Claims

2,653 claims by 33 public figures and organisations, checked against the public record. Each has its quote, source, verdict and evidence. Read them without a key; browse by person.

28,548 claims · page 254 of 286

28,548 claims, sorted by newest said. Choose a claim to read it in full.
VerdictPersonKindSaidClaimTopic
Not checkable Jeremy Grantham Not checkable Jul 2010 Running at the same rate of change in attitude as both the market and general opinion is both frustrating and unprofi table. Jeremy Grantham · Not checkable · Jul 2010
Not checkable Jeremy Grantham Not checkable Jul 2010 Remove the pressure even for a short while and the normal equilibrium will quickly be restored. Jeremy Grantham · Not checkable · Jul 2010
Not checkable Jeremy Grantham Not checkable Jul 2010 The problem is that they are mostly very expensive and only a little bit helpful. Jeremy Grantham · Not checkable · Jul 2010
Unresolvable Jeremy Grantham Prediction Jul 2010 Some further decline in house prices is probably more than a 50/50 bet in the U.S., and nearly certain in the U.K. and Australia. Jeremy Grantham · Prediction · Jul 2010 Economics and markets
Mostly true Jeremy Grantham Factual Jul 2010 A warmer atmosphere melts glaciers and ice sheets and causes global sea levels to rise. Jeremy Grantham · Factual · Jul 2010 Other global risks
Not checkable Jeremy Grantham Not checkable Jul 2010 You don’t have to be a passionate follower of Keynes to realize that to rapidly reduce defi cits at this point is at least to fl irt with a… Jeremy Grantham · Not checkable · Jul 2010
Not checkable Jeremy Grantham Not checkable Jul 2010 Sensing this, these think tanks have allowed their drive for desirable policy to trump science. Jeremy Grantham · Not checkable · Jul 2010
Not checkable Jeremy Grantham Not checkable Jul 2010 Congress has played the part of the carefree, unprepared grasshopper perfectly. Jeremy Grantham · Not checkable · Jul 2010
Not checkable Jeremy Grantham Not checkable Jul 2010 All that accumulated fi nancial wealth does is shuffl e the accounting claims to determine the pecking order Jeremy Grantham · Not checkable · Jul 2010
Not checkable Jeremy Grantham Not checkable Jul 2010 But blue chip stocks are on their own, without any natural offsetting buyers. Jeremy Grantham · Not checkable · Jul 2010
Not checkable Jeremy Grantham Not checkable Jul 2010 The only way that pensions can be paid is out of the current year’s GDP – the total output of new goods and new services. Jeremy Grantham · Not checkable · Jul 2010
Unresolvable Ray Dalio Prediction Jun 2010 The US, eurozone, UK and Japan, being heavily indebted, will need to print more and more money and will have sluggish growth rates. Ray Dalio · Prediction · Jun 2010 Economics and markets
Not checkable Ray Dalio Not checkable Jun 2010 the European situation is a particularly risky one for a number of reasons. Ray Dalio · Not checkable · Jun 2010
Not checkable Ray Dalio Not checkable Jun 2010 such efforts have become "politically untenable." Ray Dalio · Not checkable · Jun 2010
Unresolvable Ray Dalio Factual Jun 2010 The size of the European sovereign debt dwarfs, that is, is far larger than, that of any other debt crisis. Ray Dalio · Factual · Jun 2010 Economics and markets
Not checkable Ray Dalio Not checkable Jun 2010 I want to minimize my exposure to the major developed countries' currencies - the U.S. dollar, the euro, the British Pound, and the yen. Ray Dalio · Not checkable · Jun 2010
Not checkable Ray Dalio Not checkable Jun 2010 They're roaring ahead. Ray Dalio · Not checkable · Jun 2010
Unresolvable Ray Dalio Factual Jun 2010 The subject said that the matter he was describing "dwarfs" the Asian Contagion, meaning it is far larger, and called the amounts involved "enormous." Ray Dalio · Factual · Jun 2010 Economics and markets
Unresolvable Ray Dalio Factual Jun 2010 Emerging-market economies are competitive because labor is cheaper and investment levels are high. Ray Dalio · Factual · Jun 2010 Economics and markets
Resolved false Ray Dalio Prediction Jun 2010 The next US recession will come sooner than the normal roughly five-year interval, because of the size of the debt. Ray Dalio · Prediction · Jun 2010 Economics and markets
