In the 2008 bank bailouts, mainly bondholders rather than equity holders were bailed out.

Treat the claim as being about the 2008–09 financial-crisis bank rescues (TARP, Fed and FDIC guarantees, and the rescues of Bear Stearns, AIG, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac). True: authoritative analyses (official reports such as the FCIC, SIGTARP or CBO reports, or peer-reviewed or central-bank research) show that the main beneficiaries of the rescues were creditors and bondholders, who were largely protected from losses, while equity holders were mostly diluted, wiped out or took heavy losses. Mostly true: bondholders and creditors were clearly the main beneficiaries overall, but there were notable exceptions where shareholders were also substantially protected (for example, some TARP capital injections that kept equity alive), without overturning the overall pattern. Mixed: the evidence shows creditors and shareholders benefited to roughly comparable degrees, or the answer differs a lot from one rescue to another with no main pattern. Mostly false: bondholders benefited, but the evidence shows equity holders were the main or equal beneficiaries in most of the major rescues, so 'mainly bondholders' overstates it. False: the evidence shows bondholders were generally not protected (they took large losses) and the bailouts mainly benefited shareholders.

Set before the research began.

1. E1 Time to buy or just buying time? The market reaction to bank rescue packages Bank for International Settlements (BIS Working Paper No 288, Michael R King) · September 2009

   “Overall, the rescue efforts undertaken between October 2008 and January 2009 benefited creditors at the expense of shareholders.”

2. E2 Time to buy or just buying time? The market reaction to bank rescue packages Bank for International Settlements (BIS Working Paper No 288, Michael R King) · September 2009

   “In contrast to the European experience, the US rescue packages were well received by both creditors and shareholders.”

3. E3 Paulson's Gift National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER Working Paper 15458, Pietro Veronesi and Luigi Zingales) · October 2009

   “If we adjust the individual stock movement for the market movement by using the actual beta, we learn that overall banks’ shareholders do not benefit from the plan (-$2.8bn).”

4. E4 The New Bagehot Project: Resolution and Restructuring - Fannie & Freddie, The Rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac – Module A: The Conservatorships Yale University, The New Bagehot Project

   “Given Treasury’s funding commitment to guarantee GSE solvency (up to the stated limits), the GSE bondholders were protected (Jester et al. 2018, 8–9).”

A BIS working paper (E1) concludes that the rescues from October 2008 to January 2009 benefited creditors at the expense of shareholders. Veronesi and Zingales (E3) find that, once market movements are adjusted for, bank shareholders did not benefit overall from the Paulson plan. A Yale case study (E4) says bondholders of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were protected under Treasury's funding commitment. However, the same BIS paper (E2) says the US packages were well received by shareholders as well as creditors. That is a notable exception, but it does not overturn the broader pattern of creditors being the main beneficiaries.