Apple built a protocol for connecting accessories to the iPhone that is not encrypted (plain text).

True if credible technical evidence shows that, as of January 2025, Apple had built a protocol used to connect accessories or devices (such as watches or headphones) with the iPhone, and that this protocol sends its data unencrypted, in plain text. Mostly true if such an Apple protocol does send some important content unencrypted, but a minor detail is off, for example only part of the payload is plain text or the protocol is used for a related device category. Mostly false if the protocol does use encryption but has some real but different weakness (for example weak authentication or metadata leakage) that the claim overstates as 'plain text'. False if the evidence shows that the Apple accessory protocols in question are encrypted and no Apple-built accessory protocol sends plain text.

Set before the research began.

1. E1 Apple devices are leaking sensitive data over BLE Inria PRIVATICS team (Guillaume Celosia and Mathieu Cunche) · 5 December 2019

   “We found that, even though some elements are encrypted, most of the data included in Continuity messages is sent in plain text.”

2. E2 Personal Data Leaks in Apple Bluetooth-Low-Energy ... HAL (Inria open archive); peer-reviewed in Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies 2020(1):26-46 · 4 December 2019

   “The Apple Continuity messages are never encrypted as a whole and their content is thus exposed in clear as part of advertisement packets.”

3. E3 Personal Data Leaks in Apple Bluetooth-Low-Energy ... HAL (Inria open archive); peer-reviewed in Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies 2020(1):26-46 · 4 December 2019

   “Pairing and Handoff messages include an encrypted payload (through AES-128 and 256 in ECB mode).”

4. E4 iOS Security - Apple Apple Inc. · September 2015 Own record

   “device using AES-128 in CTR mode. Ephemeral keys are exchanged using ECDH”

Independent research (E1, E2) found that Apple's BLE Continuity messages are never encrypted as a whole and that most of their content is sent in clear. The same paper (E3) says that Pairing and Handoff messages carry encrypted payloads. Apple's own documentation (E4) describes a device connection that uses AES-128 encryption in CTR mode with ephemeral keys exchanged using ECDH. So an Apple-built protocol does send important content in plain text, but only part of its payload, which matches the "mostly true" criterion.