Mostly false Ray Dalio Factual Jun 2010 Government intervention and quantitative easing after 2008 did not produce new financial assets. Ray Dalio · Factual · Jun 2010 Economics and markets
Mostly true Ray Dalio Factual Jun 2010 As of mid-2010, emerging-market economies have not reached their debt limits. Ray Dalio · Factual · Jun 2010 Economics and markets
Unresolvable Ray Dalio Factual Jun 2010 The European sovereign debt dwarfs, that is, is far larger than, the debt at the centre of the Latin American debt crisis. Ray Dalio · Factual · Jun 2010 Economics and markets
Resolved true Ray Dalio Factual Jun 2010 There has been very little new lending following the 2008 crisis government intervention, as of mid-2010. Ray Dalio · Factual · Jun 2010 Economics and markets
Not checkable Ray Dalio Not checkable Jun 2010 These are enormous, enormous amounts. Ray Dalio · Not checkable · Jun 2010
Unresolvable Ray Dalio Factual Jun 2010 The government stimulus produced very little new economic activity in the US. Ray Dalio · Factual · Jun 2010 Economics and markets
Unresolvable Ray Dalio Prediction Jun 2010 Money printing will offset the deflation coming from weak demand due to weak credit growth, rather than cause inflation. Ray Dalio · Prediction · Jun 2010 Economics and markets
Unresolvable Michael Burry Prediction 6 Apr 2010 Future generations of Americans will suffer terrible financial consequences from the bailouts and the extended bubble. Michael Burry · Prediction · 6 Apr 2010 Economics and markets
Mixed Michael Burry Factual 6 Apr 2010 After the crisis became clear in early 2007, the Fed chairman, Treasury secretary, president and senior members of Congress repeatedly underestimated its severity. Michael Burry · Factual · 6 Apr 2010 Economics and markets
Not checkable Michael Burry Not checkable 6 Apr 2010 Unfortunately, he did not give good advice. Michael Burry · Not checkable · 6 Apr 2010
Resolved true Michael Burry Factual 6 Apr 2010 Michael Burry deliberately avoided Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns as swap counterparties. Michael Burry · Factual · 6 Apr 2010 Their own work or organisation
Not checkable Michael Burry Not checkable 6 Apr 2010 To me, these agencies seemed not to be paying much attention. Michael Burry · Not checkable · 6 Apr 2010
Resolved true Michael Burry Factual 6 Apr 2010 Michael Burry shut down Scion Capital in 2008. Michael Burry · Factual · 6 Apr 2010 Their own work or organisation
Resolved true Michael Burry Factual 6 Apr 2010 Michael Burry's prediction of a mortgage market meltdown was based on his research into the residential mortgage market and mortgage-backed securities. Michael Burry · Factual · 6 Apr 2010 Their own work or organisation
Not checkable Michael Burry Not checkable 6 Apr 2010 I knew that would mark the beginning of the end of the housing bubble; it would mean that prices had risen — with the expansion of easy… Michael Burry · Not checkable · 6 Apr 2010
Mostly true Michael Burry Factual 6 Apr 2010 Michael Burry began worrying about the housing market in 2003, when lenders resurrected interest-only mortgages and loosened credit standards. Michael Burry · Factual · 6 Apr 2010 Economics and markets
Unresolvable Michael Burry Factual 6 Apr 2010 Scion's credit default swaps covered AIG, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, among other firms that failed or nearly failed. Michael Burry · Factual · 6 Apr 2010 Their own work or organisation
Not checkable Michael Burry Not checkable 6 Apr 2010 Yet the tide was about to turn. Michael Burry · Not checkable · 6 Apr 2010
Not checkable Michael Burry Not checkable 6 Apr 2010 The truth is, he should have seen what was coming and offered a sober, apolitical warning. Michael Burry · Not checkable · 6 Apr 2010
Not checkable Michael Burry Not checkable 6 Apr 2010 Since then, I have often wondered why nobody in Washington showed any interest in hearing exactly how I arrived at my conclusions that the… Michael Burry · Not checkable · 6 Apr 2010
Not checkable Michael Burry Not checkable 6 Apr 2010 If the mistakes were properly outlined, that might both inform Congress’s efforts to improve financial regulation and help keep future Fed… Michael Burry · Not checkable · 6 Apr 2010
