| Unresolvable |
Prediction |
23 Sep 2026 |
Dario Amodei said he believes the field is at the very beginning of finding such RT systems and developing them into powerful tools for biotechnology.
Prediction · 23 Sep 2026 |
Science and research methods |
| Mostly false |
Prediction |
23 Sep 2026 |
Amodei said that "we" believe AI for biology is on an exponential trend similar to the one he described for AI in mathematics.
Prediction · 23 Sep 2026 |
AI capabilities |
| Unresolvable |
Prediction |
23 Sep 2026 |
Eventually Claude may be able to safely perform experiments itself by autonomously controlling lab equipment, which Anthropic is not doing today.
Prediction · 23 Sep 2026 |
AI capabilities |
| Unresolvable |
Prediction |
23 Sep 2026 |
If AI-driven biological discovery succeeds, it could greatly increase the number of promising drug candidates entering the pipeline without shortening clinical trial times.
Prediction · 23 Sep 2026 |
Science and research methods |
| Unresolvable |
Prediction |
12 Sep 2026 |
If AI is built in the wrong way, the probability of something bad happening is very high.
Prediction · 12 Sep 2026 |
AI safety and alignment |
| Unresolvable |
Prediction |
12 Sep 2026 |
If left unchecked, AI's ability to improve itself and build the next generation of AI could outrun humans' ability to understand and control these systems.
Prediction · 12 Sep 2026 |
AI safety and alignment |
| Unresolvable |
Prediction |
12 Sep 2026 |
International cooperation to put a speed limit on AI progress will be very difficult because incentives and military advantage are so large.
Prediction · 12 Sep 2026 |
AI policy and governance |
| Unresolvable |
Prediction |
12 Sep 2026 |
If AI is built in the right way, the probability of something bad happening is very low.
Prediction · 12 Sep 2026 |
AI safety and alignment |
| Unresolvable |
Prediction |
12 Sep 2026 |
This AI technology will be built in other countries, including authoritarian countries.
Prediction · 12 Sep 2026 |
AI policy and governance |
| Mostly true |
Prediction |
28 Feb 2026 |
Anthropic will be fine, and the impact of the supply chain risk designation on it will be fairly small.
Prediction · 28 Feb 2026 |
AI policy and governance |
| Not yet due |
Prediction |
5 Jun 2025 |
Amodei said he believes that if the measures Anthropic has advocated are executed well, they would slow China's progress enough to widen America's lead significantly over the next 3-5 years.
Prediction · 5 Jun 2025 |
AI policy and governance |
| Not yet due |
Prediction |
5 Jun 2025 |
Amodei worries that within 6-12 months a swarm with greater capabilities but a similar level of misalignment to the one in the OAI-HF incident could be capable of taking over the entire internet with a persistent botnet.
Prediction · 5 Jun 2025 |
AI safety and alignment |
| Unresolvable |
Prediction |
5 Jun 2025 |
Amodei said he thinks a full international pacing or pause agreement, in which participating governments agree to substantially limit the overall rate of AI development, is unlikely to happen any time soon.
Prediction · 5 Jun 2025 |
AI policy and governance |
| Unresolvable |
Prediction |
5 Jun 2025 |
Amodei said he believes that if slowing down bought an extra year or two before models reach critical levels of capability, and that time were used to advance alignment, the risk of something going seriously wrong could be greatly reduced.
Prediction · 5 Jun 2025 |
AI safety and alignment |
| Unresolvable |
Prediction |
5 Jun 2025 |
A coordinated pacing strategy would give frontier AI developers time for safety work without sacrificing commercial advantage or the US lead in AI.
Prediction · 5 Jun 2025 |
AI policy and governance |
| Unresolvable |
Prediction |
5 Jun 2025 |
Chips will be the main determinant of China's AI strength.
Prediction · 5 Jun 2025 |
AI compute, hardware and data |
| Not yet due |
Prediction |
5 Jun 2025 |
AI could cure most major diseases within 5-10 years, greatly accelerate economic growth, and usher in a renaissance of democracy and freedom.
Prediction · 5 Jun 2025 |
AI timelines and forecasting |
| Not yet due |
Prediction |
10 Mar 2025 |
China's chip gap with the US will eventually close over roughly ten to twenty years.
Prediction · 10 Mar 2025 |
AI compute, hardware and data |
| Unresolvable |
Prediction |
10 Mar 2025 |
AI will become better than almost all humans at almost all things.
Prediction · 10 Mar 2025 |
AI timelines and forecasting |
| Unresolvable |
Prediction |
10 Mar 2025 |
If the US puts export controls in place, it may be able to stop that from happening in China.
