Buffett said Berkshire tried to time its sales of Dow Chemical stock once it rose above the conversion price, selling more aggressively as the price rose, because it did not want to own the roughly 72 million common shares.

Judge against Berkshire's disclosures about its Dow Chemical convertible preferred holding (2011–2016). True: Berkshire's records or credible reporting show that Berkshire sold Dow common stock (or managed its exposure) as the price rose above the conversion price, so as not to end up holding the roughly 72 million common shares received on conversion, and that it sold more heavily as the price rose. Mostly true: the timing strategy is confirmed, but the share count or a detail is slightly off. Mixed: Berkshire did sell Dow shares around the conversion, but the evidence does not support the claim that it timed the sales to the conversion price. Mostly false: Berkshire held most of the converted shares and made only minor sales. False: Berkshire made no such sales, or kept all the shares.

Set before the research began.

1. E1 2016 Annual Report Berkshire Hathaway Inc. · 25 February 2017 Own record

   “In December 2016, Dow exercised its option to convert the Dow Preferred into 72.6 million shares of common stock. As of December 31, 2016, all shares of common stock received upon the conversion had been sold.”

Berkshire's 2016 Annual Report [E1] says Dow converted the preferred into 72.6 million common shares in December 2016, and that all of those shares had been sold by December 31, 2016. That confirms Berkshire got out of the converted shares, and the share count roughly matches the claim. The report gives no conversion price, no sale dates and no pattern of selling more as the price rose, so the evidence cannot confirm the timing strategy. Under the criteria, that fits "mixed": the sales are shown, but the timing to the conversion price is not.