The mental image of a triangular light bulb would intuitively appear to result from imposing "triangular" on the "light bulb" concept.

Judge as of 2007. The claim is hedged ('would intuitively appear') and is about how the image seems from introspection, not about how it is actually formed. True: cognitive science or conceptual-combination research (for example on modifier-noun combination and prototype theory) agrees that people's intuitive or introspective sense is that such an image comes from applying the modifier 'triangular' to the 'light bulb' concept. Mostly true: the literature supports this intuitive impression but shows the mechanism differs in a detail the claim did not depend on. Mixed: the research is divided on whether this is the intuitive impression. Mostly false: the research shows that the intuitive impression is generally something else, though a modifier-imposition account has some basis. False: evidence shows that people do not intuitively experience such images as arising from applying a modifier to a concept.

Set before the research began.

1. E1 Conceptual combination City, University of London (James Hampton; chapter in Lamberts & Shanks, Knowledge, Concepts and Categories, UCL Press) · 1996

   “One can suppose (although empirical evidence might be needed to confirm this - see Hampton 1996a) that for most people the category of red apples is simply the overlap of the categories of red things and of apples.”

2. E2 Conceptual combination City, University of London (James Hampton; chapter in Lamberts & Shanks, Knowledge, Concepts and Categories, UCL Press) · 1996

   “A second type of combination involves an adjective plus noun, or a noun plus noun combination where the first word is used to modify the second.”

3. E3 Conceptual combination City, University of London (James Hampton; chapter in Lamberts & Shanks, Knowledge, Concepts and Categories, UCL Press) · 1996

   “the categories of criminals and lawyers (although the intersective reading is also possible and produces an ambiguity in the meaning of the phrase).”

4. E4 Conceptual combination James Hampton, City University London (chapter to appear in Lamberts & Shanks, Knowledge, Concepts and Categories, UCL Press) · 1996

   “A second type of combination involves an adjective plus noun, or a noun plus noun combination where the first word is used to modify the second.”

5. E5 Conceptual combination James Hampton, City University London (chapter to appear in Lamberts & Shanks, Knowledge, Concepts and Categories, UCL Press) · 1996

   “One can suppose (although empirical evidence might be needed to confirm this - see Hampton 1996a) that for most people the category of red apples is simply the overlap of the categories of red things and of apples.”

6. E6 Conceptual combination James Hampton, City University London (chapter to appear in Lamberts & Shanks, Knowledge, Concepts and Categories, UCL Press) · 1996

   “The Selective Modification Model, and most other accounts of conceptual combination, take it as given that the complex concept forms a proper subset of the head noun concept.”

7. E7 Conceptual combination James Hampton, City University London (chapter to appear in Lamberts & Shanks, Knowledge, Concepts and Categories, UCL Press) · 1996

   “there are also cases such as "stone lion" or "chocolate rabbit" where the modifier has the effect of changing the reference of the head noun to objects with the shape and appearance of the original object”

8. E8 Inheritance of attributes in natural concept conjunctions - Memory & Cognition Springer (Memory & Cognition; author J.A. Hampton) · 1987

   “The results support a model in which a composite prototype for the conjunction is formed as the union of the constituent attribute sets, subject to two constraints”

9. E9 Relational vs. attributive interpretation of nominal compounds differentially engages angular gyrus and anterior temporal lobe - PMC PubMed Central (Brain and Language; Boylan, Trueswell, Thompson-Schill) · 23 February 2017

   “Under this account, the modifier noun (*zebra* in *zebra clam*, or *mountain* in *mountain lake*) is not incorporated into the head noun’s representation, but rather a relation”

10. E10 Relational vs. attributive interpretation of nominal compounds differentially engages angular gyrus and anterior temporal lobe - PMC PubMed Central (Brain and Language; Boylan, Trueswell, Thompson-Schill) · 23 February 2017

    “further study found evidence for a categorical distinction between a relation-linking process like that described under CARIN, and another process, by which a property or attribute of the modifier is “transferred” to the head noun (attributive combination).”

The evidence describes models in which modifier attributes are transferred to or combined with the head concept (E8, E10), alongside a relation-linking account (E9, E10). None of the items addresses what people's intuitive or introspective impression of such images is, so the evidence does not settle the claim under the criteria.