Prediction · 10 Mar 2025 |
AI policy and governance |
| Not yet due |
Prediction |
10 Mar 2025 |
Amodei said the same exponential trends and arguments predict that, if progress continues for another two, three or maybe four years, AI models will be as intelligent as Nobel Prize winners across a whole bunch of fields.
Prediction · 10 Mar 2025 |
AI timelines and forecasting |
| Unresolvable |
Prediction |
10 Mar 2025 |
Whoever establishes dominance in AI technology will have military and economic dominance everywhere.
Prediction · 10 Mar 2025 |
AI policy and governance |
| Resolved true |
Prediction |
10 Mar 2025 |
US export controls may have the effect of stimulating China's chip development.
Prediction · 10 Mar 2025 |
AI policy and governance |
| Unresolvable |
Prediction |
10 Mar 2025 |
Tracking and understanding epidemics using large quantities of data could benefit hugely from AI.
Prediction · 10 Mar 2025 |
Biosecurity |
| Unresolvable |
Prediction |
10 Mar 2025 |
Advanced AI systems could be a threat to all of humanity.
Prediction · 10 Mar 2025 |
AI safety and alignment |
| Unresolvable |
Prediction |
10 Mar 2025 |
US-China AI dialogue will not change the dynamic of national competition between the two countries.
Prediction · 10 Mar 2025 |
AI policy and governance |
| Unresolvable |
Prediction |
10 Mar 2025 |
AI systems will be able to help a lot with clinical trial problems, at least radically simplifying them.
Prediction · 10 Mar 2025 |
AI capabilities |
| Resolved false |
Prediction |
10 Mar 2025 |
Within three to six months of March 2025, AI will be writing 90 percent of code.
Prediction · 10 Mar 2025 |
AI timelines and forecasting |
| Resolved false |
Prediction |
10 Mar 2025 |
Within twelve months of March 2025, AI may be writing essentially all of the code.
Prediction · 10 Mar 2025 |
AI timelines and forecasting |
| Mostly true |
Prediction |
10 Mar 2025 |
Anthropic's models may reach AI Safety Level 3 in 2025.
Prediction · 10 Mar 2025 |
AI timelines and forecasting |
| Not yet due |
Prediction |
10 Mar 2025 |
Amodei said the AI industry as a whole probably needs maybe fifty gigawatts of additional energy by 2027 to fully power AI with the properties he had been describing.
Prediction · 10 Mar 2025 |
AI compute, hardware and data |
| Unresolvable |
Prediction |
10 Mar 2025 |
Amodei thinks regulatory problems are going to be what limits the rate of progress.
Prediction · 10 Mar 2025 |
AI capabilities |
| Unresolvable |
Prediction |
10 Mar 2025 |
The biggest thing that could halt AI progress would be an interruption to the supply of GPUs.
Prediction · 10 Mar 2025 |
AI compute, hardware and data |
| Unresolvable |
Prediction |
10 Mar 2025 |
Smuggling five million advanced GPUs to China would drastically change the world's national security balance.
Prediction · 10 Mar 2025 |
AI policy and governance |
| Unresolvable |
Prediction |
10 Mar 2025 |
Some narrow US-China agreement limiting AI risks could be achieved.
Prediction · 10 Mar 2025 |
AI policy and governance |
| Unresolvable |
Prediction |
10 Mar 2025 |
If the US does not apply AI technologies to national security, it will be defenseless against its adversaries.
Prediction · 10 Mar 2025 |
AI policy and governance |
| Not yet due |
Prediction |
28 Feb 2025 |
Over the next two years, people will wake up to both the risks and benefits of AI to a much more extreme extent than before.
Prediction · 28 Feb 2025 |
Philosophy, ethics and society |
| Unresolvable |
Prediction |
28 Feb 2025 |
Amodei said that, once people fully understand the economic and military value of AI, which he thinks they mostly already do, he does not see any way it turns into anything other than the most intense race, whatever is said now about cooperation.
Prediction · 28 Feb 2025 |
AI policy and governance |
| Mostly true |
Prediction |
28 Feb 2025 |
In the short run (about 6 to 12 months), AI will augment and increase coders' productivity rather than replace them.
Prediction · 28 Feb 2025 |
AI, the economy and work |
| Not yet due |
Prediction |
28 Feb 2025 |
In the longer run (perhaps 18 to 24 months), AI may replace coders, particularly at lower levels.
Prediction · 28 Feb 2025 |
AI, the economy and work |
| Not yet due |
Prediction |
28 Feb 2025 |
Amodei put a chance of maybe 70–80% on a very large number of AI systems much smarter than humans at almost everything arriving before the end of the decade, and said his guess was 2026–2027.
