in particular more early payment defaults, which supports the claim's timing. E2 gives no December 2005 figures, though, and does not directly compare mid-2005 loans with earlier vintages at the same age. E3 notes that as of November 2006 it was still unclear whether the high delinquencies were a short-term blip or a lasting trend, which suggests the elevated delinquencies were real but not yet clearly established.