ClaimsMichael Burry

“At the same time, I also watched how ratings agencies vouched for subprime mortgage-backed securities.”

Michael Burry, op-ed author 6 April 2010 Michael Burry Saw the Financial Crisis Coming. Why didn't the Fed? (NYT op-ed) (Lawrence University blog)

Factual Economics and markets

Michael Burry said that, during the same period, he also watched ratings agencies vouch for subprime mortgage-backed securities.

Unresolvable The public record could not settle it.

Factual: Statements about the present or the past, checked against the record: did they hold up?

What would count as true or false

This is a claim about what Burry said. True: Burry's published writing or remarks from about 2010-04 (e.g. his April 2010 New York Times op-ed) contain the statement that, in the same period, he watched ratings agencies vouch for subprime mortgage-backed securities, and it is well documented that the agencies did give such securities high ratings. Mostly true: the statement is in his writing, with a small difference in date or wording. Mixed: he made a related but substantially different statement. Mostly false: the statement is wrongly attributed in a material way, e.g. it belongs to a different text and is distorted in meaning. False: there is no such statement by Burry and the record shows a different author or contrary content.

Set before the research began.

Evidence (10)

  1. E1 MBS Ratings and the Mortgage Credit Boom Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports (Staff Report no. 449) · May 2010

    “Prior to the crisis, 80-95% of a typical subprime or Alt-A mortgage-backed-securities (MBS) deal was assigned the”
  2. E2 Mass Credit Rating Downgrades — Levin–Coburn Financial Crisis Report U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (Levin–Coburn report, hosted by Reports That Matter) · 13 April 2011

    “In the years leading up to the financial crisis, Moody's and S&P together issued investment grade ratings for tens of thousands of RMBS and CDO securities, earning substantial sums for issuing these ratings.”
  3. E3 Mass Credit Rating Downgrades — Levin–Coburn Financial Crisis Report U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (Levin–Coburn report, hosted by Reports That Matter) · 13 April 2011

    “During the first half of 2007, despite the news of failing subprime lenders and increasing subprime mortgage defaults, Moody's and S&P continued to issue AAA credit ratings for a large number of RMBS and CDO securities.”
  4. E4 Mass Credit Rating Downgrades — Levin–Coburn Financial Crisis Report Reports That Matter (hosting the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations report) · 13 April 2011

    “During the first half of 2007, despite the news of failing subprime lenders and increasing subprime mortgage defaults, Moody's and S&P continued to issue AAA credit ratings for a large number of RMBS and CDO securities.”
  5. E5 Mass Credit Rating Downgrades — Levin–Coburn Financial Crisis Report Reports That Matter (hosting the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations report) · 13 April 2011

    “In the years leading up to the financial crisis, Moody's and S&P together issued investment grade ratings for tens of thousands of RMBS and CDO securities, earning substantial sums for issuing these ratings.”
  6. E6 Mass Credit Rating Downgrades — Levin–Coburn Financial Crisis Report Reports That Matter (hosting the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations report) · 13 April 2011

    “Analysts have determined that, by 2010, over 90% of subprime RMBS securities issued in 2006 and 2007 and originally rated AAA had been downgraded to junk status by Moody's and S&P.”
  7. E7 Michael Burry: I Saw the Crisis Coming. Why Didn't the Fed? GuruFocus.com · 6 April 2010

    “Throughout 2004, I had watched as these mortgages were offered to more and more subprime borrowers — those with the weakest credit.”
  8. E8 NY Times Op-Ed: I Saw the Crisis Coming. Why Didn't the Fed? - By Michael J. Burry Value Investing World · 4 April 2010 Own record

    “But the signs were all there in 2005, when a bursting of the bubble would have had far less dire consequences, and when the government could have acted to minimize the fallout.”
  9. E9 Credit rating agencies and the subprime crisis - Wikipedia Wikipedia · 19 September 2008 Own record

    “Credit rating agencies came under scrutiny following the mortgage crisis for giving investment-grade, "money safe" ratings to securitized mortgages (in the form of securities known as mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and collateralized debt obligations (CDO)) based on "non-prime"—subprime or Alt-A—mortgages loans.”
  10. E10 Credit rating agencies and the subprime crisis - Wikipedia Wikipedia · 19 September 2008 Own record

    “The pools of debt the agencies gave their highest ratings to included over three trillion dollars of loans to homebuyers with bad credit and undocumented incomes through 2007.”

Reasoning

E9 and E10 reproduce Burry's April 2010 New York Times op-ed. The passages quoted from them cover his watching subprime lending in 2004 and the warning signs in 2005, but neither includes the sentence about ratings agencies vouching for subprime mortgage-backed securities. Independent sources (E3, E4, E8) document that Moody's and S&P gave investment-grade and AAA ratings to such securities, which supports the substance of the statement. However, the excerpts in the evidence do not include this sentence, so the attribution to Burry cannot be confirmed from the material reviewed.

Cite this claim

Michael Burry, “Michael Burry said that, during the same period, he also watched ratings agencies vouch for subprime mortgage-backed securities.” (said 6 April 2010). Verdict: unresolvable. Reliability API, claim c_758907eb5c50, method 0.1.0+c876030c, dataset release v1.1.2. https://epistacklabs.com/claims/c_758907eb5c50

This claim is in dataset release v1.1.2, with the same verdict.

Reply to this claim

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More factual claims by Michael Burry

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    The Superinvestors of Graham & Doddsville all lost money three years in a row during the mid-1970s.

  2. Mostly true Factual 30 October 2026
    “It’s a perfect storm for Build-A-Bear (BBW), a one-of-one retailer now heavily shorted, 25% of the float, almost 9 days to cover.”

    Build-A-Bear (BBW) is heavily shorted, with short interest at 25% of the float and almost 9 days to cover.

  3. Resolved true Factual 30 October 2026
    “Here is the link where I made the case last week that beneath the surface the October 6, 2026 record close in the S&P 500 looks more like the March 2000 top than any other record high since 1980.”

    Burry made the case the prior week that the October 6, 2026 S&P 500 record close looks more like the March 2000 top than any other record high since 1980.

  4. Mostly true Factual 24 October 2026
    “October 6, 2026 stands head to head with March 2000 as the two most narrow, thin, soft new highs”

    Across 982 S&P 500 record closes since 1980, October 6, 2026 and March 2000 are the two most narrow, thin, soft new highs by almost any measure.

  5. Mostly true Factual 11 October 2026
    “Both stocks have retraced essentially all their gains since Trump’s election, and they put in a giant head-and-shoulders-and-elbows top for added emphasis.”

    Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac stocks have retraced essentially all their gains since Trump's election and formed a large head-and-shoulders top.

All of them

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