GEICO's underwriting loss in 2000 produced a float cost of 6.1%.

True: Berkshire's 2000 annual report or Buffett's 2000 letter, and any later correction, gives GEICO's 2000 cost of float as 6.1%, caused by an underwriting loss. Mostly true: the reported figure is within 0.2 percentage points of 6.1%, or the 6.1% is right but is tied to a slightly different measure (for example, the combined insurance operations rather than GEICO alone, or the other way round). Mixed: GEICO did have an underwriting loss in 2000, but its float cost differs by 0.3–1 point. Mostly false: there was an underwriting loss, but the float cost differs by more than 1 point. False: GEICO had no underwriting loss in 2000, or the official figure is very different.

Set before the research began.

1. E1 berkshire hathaway inc. 2000 annual report Berkshire Hathaway Inc. Own record

   “In 2000, however, we had an underwriting loss of $1.6 billion, which gave us a float cost of 6%.”

2. E2 a70817e10-k.txt U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (filed by Berkshire Hathaway Inc.) Own record

   “The increases in severity were greater than anticipated resulting in larger than expected underwriting losses.”

Berkshire's 2000 annual report (E2) says the 2000 underwriting loss of $1.6 billion "gave us a float cost of 6%." That 6% is within 0.2 points of the claimed 6.1%. The quoted passage does not say whether the 6% figure covers GEICO alone or Berkshire's insurance operations more broadly. The 10-K (E3) refers to larger-than-expected underwriting losses, but the quote does not show a GEICO-only float cost. The resolution criteria count a close figure tied to the combined insurance operations, rather than GEICO alone, as mostly true.