Scores by kind of claim
Each kind of claim is scored on its own, out of 100: the share that held up, with the range it likely falls in. Fewer resolved claims give a wider range.
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Factual claims
Statements about the present or the past, checked against the record: did they hold up?
77 71 83 -
Predictions
Statements about events outside the person's control, checked once they fell due: did they come true?
72 56 86
All types combined: 76 (likely 71 to 82, high confidence), from 91 claims: 80 factual claims, 11 predictions. It mixes kinds of claim in different proportions for different people, so compare people kind by kind.
Ray Dalio's claims
34 claims
“the 1982 crisis ... one of the big differences was they didn’t have mark-to-market accounting.”
Ray Dalio, interviewee 11 November 2018 Transcript: Ray Dalio, Bridgewater (Ritholtz)
This quote could not be matched word for word to the source page.
During the 1982 debt crisis, banks did not use mark-to-market accounting, so solvency was less of an issue than liquidity.
Resolved true The record shows it happened or was so.
What would count as true or false
True: accounting and banking history shows that in the 1982 LDC (Latin American) debt crisis, US banks were not required to mark their sovereign loans to market (they held them at book value), so regulators could put off recognising insolvency and treat it mainly as a liquidity problem. Mostly true: mark-to-market was not required for those loans, but the solvency vs liquidity point is overstated or some partial write-downs/reserves were required. Mixed: mark-to-market was not used for loans, but it was used for important parts of bank balance sheets relevant to the crisis. Mostly false: the accounting point is technically right but did not materially affect how solvency was treated. False: banks were required to mark these loans to market in 1982.
Evidence
- [PDF] FRBSF WEEKLY LEftea - Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco · 30 September 1988
“As a result, banks were not required to record capital even though the market value of those loans de clined precipitously following the 1982 crisis.”
- Latin American Debt Crisis of the 1980s - Federal Reserve History Federal Reserve History (Federal Reserve System) · 22 November 2013
“US banking regulators allowed lenders to delay recognizing the full extent of the losses on LDC lending in their loan loss provisions.”
- The LDC Debt Crisis Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
“Unlike some European regulatory authorities, immediately after the Mexican crisis U.S. banking officials did not require that large reserves be set aside on the restructured LDC loans or on the succeeding arrearages by other LDC nations.”
Reasoning
E1, a 1988 San Francisco Fed letter, says banks were not required to recognise capital losses even though the market value of LDC loans fell sharply after the 1982 crisis. In other words, the loans were not marked to market. E2, from Federal Reserve History, says US regulators let lenders delay recognising the full LDC losses. E4, from the FDIC's history, says US officials did not require large reserves on restructured LDC loans right after the Mexican crisis. Together these independent sources support the accounting point and show that regulators let banks delay recognising losses on LDC loans.
Cite this claim
Ray Dalio, “During the 1982 debt crisis, banks did not use mark-to-market accounting, so solvency was less of an issue than liquidity.” (said 11 November 2018). Verdict: resolved true. Reliability API, claim c_959a91692363, method 0.1.0+c876030c. https://epistacklabs.com/claims/c_959a91692363
Claims without a verdict
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