Prediction · 28 Feb 2025 |
AI timelines and forecasting |
| Unresolvable |
Prediction |
28 Feb 2025 |
AI replacement of coders may occur even earlier than 18 to 24 months.
Prediction · 28 Feb 2025 |
AI, the economy and work |
| Resolved true |
Prediction |
28 Feb 2025 |
By the end of 2025, AI will do very serious things in coding.
Prediction · 28 Feb 2025 |
AI capabilities |
| Unresolvable |
Prediction |
18 Feb 2025 |
If truly compelling evidence of the dangers of autonomous AI emerged, a slowdown in AI development would be just barely possible.
Prediction · 18 Feb 2025 |
AI policy and governance |
| Unresolvable |
Prediction |
18 Feb 2025 |
Interpretability, meaning understanding the inner workings of AI systems, could be achieved before AI models reach an overwhelming level of power.
Prediction · 18 Feb 2025 |
AI safety and alignment |
| Unresolvable |
Prediction |
18 Feb 2025 |
Amodei said that multiple recent breakthroughs had convinced him that interpretability research is on the right track and has a real chance of success in its goal of fully revealing the inner workings of AI models.
Prediction · 18 Feb 2025 |
AI safety and alignment |
| Unresolvable |
Prediction |
18 Feb 2025 |
Better interpretability could greatly improve the ability to set bounds on the range of possible AI errors.
Prediction · 18 Feb 2025 |
AI safety and alignment |
| Not yet due |
Prediction |
18 Feb 2025 |
Amodei said that, on its current trajectory, he would bet strongly in favor of interpretability becoming a sophisticated and reliable way to diagnose problems in even very advanced AI within 5-10 years.
Prediction · 18 Feb 2025 |
AI timelines and forecasting |
| Unresolvable |
Prediction |
18 Feb 2025 |
If it were possible to look inside models, it might be possible to systematically block all jailbreaks and characterize what dangerous knowledge models have.
Prediction · 18 Feb 2025 |
AI safety and alignment |
| Unresolvable |
Prediction |
18 Feb 2025 |
Amodei said he is quite skeptical that any slowdown in AI development to address risk is possible, even among companies within democratic countries, given AI's economic value.
Prediction · 18 Feb 2025 |
AI policy and governance |
| Unresolvable |
Prediction |
18 Feb 2025 |
The most likely route to "smoking gun" evidence of AI danger is interpretability itself.
Prediction · 18 Feb 2025 |
AI safety and alignment |
| Unresolvable |
Prediction |
11 Nov 2024 |
Amodei guessed that, if the task is kept very narrow to just writing code, AI systems will probably be able to do the kind of task that the vast majority of coders do.
Prediction · 11 Nov 2024 |
AI, the economy and work |
| Unresolvable |
Prediction |
11 Nov 2024 |
Powerful AI will most likely arrive with a mild delay relative to the 2026-2027 straight-line extrapolation.
Prediction · 11 Nov 2024 |
AI timelines and forecasting |
| Not yet due |
Prediction |
11 Nov 2024 |
Amodei said that eyeballing the rate at which capabilities are increasing, which he called totally unscientific, does make him think 'we'll get there' by 2026 or 2027, and he added that lots of things could derail it.
Prediction · 11 Nov 2024 |
AI timelines and forecasting |
| Unresolvable |
Prediction |
11 Nov 2024 |
At some point AI systems will become the principal investigators and leaders in research, directing humans or other AI systems.
Prediction · 11 Nov 2024 |
Science and research methods |
| Mostly false |
Prediction |
11 Nov 2024 |
Amodei said that, after progress from 3% to 50% on SWE-bench in 10 months, state-of-the-art models would probably be at about 90% in another year, while adding that he did not know and it might be less.
Prediction · 11 Nov 2024 |
AI capabilities |
| Unresolvable |
Prediction |
11 Nov 2024 |
Amodei expects that the same training techniques used for code, image input and voice will scale to this area, which the conversation describes as giving Claude the power of action.
Prediction · 11 Nov 2024 |
AI capabilities |
| Unresolvable |
Prediction |
11 Nov 2024 |
Within a few years, AI models will exceed the highest professional human level in skill.
Prediction · 11 Nov 2024 |
AI timelines and forecasting |
| Unresolvable |
Prediction |
11 Nov 2024 |
Extrapolating the next few points on the capability curve, AI is very quickly approaching human-level ability.
Prediction · 11 Nov 2024 |
AI timelines and forecasting |
| Mostly true |
Prediction |
11 Nov 2024 |
Amodei guessed that by about November 2025, AI models would be able to perform computer-use tasks very, very reliably.