Mixed Michael Burry Factual 6 Apr 2010 By mid-2005 Michael Burry bought credit default swaps on billions of dollars of subprime mortgage-backed securities and bonds of financial companies. Michael Burry · Factual · 6 Apr 2010 Their own work or organisation
Not checkable Michael Burry Not checkable 6 Apr 2010 Because I had been operating in the face of strong opposition from both my investors and the Wall Street community, it took everything I… Michael Burry · Not checkable · 6 Apr 2010
Not checkable Michael Burry Not checkable 6 Apr 2010 But the signs were all there in 2005, when a bursting of the bubble would have had far less dire consequences, and when the government… Michael Burry · Not checkable · 6 Apr 2010
Mostly true Michael Burry Factual 6 Apr 2010 Goldman Sachs and other derivatives dealers did not demand daily collateral settlement from AAA-rated AIG. Michael Burry · Factual · 6 Apr 2010 Economics and markets
Unresolvable Michael Burry Factual 6 Apr 2010 Throughout 2004, interest-only mortgages were offered to more and more subprime borrowers with the weakest credit. Michael Burry · Factual · 6 Apr 2010 Economics and markets
Unresolvable Michael Burry Factual 6 Apr 2010 After studying regulatory filings on mortgage-backed securities, Michael Burry waited for lenders to offer the riskiest mortgages to the least qualified buyers. Michael Burry · Factual · 6 Apr 2010 Their own work or organisation
Unresolvable Michael Burry Factual 6 Apr 2010 Michael Burry said that, during the same period, he also watched ratings agencies vouch for subprime mortgage-backed securities. Michael Burry · Factual · 6 Apr 2010 Economics and markets
Not checkable Michael Burry Not checkable 6 Apr 2010 And at this point there is no reason to reflexively dismiss the analysis of those who foresaw the crisis. Michael Burry · Not checkable · 6 Apr 2010
Mostly true Michael Burry Factual 6 Apr 2010 Michael Burry demanded daily collateral settlement on his swaps, with cash posted to Scion's account the next day if positions moved in its favor. Michael Burry · Factual · 6 Apr 2010 Their own work or organisation
Not checkable Michael Burry Not checkable 6 Apr 2010 Instead, our leaders in Washington either willfully or ignorantly aided and abetted the bubble. Michael Burry · Not checkable · 6 Apr 2010
Unresolvable Michael Burry Factual 6 Apr 2010 By early 2008 Michael Burry exited all remaining credit default positions by auctioning them to Wall Street banks seeking protection. Michael Burry · Factual · 6 Apr 2010 Their own work or organisation
Unresolvable Michael Burry Factual 6 Apr 2010 Burry exited his remaining credit default positions well before the government bailouts of the financial crisis. Michael Burry · Factual · 6 Apr 2010 Their own work or organisation
Unresolvable Michael Burry Factual 6 Apr 2010 During 2007, under pressure from investors, Michael Burry liquidated most of Scion's credit default swaps at a substantial profit. Michael Burry · Factual · 6 Apr 2010 Their own work or organisation
Not checkable Michael Burry Not checkable 6 Apr 2010 ultimately leaving themselves with only one policy tool — the epic and unfair taxpayer-financed bailouts. Michael Burry · Not checkable · 6 Apr 2010
Not checkable Michael Burry Not checkable 6 Apr 2010 As a nation, we cannot afford to live with Mr. Greenspan’s way of thinking. Michael Burry · Not checkable · 6 Apr 2010
Mostly true Michael Burry Factual 6 Apr 2010 Michael Burry used six counterparties for his credit default swaps to limit exposure to any one of them. Michael Burry · Factual · 6 Apr 2010 Their own work or organisation
Not checkable Michael Burry Not checkable 6 Apr 2010 It did not have to be this way. Michael Burry · Not checkable · 6 Apr 2010
Unresolvable Michael Burry Factual 6 Apr 2010 In 2005 and 2006 Michael Burry argued in letters to Scion Capital clients that the mortgage market would melt down in the second half of 2007, badly damaging the economy. Michael Burry · Factual · 6 Apr 2010 Their own work or organisation
Mostly true Michael Burry Factual 6 Apr 2010 By December 2005, subprime mortgages issued six months earlier were already showing atypically high delinquency rates. Michael Burry · Factual · 6 Apr 2010 Economics and markets