Prediction · 11 Nov 2024 |
AI capabilities |
| Resolved true |
Prediction |
11 Nov 2024 |
Dario Amodei said he would not be surprised at all if Anthropic's models hit ASL-3 in 2025.
Prediction · 11 Nov 2024 |
AI safety and alignment |
| Unresolvable |
Prediction |
11 Nov 2024 |
In the early stages of AI-assisted science, AI systems will act like grad students working on projects given by human scientists.
Prediction · 11 Nov 2024 |
Science and research methods |
| Not yet due |
Prediction |
11 Nov 2024 |
In the near term, and maybe even in the medium term of 2, 3 or 4 years, Amodei expects humans to keep a huge role and programming as a job not to change, although the nature of programming will change, with less line-by-line writing and more macroscopic work.
Prediction · 11 Nov 2024 |
AI, the economy and work |
| Unresolvable |
Prediction |
11 Nov 2024 |
AI disruption of programming will happen fast.
Prediction · 11 Nov 2024 |
AI, the economy and work |
| Resolved false |
Prediction |
11 Nov 2024 |
Amodei guessed that within about 10 months AI models would probably get pretty close on typical real-world programming tasks, reaching at least 90%.
Prediction · 11 Nov 2024 |
AI capabilities |
| Not yet due |
Prediction |
11 Nov 2024 |
Amodei said that probably by 2027 there will be ambitions to build hundred-billion-dollar compute clusters, and that he thinks this will actually happen.
Prediction · 11 Nov 2024 |
AI compute, hardware and data |
| Not yet due |
Prediction |
11 Nov 2024 |
Powerful AI's transformative deployment in the world will take more likely five or 10 years than 50 or 100 years.
Prediction · 11 Nov 2024 |
AI timelines and forecasting |
| Unresolvable |
Prediction |
11 Nov 2024 |
For much longer than expected, the small parts of jobs humans still do will expand to fill their whole jobs as AI automates the rest.
Prediction · 11 Nov 2024 |
AI, the economy and work |
| Unresolvable |
Prediction |
11 Nov 2024 |
Dario Amodei said that as a CEO he does not get to program much, and that he felt that if he went back to it six months later, it would be completely unrecognizable to him.
Prediction · 11 Nov 2024 |
AI capabilities |
| Not yet due |
Prediction |
11 Nov 2024 |
Over the next year or two, even without better models, there would be enormous opportunity to boost productivity by catching mistakes and doing grunt work with current AI models.
Prediction · 11 Nov 2024 |
AI, the economy and work |
| Unresolvable |
Prediction |
11 Nov 2024 |
Scaling up models will enable AI to perform very wide-ranging cognitive tasks.
Prediction · 11 Nov 2024 |
AI capabilities |
| Not yet due |
Prediction |
11 Nov 2024 |
Eyeballing the rate at which AI capabilities are increasing makes Amodei think "we'll get there" by 2026 or 2027, though he says there are still worlds where it does not happen in 100 years.
Prediction · 11 Nov 2024 |
AI timelines and forecasting |
| Not yet due |
Prediction |
11 Nov 2024 |
Within two to three years, whether or not super powerful AI exists, compute clusters will be large enough to deploy millions of AI model instances.
Prediction · 11 Nov 2024 |
AI compute, hardware and data |
| Unresolvable |
Prediction |
11 Nov 2024 |
AI will disrupt agriculture, though more slowly than skills closer to AI builders.
Prediction · 11 Nov 2024 |
AI, the economy and work |
| Unresolvable |
Prediction |
11 Nov 2024 |
Running out of training data could become a limit on AI scaling, though Amodei would bet against it.
Prediction · 11 Nov 2024 |
AI compute, hardware and data |
| Unresolvable |
Prediction |
11 Nov 2024 |
Dario Amodei said he would suspect that if AI models reach 90-95% on the software-engineering benchmark, that will represent the ability to autonomously do a significant fraction of software engineering tasks.
Prediction · 11 Nov 2024 |
AI capabilities |
| Unresolvable |
Prediction |
11 Nov 2024 |
Amodei said he would bet on AI scaling laws continuing to hold, though he is not certain of that.
Prediction · 11 Nov 2024 |
AI capabilities |
| Not yet due |
Prediction |
11 Nov 2024 |
Within two to three years, compute clusters will be large enough to deploy millions of instances of AI models.
Prediction · 11 Nov 2024 |
AI compute, hardware and data |
| Unresolvable |
Prediction |
11 Nov 2024 |
AI scaling will probably continue to produce gains.
Prediction · 11 Nov 2024 |
AI timelines and forecasting |
| Not yet due |
Prediction |
11 Nov 2024 |
Within two to three years, the millions of deployable AI model instances will run faster than humans.
Prediction · 11 Nov 2024 |
AI capabilities |
| Not yet due |
Prediction |
12 Apr 2024 |
By 2026 to 2028, the compute needed for AI will reach levels the semiconductor industry struggles to supply.
Prediction · 12 Apr 2024 |
AI compute, hardware and data |
| Unresolvable |
Prediction |
12 Apr 2024 |
AI's impact may also show up first in the fields under discussion.
Prediction · 12 Apr 2024 |
AI, the economy and work |
| Not yet due |
Prediction |
12 Apr 2024 |
If a pause in AI development of one year were needed in 2027, it would be feasible.
Prediction · 12 Apr 2024 |
AI policy and governance |
| Not yet due |
Prediction |
12 Apr 2024 |
AI Safety Level ASL-3 capabilities may arrive this year or next (2024 or 2025), and ASL-4 between 2025 and 2028.
Prediction · 12 Apr 2024 |
AI timelines and forecasting |
| Unresolvable |
Prediction |
12 Apr 2024 |
Within three to eighteen months, AI models will perform end-to-end tasks for users, which will fundamentally change how people view AI.
Prediction · 12 Apr 2024 |
AI timelines and forecasting |
| Not yet due |
Prediction |
12 Apr 2024 |
Amodei said he thinks the cost of training AI models may reach $5 billion to $10 billion in 2025 to 2026.
Prediction · 12 Apr 2024 |
AI timelines and forecasting |
| Unresolvable |
Prediction |
12 Apr 2024 |
A ten-year pause in AI development would be very difficult because other countries would keep developing these models, people might break the law, and the economic pressure would be enormous.
Prediction · 12 Apr 2024 |
AI policy and governance |
| Unresolvable |
Prediction |
12 Apr 2024 |
If human-AI collaboration does not arise naturally, it will eventually be achieved.
Prediction · 12 Apr 2024 |
AI capabilities |
| Unresolvable |
Prediction |
12 Apr 2024 |
AI systems may fundamentally change industries and professions one after another, in hard-to-predict ways.
Prediction · 12 Apr 2024 |
AI, the economy and work |
| Not yet due |
Prediction |
8 Aug 2023 |
Control of powerful AI models five years from now will involve substantial involvement of a government or assembly of government bodies.
Prediction · 8 Aug 2023 |
AI policy and governance |
| Unresolvable |
Prediction |
8 Aug 2023 |
Danger from AI may lead to unilateral, multilateral or government-enforced decisions not to scale as fast as possible, which Anthropic supports.
Prediction · 8 Aug 2023 |
AI policy and governance |
| Own records only |
Prediction |
8 Aug 2023 |
Anthropic's security measures will defend against most attacks and against a less determined state-level actor.
Prediction · 8 Aug 2023 |
Their own work or organisation |
| Unresolvable |
Prediction |
8 Aug 2023 |
Powerful, agentic AI models will be built.
Prediction · 8 Aug 2023 |
AI capabilities |
| Unresolvable |
Prediction |
8 Aug 2023 |
Dario Amodei expects the money spent on the largest AI models to rise by something like a factor of 100.
Prediction · 8 Aug 2023 |
AI compute, hardware and data |
| Unresolvable |
Prediction |
8 Aug 2023 |
Amodei guessed that reinforcement learning will become a thing for models taking actions in the world, with all the power and safety issues that come with it.
Prediction · 8 Aug 2023 |
AI capabilities |
| Unresolvable |
Prediction |
8 Aug 2023 |
AI developers could run out of training data, which would limit scaling.
Prediction · 8 Aug 2023 |
AI compute, hardware and data |
| Unresolvable |
Prediction |
8 Aug 2023 |
If China sees AI as a source of national power, it will try the most effective approach, which could lead it toward AGI.
Prediction · 8 Aug 2023 |
AI policy and governance |
| Unresolvable |
Prediction |
8 Aug 2023 |
Running out of training data will not be a blocker to AI scaling.
Prediction · 8 Aug 2023 |
AI compute, hardware and data |
| Resolved true |
Prediction |
8 Aug 2023 |
In a year or two (from 2023), AI model consciousness might become a very real concern.
Prediction · 8 Aug 2023 |
Philosophy, ethics and society |
| Unresolvable |
Prediction |
8 Aug 2023 |
In Dario Amodei's view, AI models would keep getting better across the board; he said he did not see any area where the models were very weak or not starting to make progress.
Prediction · 8 Aug 2023 |
AI capabilities |