Not checkable Michael Burry Not checkable 6 Apr 2010 Mr. Greenspan should use his substantial intellect and unsurpassed knowledge of government to ascertain and explain exactly how he and… Michael Burry · Not checkable · 6 Apr 2010
Not checkable Michael Burry Not checkable 6 Apr 2010 Increasingly, lenders concerned themselves more with the quantity of mortgages they sold than with their quality. Michael Burry · Not checkable · 6 Apr 2010
Not checkable Michael Burry Not checkable 6 Apr 2010 By mid-2005, I had so much confidence in my analysis that I staked my reputation on it. Michael Burry · Not checkable · 6 Apr 2010
Not checkable Michael Burry Not checkable 6 Apr 2010 But at the time almost no one else thought these trades would work out in my favor. Michael Burry · Not checkable · 6 Apr 2010
Not checkable Michael Burry Not checkable 6 Apr 2010 I believed that the collapse of the subprime mortgage market would ultimately lead to huge failures among the largest financial… Michael Burry · Not checkable · 6 Apr 2010
Not checkable Michael Burry Not checkable 4 Mar 2010 And yes, I am talking about March 2001, not March 2000. Michael Burry · Not checkable · 4 Mar 2010
Not checkable Michael Burry Not checkable 4 Mar 2010 Many stocks remain overvalued, and speculative excess – both on the upside and on the downside – is embedded in the frenzy around stocks of… Michael Burry · Not checkable · 4 Mar 2010
Not checkable Michael Burry Not checkable 4 Mar 2010 The preference, always, would be to buy a long-term franchise at a substantial discount from growing intrinsic value. Michael Burry · Not checkable · 4 Mar 2010
Not checkable Michael Burry Not checkable 4 Mar 2010 these stocks, having largely missed out on the speculative ride up, have nevertheless frequently been pushed down to absurd levels owing to… Michael Burry · Not checkable · 4 Mar 2010
Not checkable Michael Burry Not checkable 4 Mar 2010 In essence, the stock market represents three separate categories of business. Michael Burry · Not checkable · 4 Mar 2010
Not checkable Michael Burry Not checkable 4 Mar 2010 They are, adjusted for inflation, those with shrinking intrinsic value, those with approximately stable intrinsic value, and those with… Michael Burry · Not checkable · 4 Mar 2010
Not checkable Michael Burry Not checkable 4 Mar 2010 The bulk of the opportunities remain in undervalued, smaller, more illiquid situations that often represent average or slightly… Michael Burry · Not checkable · 4 Mar 2010
Not checkable Michael Burry Not checkable 4 Mar 2010 I will not label this Fund a “small cap” fund, for this may not be where the best opportunities are next month or next year. Michael Burry · Not checkable · 4 Mar 2010
Not checkable Michael Burry Not checkable 4 Mar 2010 Hence, the world’s best companies largely remain overpriced in the marketplace. Michael Burry · Not checkable · 4 Mar 2010
Not checkable Michael Burry Not checkable 4 Mar 2010 it is my feeling that the revisions have not been severe enough, the expectations not yet realistic enough. Michael Burry · Not checkable · 4 Mar 2010
Not checkable Michael Burry Not checkable 4 Mar 2010 As for the future, I can only say the Fund will always be biased to where the value is. Michael Burry · Not checkable · 4 Mar 2010
Not checkable Michael Burry Not checkable 4 Mar 2010 When I stand on my special-issue “Intelligent Investor” ladder and peer out over the frenzied crowd, I see very few others doing the same. Michael Burry · Not checkable · 4 Mar 2010
Not checkable Michael Burry Not checkable 4 Mar 2010 If recent trends continue, it would not be surprising to find the stocks of several larger capitalization stocks with significant long-term… Michael Burry · Not checkable · 4 Mar 2010
Not checkable Michael Burry Not checkable 4 Mar 2010 the valuations placed on these securities have implied overly rosy scenarios prone to popular revision in times of more realistic… Michael Burry · Not checkable · 4 Mar 2010
Unresolvable GiveWell Factual 7 Jan 2010 GiveWell's reviews of other organizations tend to focus on the end product and stay agnostic on those organizations' progress and how they can improve. GiveWell · Factual · 7 Jan 2010 Their own work or organisation
Not checkable GiveWell Not checkable 7 Jan 2010 Is GiveWell’s research process “robust,” i.e., can it be continued & maintained without relying on the co-Founders? GiveWell · Not checkable · 7 Jan 2010
Mostly true GiveWell Factual 7 Jan 2010 GiveWell last laid out a business plan in November 2008. GiveWell · Factual · 7 Jan 2010 Their own work or organisation
Not checkable GiveWell Not checkable 7 Jan 2010 Our current top priority is assessing the state of GiveWell: what we’ve accomplished, where we stand, and where we should focus our limited… GiveWell · Not checkable · 7 Jan 2010
Not checkable GiveWell Not checkable 7 Jan 2010 Our self-review won’t be entirely comparable to the reviews we perform of other organizations. GiveWell · Not checkable · 7 Jan 2010
Not checkable GiveWell Not checkable 7 Jan 2010 When evaluating ourselves, it is essential that we examine “intermediate indicators” as well as our ultimate impact, and think critically… GiveWell · Not checkable · 7 Jan 2010
Not checkable GiveWell Not checkable 7 Jan 2010 The ultimate goal is to have significant impact on the flow of donations, moving toward a world in which donors reward charities for… GiveWell · Not checkable · 7 Jan 2010
Not checkable GiveWell Not checkable 7 Jan 2010 The major questions about GiveWell, as I see them, are as follows. GiveWell · Not checkable · 7 Jan 2010
Not checkable GiveWell Not checkable 7 Jan 2010 GiveWell’s mission is to find outstanding charities and publish the full details of our analysis to help donors decide where to give. GiveWell · Not checkable · 7 Jan 2010
Not checkable GiveWell Not checkable 7 Jan 2010 Does GiveWell provide quality research that highlights truly outstanding charities in the areas it has covered? GiveWell · Not checkable · 7 Jan 2010
Resolved true GiveWell Promise 7 Jan 2010 GiveWell will examine itself critically over the coming weeks and share its self-review in near real time on its blog. GiveWell · Promise · 7 Jan 2010 Their own work or organisation
Resolved true GiveWell Promise 7 Jan 2010 GiveWell intends to discuss, for each of its self-review questions, its progress since November 2008, where it stands today relative to success, and what it can do to improve. GiveWell · Promise · 7 Jan 2010 Their own work or organisation
Not checkable Warren Buffett Not checkable 2010 Too often, a vast collection of possessions ends up possessing its owner. Warren Buffett · Not checkable · 2010
Not checkable Bill Gates Not checkable 2010 But my dream here is that, if you can make it economic, and meet the CO2 constraints Bill Gates · Not checkable · 2010
Not checkable Yann LeCun Not checkable 2010 Implementing ConvNets in software is best achieved using the modular, object-oriented approach suggested in [2]. Yann LeCun · Not checkable · 2010
Not checkable Warren Buffett Not checkable 2010 In contrast, my family and I will give up nothing we need or want by fulfilling this 99% pledge. Warren Buffett · Not checkable · 2010
Not checkable Warren Buffett Not checkable 2010 My luck was accentuated by my living in a market system that sometimes produces distorted results, though overall it serves our country… Warren Buffett · Not checkable · 2010
Not checkable Yann LeCun Not checkable 2010 It is clear that abs and normalization are cruciala for achieving good performance. Yann LeCun · Not checkable · 2010
Not researched Yann LeCun Factual 2010 To the authors' knowledge, 0.53% is the lowest error rate reported on the original MNIST dataset without distortions or preprocessing; the best previously reported error rate was 0.60%. Yann LeCun · Factual · 2010 AI capabilities
Not checkable Yann LeCun Not checkable 2010 We describe new unsupervised learning algorithms, and new non-linear stages that allow ConvNets to be trained with very few labeled samples. Yann LeCun · Not checkable · 2010
Not checkable Warren Buffett Not checkable 2010 My wealth has come from a combination of living in America, some lucky genes, and compound interest. Warren Buffett · Not checkable · 2010
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Michael Burry

Open its page

Factual Their own work or organisation

“Our swaps covered many of the firms that failed or nearly failed, including the insurer American International Group and the mortgage lenders Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.”

Michael Burry, op-ed author 6 April 2010 Michael Burry Saw the Financial Crisis Coming. Why didn't the Fed? (NYT op-ed) (Lawrence University blog)

Scion's credit default swaps covered AIG, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, among other firms that failed or nearly failed.

Unresolvable The public record could not settle it.

What would count as true or false

True: Scion's records or reliable accounts show that it held credit default swaps referencing AIG, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, as well as other firms that failed or nearly failed. Mostly true: CDS on two of the three named firms plus other failed or near-failed firms, or the swaps on one named firm were held by an affiliated vehicle rather than Scion itself. Mixed: CDS on only one of the three named firms, plus others. Mostly false: Scion held CDS on failed or troubled financial firms, but on none of the three named. False: Scion held no single-name CDS on financial firms of this kind.

Evidence

  1. 서브프라임 CDS 공매도의 안전성 문답 — Michael Burry valuebeast.co.kr · 1 November 2006
    “The mortgage shorts are spread across BBB-, BBB, and A ratings, while a separate set of single-name CDS, $4.27 billion notional, is concentrated in financial and mortgage companies.”
  2. Scion-Capital-Letters.pdf Scribd (upload of Scion Capital investor letters) · 7 November 2006 Own record
    “notional value, largely focused on financial companies. A number of these companies are”
  3. Betting on the Blind Side Vanity Fair · 1 April 2010
    “In a few weeks Mike Burry bought several hundred million dollars in credit-default swaps from half a dozen banks, in chunks of $5 million.”
  4. Michael Burry's Testimony Before The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission ValueWalk · 29 March 2011 Own record
    “So, this does not have our Deutsche Bank trades on it; because, I sold them to Gregg Lipmann in late ’05.”
  5. Scion-Capital-Letters.pdf Scribd (repost of Scion Capital investor letters) · 7 November 2006 Own record
    “These credit protection contracts cover $4.27 billion in notional value, largely focused on financial companies. A number of these companies are engaged in the mortgage business”
  6. Betting on the Blind Side Vanity Fair · 1 April 2010
    “In 2004 he began to buy insurance on companies he thought might suffer in a real-estate downturn: mortgage lenders, mortgage insurers, and so on.”
  7. Betting on the Blind Side Vanity Fair · 1 April 2010
    “he’d been forced to fire half his small staff, and dump billions of dollars’ worth of bets he had made against the companies most closely associated with the subprime-mortgage market.”
  8. Michael Burry's Testimony Before The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission ValueWalk · 29 March 2011 Own record
    “So do you recall if you had any CDS with Goldman in the third quarter of ’08 when AIG goes down?”
  9. Transcript of Michael Burry's talk, "Missteps to Mayhem: Inside the Doomsday Machine with the Outsider who Predicted and Profited from America's Financial Armageddon" Vanderbilt University News · 13 April 2011 Own record
    “about $6.6 billion notional in corporate credits, including AIG, Countrywide, Washington Mutual, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac.”
  10. Betting on the Blind Side Vanity Fair · 1 March 2010
    “He was already in the market for corporate credit-default swaps. In 2004 he began to buy insurance on companies he thought might suffer in a real-estate downturn: mortgage lenders, mortgage insurers, and so on.”
  11. Transcript of Michael Burry's talk, "Missteps to Mayhem: Inside the Doomsday Machine with the Outsider who Predicted and Profited from America's Financial Armageddon" Vanderbilt University News · 13 April 2011 Own record
    “I instead liquidated billions of our corporate credit default swap short positions in something of a fire sale.”
  12. Transcript of Michael Burry's talk, "Missteps to Mayhem: Inside the Doomsday Machine with the Outsider who Predicted and Profited from America's Financial Armageddon" Vanderbilt University News · 13 April 2011 Own record
    “he orchestrated the once unthinkable government takeovers of AIG, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the bailouts of Wall Street.”

Reasoning

Scion's investor letters (E5, E2) and an account of a 2006 document (E1) show single-name CDS of $4.27 billion notional, concentrated in financial and mortgage companies. Lewis's excerpt (E6, E10) independently describes swaps on mortgage lenders and mortgage insurers. None of these names AIG, Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac as reference entities. The only source that names those three firms is Burry's own 2011 talk (E9), an ordinary statement by the subject, so the specific claim cannot be confirmed.

Cite this claim

Michael Burry, “Scion's credit default swaps covered AIG, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, among other firms that failed or nearly failed.” (said 6 April 2010). Verdict: unresolvable. Reliability API, claim c_2da123733afc, method 0.1.0+c876030c. https://epistacklabs.com/claims/c_2da123733afc

Verdicts are made automatically; how verdicts and scores are made. The same data is on Hugging Face under CC BY 4.0.